Appeal from the 164th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2017-64150
consists of Justices Higley, Brown, and Caughey.
Willis Floyd Wiley, proceeding pro se, attempts to appeal
from the trial court's order, signed on January 24, 2018,
by filing a notice of appeal on March 22, 2018. We dismiss
this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
a notice of appeal is due within thirty days after the final
judgment or appealable order is signed. See Tex. R.
App. P. 26.1. The deadline to file a notice of appeal is
extended to ninety days after the date the judgment is signed
if, within thirty days after the judgment is signed, any
party timely files a motion for new trial, motion to modify
the judgment, motion to reinstate, or, under certain
circumstances, a request for findings of fact and conclusions
of law. See id. 26.1(a); Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(a), (g).
The time to file a notice of appeal may also be extended if,
within fifteen days after the deadline to file the notice of
appeal, a party properly files a notice and an extension.
See Tex. R. App. P. 10.5(b), 26.3.
to the clerk's record, no post-judgment motion was filed
by Wiley after the trial court's order was signed on
January 24, 2018, which granted the appellee's Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 91a motion to dismiss. See Tex.
R. Civ. P. 91a.1. Thus, Wiley's notice of appeal was due
within thirty days of the January 24, 2018 order, or by
February 23, 2018, and even with the fifteen-day grace
period, the extended deadline was March 12, 2018.
See Tex. R. App. P. 4.1(a), 26.1. Wiley's notice
of appeal was filed on March 22, 2018, ten days after the
fifteen-day grace period ended. Wiley neither filed a motion
for an extension of time to file the notice of appeal, nor
can one be implied because the notice of appeal was untimely
filed beyond the fifteen-day grace period. See Tex.
R. App. P. 26.3(b); Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d
615, 617-18 (Tex. 1997).
March 29, 2018, the Clerk of this Court notified Wiley that
this appeal was subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction
unless he timely responded and showed how this Court had
jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), (c).
After this Court extended his deadline to file a response,
Wiley timely filed a response on April 23, 2018. Wiley
contends that his notice of appeal was timely because he is
actually appealing from the trial court's failure to
timely rule on his motion for summary judgment. Because Wiley
noticed his motion for a hearing on submission for February
23, 2018, he claims that he timely appealed within thirty
days after this hearing date passed with no ruling on his
ordinary cases, a trial court's failure to rule within a
reasonable time period may constitute an abuse of discretion
for which the remedy of a writ of mandamus is available.
See, e.g., In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 450
n.7 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing that mandamus
relief is available to remedy trial court's erroneous
refusal to enter judgment on mediated settlement agreement).
However, this Court generally has appellate jurisdiction only
over appeals from signed, final judgments or orders unless a
statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal. See Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 51.012,
51.014(a)(1)-(12) (West 2014) (listing appealable
interlocutory orders); see also Lehmann v. Har-Con
Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192-93 (Tex. 2001).
91a allows a party to move for early dismissal of a cause of
action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact,
and it requires the trial court to grant or deny such a
motion within forty-five days after the motion is filed.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1, a.3(c). Appellate courts
review Rule 91a dismissals under a de novo standard of
review, but we lack appellate jurisdiction over denials of
such motions. See Walker v. Owens, 492 S.W.3d 787,
789 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.); cf. S.
Cent. Houston Action v. Stewart, No. 14-15-00088-CV,
2015 WL 1508699, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar.
31, 2015, no pet.) (holding that appellate court has no
jurisdiction over denial of Rule 91a motion).
Wiley could have filed a mandamus petition to challenge the
trial court's refusal to rule on his motion for summary
judgment within a reasonable time period, he cannot appeal
such a refusal. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1; see,
e.g., In re Granite Shop, No. 02-08-00410-CV,
2009 WL 485696, at *3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 24, 2009,
orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (granting mandamus
relief to compel respondent to vacate order that earlier
judgment was final and to proceed to rule on relator's
partial summary judgment motion). Thus, the only signed and
appealable order is the January 24, 2018 order granting the
Rule 91a motion to dismiss for which Wiley's March 22,
2018 notice of appeal was untimely filed. Therefore,
Wiley's response was inadequate to show how this Court
has jurisdiction over his untimely appeal. See Tex.
R. App. P. 26.1, 42.3(c). Without a timely filed notice of
appeal, this Court can take no action other than to dismiss
this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R.
App. P. 25.1, 26.1; Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 617-18.
we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See