Court of Appeals of Texas, Seventh District, Amarillo
Appeal from the 100th District Court Childress County, Texas
Trial Court No. 10215, Honorable Stuart Messer, Presiding
CAMPBELL and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
T. Campbell, Justice.
private termination case, appellant R.F. appeals the trial
court's final order adjudicating his parentage and
terminating his parental rights to A.I.F., a child born of
his relationship with appellee B.F. We will overrule each of
appellant's issues and affirm the trial court's final
was born in June 2012. During final hearing testimony,
appellant agreed that he is the father of A.I.F., she is his
daughter, and he did not want his parental rights with A.I.F.
terminated. At the time of A.I.F.'s birth, according to
her mother's testimony, she and appellant were "in a
relationship" and living together. She added they ceased
living together two to three months after A.I.F.'s birth.
Appellant testified he and B.F. separated when B.F. learned
he had a daughter only six days younger than A.I.F.
October 2012, B.F. filed a petition to adjudicate parentage.
She alleged appellant was the father of A.I.F. but that the
man to whom she was then married was the child's presumed
father. After a hearing later that month, the trial court
rendered temporary orders which, among other things, named
appellant the father of A.I.F., granted him visitation, and
ordered that he make child support payments of $178 per
month. Appellant also was ordered to participate in a
hair-follicle drug test.
testified that appellant never paid child support and has not
financially supported A.I.F. Appellant testified that while
he did not pay child support, during periods of visitation he
provided diapers and "everything" A.I.F. needed.
Appellant also did not take the hair-follicle drug test and
the court therefore suspended his visitation in November
testified that in early January 2013 he was confined in the
county jail for a parole violation and while in custody was
served with an indictment charging him with forgery.
According to the final hearing evidence, during 2013 he was
out of jail most of the time between March 26 and September
24 but paid no child support. On October 9, 2013, appellant
was convicted of the forgery charge and sentenced to twenty
years' confinement in prison and a fine of $10, 000. He
remained continuously incarcerated to the time of final
testified he has learned advanced computer skills in prison
and is studying for certification in Braille translation. He
believes the skills he has learned will qualify him, on
release from prison, to earn enough income to pay child
support for all his children. He has three children in
addition to A.I.F. His parents bring his three other children
to the prison for visitation. B.F. is on appellant's
visitation list and he testified to a desire that she bring
A.I.F. to visit.
amended her petition in February 2015 to seek termination of
appellant's parental rights. She alleged three predicate
acts under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)and that
termination was in the best interest of A.I.F. Final hearing
was before the bench in December 2017. Appellant appeared
from prison by telephone. Following the hearing, the trial
court rendered a final order adjudicating appellant the
father of A.I.F. and terminating his parental rights to the
first issue, appellant argues that because A.I.F. has a
presumed father genetic testing was required before appellant
could be adjudicated the child's father. Without genetic
testing, the argument continues, appellant's parental
rights were not established and could not, therefore, have
sought adjudication of appellant's paternity in 2012. At
the final hearing, rather than contesting his paternity, or
otherwise arguing that procedurally he could not be
adjudicated the father of A.I.F. until he and the presumed
father were genetically tested, he agreed in testimony that
he is the child's father and that she is his daughter.
Only on appeal does appellant complain that the trial court
did not follow the proper statutory procedure to adjudicate
his parentage. Because his appellate complaint was not
presented to the trial court, it was waived. Tex.R.App.P.
33.1(a). Further, we believe under the doctrine of invited
error appellant could not now complain of the trial
court's adjudication of his parentage when at the final
hearing he claimed to be A.I.F.'s father and actively
resisted B.F.'s effort to terminate his parental rights.
See Naguib v. Naguib,137 S.W.3d 367, 375 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied) ("A party to a lawsuit
cannot ask something of a trial court and then complain on
appeal that the trial court committed error in granting that
party's request. This rule is grounded in even ...