Court of Appeals of Texas, Thirteenth District, Corpus Christi-Edinburg
CAMERON COUNTY AND LOS FRESNOS CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellants,
VALLEY SANDIA, LTD. CO., A TEXAS LIMITED LIABILITY CO., Appellee.
appeal from the 404th District Court of Cameron County,
Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Contreras and Hinojosa
ROGELIO VALDEZ Chief Justice
Cameron County and Los Fresnos Consolidated Independent
School District (collectively the "County") appeal
the trial court's order releasing a tax lien on property
belonging to appellee Valley Sandia, Ltd. Co. ("Valley
Sandia"). By one multifarious issue, the County contends
that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing an
order in favor of Valley Sandia. We affirm.
County filed suit against Valley Sandia for payment of
delinquent taxes on four tracts of land, which included Lots
1-10, Block 97. The trial court granted a default judgment in
favor of the County on June 12, 2014; however, by agreed
order, the default judgment was overturned, declared void,
and a new trial was granted. The County's cause of action
regarding two other tracts of land was dismissed. The only
claim for delinquent taxes currently pending is regarding
Lots 1-10, Block 97.
3, 2016, Valley Sandia filed an emergency motion to sell
property and release the lien on Lots 1-10. The trial court
held a hearing on Valley Sandia's motion, and it granted
the motion on June 9, 2016. This appeal followed.
Nature of the Order
preliminary matter, the County claims that the trial
court's order is a "mandatory injunction."
Valley Sandia argues that the order is either a writ of
mandamus or an order issued pursuant to the trial court's
A. Applicable Law
injunctions are either prohibitive or mandatory. Tri-Star
Petroleum Co. v. Tipperary Corp., 101 S.W.3d 583, 592
(Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, pet. denied). While "a
prohibitive injunction forbids conduct, . . . a mandatory
injunction requires it." Id. (citing
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 24 S.W.3d
570, 576 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) ("A mandatory
injunction requires conduct from a party, whereas a
prohibitive injunction forbids conduct.")).
injunctions preserve the status quo pending trial on the
merits. Elizondo v. Williams, 643 S.W.2d 765, 767
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ). Status quo is defined
as "the last, actual, peaceable, non[-]contested status
which preceded the pending controversy." Transport
Co. of Tex. v. Robertson Transports, Inc., 261 S.W.2d
549, 553-54 (Tex. 1953) (internal quotations omitted).
Generally, the preservation of the [status] quo can be
accomplished by an injunction prohibitory in form, but it
sometimes happens that the status quo is a condition not of
rest, but of action, and the condition of rest is exactly
what will inflict the irreparable injury on complainant. In
such a case, courts of equity issue mandatory writs before
the case is heard on its merits. This character of cases has
been repeatedly held to constitute an exception to the
general rule that temporary injunction may not be resorted to
to obtain all relief sought in the main action; such
temporary injunction may be mandatory in character.
Rhodia, Inc. v. Harris Cty., 470 S.W.2d 415, 419-20
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, no writ). A ruling
on temporary injunctive relief may not be used to obtain an
advance ruling on the merits. Tri-St ...