United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
P. ELLISON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Freddie Lee Wallace, a state inmate proceeding pro
se, filed this section 2254 habeas petition challenging
his 2006 conviction and life sentence for aggravated sexual
assault. Respondent Lorie Davis filed a motion for summary
judgment based on expiration of limitations (Docket Entry No.
16), to which petitioner filed a response (Docket Entry No.
considered the motion for summary judgment, the response, the
record, the summary judgment evidence, and the applicable
law, the Court GRANTS summary judgment and
DISMISSES this lawsuit as barred by
BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS
was convicted of aggravated sexual assault in Brazos County,
Texas and sentenced to life imprisonment in July 2006. The
conviction was affirmed on appeal, and discretionary review
was refused in February 2010. Wallace v. State, 2009
WL 2397319 (Tex. App. - Waco 2009, pet. ref d).
Petitioner's governing applications for state habeas
relief were denied in March and July 2012.
instant federal habeas petition was filed no earlier than
October 10, 2017. Petitioner claims that his conviction is
void and enforceable, and that he was compelled to testify
against himself after pleading guilty. Respondent contends
that this petition is untimely and barred by limitations.
Petitioner counters that limitations does not bar habeas
challenges to void criminal convictions.
petition is governed by provisions of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Under AEDPA,
federal habeas corpus petitions are subject to a one-year
limitations period found in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which
provides as follows:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be
counted toward ...