United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
CHRISTINE A. NOWAK, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff
brings this appeal for judicial review of the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), denying her claim for disability insurance benefits
and supplemental security income. After reviewing the Briefs
submitted by the Parties, as well as the evidence contained
in the administrative record, the Court finds that the
Commissioner's decision should be
REMANDED.
BACKGROUND
On
March 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed applications for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental
security income benefits (“SSI”), under Titles II
and XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”),
alleging an onset of disability date of September 30, 2009
[TR 251-58]. Plaintiff claimed disability because of
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, status post
fusion surgery, spondyoarthritis, Ehlers Danlos Syndome,
dengerative disc disease of the cervical and thoracic spine,
depression, and anxiety [TR 12-13]. Plaintiff was born on
November 12, 1977 and was thirty-one (31) years of age at the
alleged onset of her disability. She was thirty-eight (38)
years old on the date of the ALJ's decision (June 20,
2016) [TR 23, 251, 253]. Plaintiff was, at all times relevant
to this case, a “younger individual age 18-49.”
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(d). Plaintiff has a
high school education [TR 46] and past relevant work as a
waitress, a greenhouse worker, a sales representative, a
bartender, and an insurance clerk [TR 22, 298, 316-21, 373,
376, 379].
Plaintiff's
claims were initially denied [TR 151-57] and upon
reconsideration [TR 160-65]. Plaintiff requested an
administrative hearing [TR 166-69], which was held before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on May 12, 2016
[TR 40-82]. At hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from
Plaintiff and a vocational expert. Plaintiff was represented
by counsel at the hearing.
On June
20, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, denying
Plaintiff benefits [TR 7-31]. Applying the sequential,
five-step analysis, the ALJ first determined that Plaintiff
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
September 30, 2009, the alleged disability onset date [TR
12]. At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the
severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar
spine, status post fusion surgery; spondyoarthritis, Ehlers
Danlos Syndrome; degenerative disc disease of the cervical
and thoracic spine; depression; and anxiety [TR 12-13]. At
step three, the ALJ found that these impairments, singly or
in combination, did not satisfy the requirements for a
presumptive finding of disability under the Act [TR 13-14].
At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform
“less than the full range of light work” [TR
14-22]. Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff could lift and
carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently,
stand or walk six hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit six
hours in an eight-hour workday [TR 14]. The ALJ further found
that Plaintiff could never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds; limited to occasional balance, stoop, kneel,
crouch, crawl, and climb ramps or stairs; could not be
exposed to work hazards such as unprotected heights or
dangerous moving machinery; limited to understanding,
remembering and carrying out short, simple instructions; and
interact appropriately with co-workers and the general public
on an occasional basis [TR 14-15]. Continuing the step four
analysis, the ALJ then determined that Plaintiff was unable
to perform any of her past relevant work [TR 22]. At
step-five, based on Plaintiff's age, education, work
experience, RFC, and the testimony of a vocational expert,
the ALJ found there were jobs existing in significant numbers
in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform [TR
22-23]. Thus, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled
from September 30, 2009 until the date of the ALJ's
decision [TR 23].
Plaintiff
requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals
Council [TR 5-7]. The Appeals Council denied the request for
review on August 30, 2016, making the ALJ's decision the
Commissioner's final administrative decision [TR
1-4].[1]
On
October 31, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), appealing the final decision [Dkt. 1].
On February 10, 2017, the Administrative Record was received
from the Social Security Administration [Dkt. 10]. Plaintiff
filed her Brief on April 4, 2017 [Dkt. 19], and the
Commissioner filed her Brief in Support of the
Commissioner's Decision on June 5, 2017 [Dkt. 24].
Plaintiff filed her reply brief on June 15, 2017 [Dkt. 25].
LEGAL
STANDARDS
The
legal standard for determining disability under Titles II and
XVI of the Act is whether the claimant is unable to perform
substantial gainful activity for at least twelve months
because of a medically determinable impairment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A). “Substantial gainful
activity” is determined by a five-step sequential
evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
Sequential
Evaluation Process
Pursuant
to the statutory provisions governing disability
determinations, the Commissioner has promulgated regulations
that establish a five-step process to determine whether a
claimant suffers from a disability. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520. First, a claimant who is engaged in substantial
gainful employment at the time of his disability claim is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant
is not disabled if his alleged impairment is not severe,
without consideration of his residual functional capacity,
age, education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(c). Third, if the alleged impairment is severe, the
claimant is considered disabled if his impairment corresponds
to a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Fourth, a claimant
with a severe impairment that does not correspond to a listed
impairment is not considered to be disabled if he is capable
of performing his past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
Finally, a claimant who cannot return to his past work is not
disabled if he has the residual functional capacity to engage
in work available in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(f). Under the first four steps of the analysis, the
burden lies with the claimant to prove disability and at the
last step the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Leggett
v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995). If at any
step the Commissioner finds that the claimant is or is not
disabled, the inquiry terminates. Id.
Substantial
Evidence
In an
appeal under § 405(g), judicial review of the
Commissioner's decision to deny benefits is limited to
determining whether there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the Commissioner's factual findings and
whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards
in evaluating the evidence. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38
F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 392 (5th
Cir. 1985); Jones v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 616, 620 (5th
Cir. 1983). This Court cannot reweigh the evidence or
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 434 ...