Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin
THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-FM-14-002342, HONORABLE KARIN CRUMP, JUDGE PRESIDING
Chief Justice Rose, Justices Pemberton and Goodwin
Hall Lecuona appeals from a final divorce decree that ended
her marriage to Mark R. Lecuona. We will affirm the decree.
was the petitioner below,  and the sole ground for divorce on
which he relied, and which the district court subsequently
found, was the no-fault "insupportability"
ground. Shawn opposed the divorce on religious
grounds and urged that Mark's suit, and particularly the
no-fault "insupportability" standard on which he
relied, unconstitutionally infringed her protected interests
in what she viewed as an immutable "blood covenant"
among the couple and the Almighty. Shawn brings a version of
this argument forward on appeal as her first issue and chief
ground for reversal-she insists that the United States
Supreme Court's decision Obergefell v. Hodges,
decision striking down state prohibitions against same-sex
marriage as violative of a "right to marry [that] is a
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person"
and protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the federal constitution,  translates into a constitutional
restriction against Mark's unilateral invocation of
Texas's no-fault divorce law to end a marriage that she,
for professed religious reasons, desires to
continue. We cannot agree that Obergefell,
whose analysis is rooted in the Supreme Court's view of
personal liberty,  either directly or by implication
recognizes what would effectively be an affirmative
constitutional right of one spouse to compel an unwilling
other spouse to remain married, in derogation of both the
other spouse's liberty and state divorce
laws. In the very least, Shawn's theory
represents a significant and novel expansion of
Obergefell that is not properly undertaken by this
intermediate state appellate court. We accordingly overrule
Shawn's first issue.
from her arguments derived from Obergefell, Shawn
brings two additional issues, each of which challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the decree. In her
second issue, Shawn insists that Mark failed to prove up the
ground of insupportability. The record, including Mark's
testimony, belies that contention. Shawn's assertions to
the contrary ultimately implicate instead the district
court's judgments as to the credibility and weight of the
evidence presented. We overrule Shawn's second issue.
third issue is predicated on her first two, urging that the
district court lacked authority to divide the community
estate because it had no authority to grant the divorce in
the first place. This contention fails for the preceding
reasons. Alternatively, Shawn asserts that the district court
improperly characterized certain of her retirement accounts
as community property despite her having established their
separate character through clear and convincing
evidence. We review the district court's
division of property under an overarching abuse-of-discretion
standard. To establish an abuse of discretion
here, Shawn must demonstrate that she presented conclusive
evidence that the accounts were separate property and that
the mischaracterization materially impacted the district
court's division of the community estate.
"Evidence is conclusive only if reasonable people could
not differ in their conclusions." The evidence
fell short of conclusively establishing the separate-property
status of the retirement accounts-it included a property
inventory from Shawn herself in which she indicated that the
accounts in question were community assets. We overrule
Shawn's third issue.
affirm the district court's final divorce decree.
 We refer to the parties by their first
names because they share a surname.
See Tex. Fam. Code §
6.001 ("On the petition of either party to a marriage,
the court may grant a divorce without regard to fault if the
marriage has become insupportable because of discord or
conflict of personalities that destroys the legitimate ends
of the marital relationship and prevents any reasonable
expectation of reconciliation."). The parties had been
married since 1994, but Mark alleged, without dispute, that
the couple had been separated for approximately ...