United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
SALIM I. SINDHI, Plaintiff,
KUNAL R. RAINA, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
A. FITZWATER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the court's entry of a final judgment in this case,
defendant Kunal R. Raina (“Raina”) appealed the
judgment to the Fifth Circuit and filed a lawsuit in India,
alleging, inter alia, that plaintiff Salim I.
Sindhi's (“Sindhi's”) instant suit
(hereafter referred to as “the Sindhi I
suit”) was frivolous. Sindhi now moves for issuance of
a permanent injunction enjoining the prosecution of the India
lawsuit, and Raina moves for a new trial under Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(b) in the Sindhi I suit. For the reasons that
follow, the court grants in part and denies in part
Sindhi's motion for a permanent injunction, and it denies
Raina's motion for a new trial.
this case is the subject of a prior memorandum and order,
Sindhi v. Raina, 2017 WL 4167511 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
20, 2017) (Fitzwater, J.) (“Sindhi I”),
the court will recount only the background facts and
procedural history that are pertinent to this decision.
filed the Sindhi I suit against Raina, alleging
claims for copyright infringement, under 17 U.S.C.
§§ 501-505, and for violating the Texas Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§§ 134A.002-005 (West Supp. 2016). After Raina
twice failed to comply with orders of this court, the court
struck Raina's responsive pleadings, including his motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, on the basis
that he had “repeatedly failed to comply with orders of
this court after having been advised of the consequences of
such failure.” Nov. 8, 2016 Order at 1. The court also
entered an interlocutory default judgment against Raina.
Shortly thereafter, the court entered an interlocutory
permanent injunction against Raina (it was interlocutory
rather than final because it did not address all the relief
that Sindhi sought).
Sindhi I the court denied Raina's motion to
overturn the interlocutory default judgment and granted
Sindhi's motion for an order to show cause. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the court entered a final judgment and
permanent injunction. Raina has appealed the judgment, and
the appeal is currently pending in the Fifth Circuit.
after filing the appeal of Sindhi I, Raina filed
suit against Sindhi in India, alleging, inter alia,
that the Sindhi I suit was frivolous and that
Sindhi's correspondence with third parties regarding the
court's permanent injunction was defamatory. Sindhi now
moves for a permanent injunction enjoining Raina's India
suit. Raina opposes the motion and moves under Rule 60(b) for
a new trial in the Sindhi I suit.
court turns first to Sindhi's motion for an antisuit
well-settled that “federal courts have the power to
enjoin persons subject to their jurisdiction from prosecuting
foreign suits.” Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp.,
76 F.3d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1996). “In assessing whether
an injunction is necessary, [the court] weigh[s] the need to
prevent vexatious or oppressive litigation and to protect the
court's jurisdiction against the need to defer to
principles of international comity.” Karaha Bodas
Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 366 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[A]ntisuit injunctions have
been granted when foreign litigation would (1) frustrate a
policy of the forum issuing the injunction; (2) be vexatious
or oppressive; (3) threaten the issuing court's in rem or
quasi in rem jurisdiction; or (4) prejudice other equitable
considerations.” Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627 (citing
In re Unterweser Reederei, Gmbh, 428 F.2d 888, 896
(5th Cir. 1970), on reh'g en banc sub nom. In re
Complaint of Unterweser Reederei, GmbH, 446 F.2d 907
(5th Cir. 1971), vacated sub nom. M/S Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)). “[N]otions of
comity do not wholly dominate [the Fifth Circuit's]
analysis to the exclusion of these other concerns.”
Karaha Bodas Co., 335 F.3d at 366. This court is not
required “to genuflect before a vague and omnipotent
notion of comity every time that it must decide whether to
enjoin a foreign action.” Kaepa, Inc., 76 F.3d
maintains that the India suit is duplicative because
Raina's defamation claim in that lawsuit is a compulsory
counterclaim that he was required to bring in the Sindhi
I suit. Raina responds that India suit is not oppressive
because Sindhi chose to start his business in India and has
filed multiple lawsuits in India.
analyzing whether foreign litigation is vexatious or
oppressive, the court considers “(1) inequitable
hardship resulting from the foreign suit; (2) the foreign
suit's ability to frustrate and delay the speedy and
efficient determination of the cause; and (3) the extent to
which the foreign suit is [duplicative] of the litigation in
the United States.” Karaha Bodas Co., 335 F.3d
at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court will
analyze the three factors in turn.
the first factor, “voluntary invocation of a foreign
forum [by a party] . . . would militate against a finding
that litigating a foreign action amounts to an inequitable
hardship [against that party].” Commercializadora
Portimex, S.A. de CV v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 373
F.Supp.2d 645, 649 (E.D. La. 2005) (citing Karaha Bodas
Co., 335 F.3d at 368). Here, Sindhi initiated in India
three separate legal proceedings of his own related to this
case. The court thus holds that the first factor weighs
against the issuance of a foreign antisuit injunction.
the second factor, the court finds this reasoning from