DEBORAH B. HUNTER, Appellant
ERIC M. HUNTER, Appellee
Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Williamson County,
Texas Trial Court Case No. 15-2351-FC3
consists of Justices Jennings, Keyes, and Higley.
Deborah B. Hunter, proceeding pro se, attempts to appeal from
the trial court's final decree of divorce, signed on
October 20, 2015, by filing an "Order Requesting Motion
for Appeal" on December 6, 2017, which we construe as a
notice of restricted appeal. In response to this Court's
notice, Hunter also filed a pro se motion for an extension of
time to file a notice of restricted appeal. We dismiss this
appeal for want of jurisdiction and dismiss the motion as
a notice of appeal is due within thirty days after the final
judgment is signed. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1. The
deadline to file a notice of appeal is extended to ninety
days after the date the judgment is signed if, within thirty
days after the judgment is signed, any party timely files a
motion for new trial, motion to modify the judgment, motion
to reinstate, or, under certain circumstances, a request for
findings of fact and conclusions of law. See id.
26.1(a); Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(a), (g). The time to file a notice
of appeal may also be extended if, within fifteen days after
the deadline to file the notice of appeal, a party properly
files a motion for extension. See Tex. R. App. P.
Clerk of this Court categorized this appeal as a restricted
appeal. However, to qualify for a restricted appeal, an
appellant must establish that: (1) she filed the notice of
restricted appeal within six months after the judgment or
order appealed from was signed; (2) she was a party to the
underlying suit; (3) she did not timely file a post-judgment
motion or request for findings of fact and conclusions of
law, or notice of appeal; (4) she did not participate, either
in person or through counsel, in the hearing that resulted in
the judgment complained of; and (5) the trial court erred and
the error is apparent from the face of the record. See
Bassie v. Citibank (S. Dakota) N.A., 01-05-00943-CV,
2006 WL 181514, at *1 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Jan.
26, 2006, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (citing, inter
alia, Tex.R.App.P. 30, 26.1(c)).
Hunter's notice of appeal was filed on December 6, 2017,
more than one year and seven months past the
restricted-appeal deadline of April 20, 2016, six months
after the October 20, 2015 divorce decree. See Tex.
R. App. P. 26.1(c), 30. Thus, to the extent that Hunter
claims that this appeal qualifies as a restricted appeal, she
failed to comply with the first requirement because she did
not timely file a notice of restricted appeal within six
months of the October 20, 2015 final decree of divorce, or by
April 20, 2016. Without a timely filed notice of appeal, this
Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. See id.
March 8, 2018, the Clerk of this Court notified Hunter that
this appeal was subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction
unless she timely responded and showed how this Court had
jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), (c). On
March 12, 2018, Hunter filed a motion for an extension of
time, but she seeks an extension of time to file a notice of
restricted appeal from April 18, 2016, until January 31,
2018, because she contends that she was not at the divorce
hearing and did not receive notice of the October 20, 2015
divorce decree until August 1, 2017.
party claims, as Hunter did in her extension and notice of
appeal, that she did not receive notice or acquire actual
knowledge that a judgment was signed within 20 days of the
signing, the date the filing period discussed above commences
can be changed from the date the judgment is signed to the
date the party first received notice or acquired actual
knowledge of the signing. See Tex. R. App. P.
4.2(a)(1); Tex.R.Civ.P. 306a(4). However, to invoke one of
these rules, the party must file a sworn motion, provide
notice to the other parties, and prove to the trial court the
date that notice was received or acquired. Tex.R.App.P.
4.2(b), (c); Tex.R.Civ.P. 306a(5); see In re Lynd
Co., 195 S.W.3d 682, 685 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding).
The filing periods may not, however, begin more than 90 days
after the date of signing; therefore, the party must have
received notice or acquired actual knowledge of the signing
within 90 days of the date the judgment or order is signed
for these rules to apply. See Lynd, 195 S.W.3d at
683, 685. The clerk's record does not indicate that any
sworn motion was filed by Hunter under Rule 306a in the trial
court within 90 days of the October 20, 2015 final decree of
divorce. Thus, Hunter's motion was inadequate to show how
this Court has jurisdiction over her untimely restricted
appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(c).
we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See
Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a); 43.2(f). We dismiss as moot
Hunter's motion for an extension of time.
 The Texas Supreme Court transferred
this appeal from the Third Court of Appeals to this Court
pursuant to its docket equalization powers. See Tex.