Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court Dallas County,
Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-00289
Justices Lang-Miers, Fillmore, and Stoddart
receiving a notice of violation of the red light camera
ordinance, Russell J. Bowman filed suit in district court to
enjoin enforcement of the ordinance and for a declaration
that the ordinance and enabling statute are unconstitutional.
Alternatively, he alleged the City of Richardson failed to
comply with the enabling statute when it installed the red
light camera at issue. The City filed a partial plea to the
jurisdiction and both parties filed motions for summary
judgment. The trial court denied the City's partial plea
to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment and
granted Bowman's motion.
City appeals arguing (1) Bowman failed to exhaust
administrative remedies on the claim for failure to comply
with the enabling statute, (2) the City was not required to
comply with the provision of the enabling statute cited by
Bowman, and (3) the ordinance and enabling statute are
constitutional. We conclude Bowman was required to exhaust
his administrative remedies regarding compliance with the
enabling statute and that the ordinance and enabling statute
are constitutional. Accordingly, we vacate the denial of the
partial plea to the jurisdiction, reverse the trial
court's judgment, and render judgment dismissing
Bowman's claim based on non-compliance with the enabling
statute for want of jurisdiction and denying Bowman's
claim for a declaration that the ordinance and enabling
statute are unconstitutional.
2005, the City entered into a contract with Redflex Traffic
Systems, Inc. to install the red light camera system involved
in this case. In 2007, the Legislature enacted Chapter 707 of
the transportation code authorizing municipalities to adopt
red light camera systems. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann.
§§ 707.001-.019 (West 2011 & Supp. 2017).
Pursuant to this enabling statute, the City adopted a red
light camera ordinance on September 10, 2007. Richardson,
Tex., Code of Ordinances art. VII, §§ 22.185-.193
[hereinafter Ordinance]. For convenience, we refer to Chapter
707 and the Ordinance collectively as the Camera Laws. The
Camera Laws provide that an owner has the right to contest
the imposition of a civil penalty in an administrative
adjudicative hearing. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§
707.011(c)(10), .014; Ordinance §§ 22-187(c)(10),
22-189. The owner may appeal a finding of liability by the
hearing officer to the municipal court for trial de novo.
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 707.016; Ordinance §
November 12, 2012, a red light camera recorded Bowman's
vehicle entering an intersection when the traffic signal was
red. According to his summary judgment evidence, Bowman did
not know about the violation until December 1, 2014, when he
was notified of a registration hold on his vehicle for
failing to pay the civil penalty associated with the 2012
violation. Bowman contacted the City and received a notice of
the November 12, 2012 violation on December 4,
2014. The notice stated that, as owner of the
vehicle, Bowman was responsible for a civil penalty of $75
and a $25 fee for late payment.
response, on December 12, 2014, Bowman sent a letter to the
City requesting an administrative hearing as authorized by
section 707.015 of the transportation code. Bowman requested
that the hearing be before a jury and that the hearing
officer declare Chapter 707 unconstitutional on several
grounds. Bowman also requested the City produce several
documents about the red light camera system, including an
engineering study for the intersection at issue and reports
to a citizens advisory committee.
an administrative hearing was scheduled, Bowman filed this
suit for declaratory judgment and an injunction against
enforcement of the Ordinance. Bowman sought a declaration
that the Camera Laws and government code section 29.003(g)
are unconstitutional. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann.
§ 29.003(g) (West Supp. 2017). In the alternative,
Bowman alleged the City could not enforce the Ordinance
against him because the City failed to comply with
subsections 707.003(c) and (e), which require the City to
conduct an engineering study and present the study to a
citizens advisory committee before installing a red light
camera. We refer to the alternative claims as the Compliance
City filed a partial plea to the jurisdiction regarding the
Compliance Claims. It argued the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over those claims because Bowman failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies by raising the claims
with the hearing officer. In addition, both parties filed
motions for summary judgment. Without specifying the grounds
for its decision, the trial court denied the City's
partial plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary
judgment, granted Bowman's motion for summary judgment,
and rendered judgment that (1) Bowman is not liable for the
civil penalty, (2) the City notify the department of motor
vehicles to remove the registration hold on Bowman's
vehicle, and (3) Bowman recover attorney's fees from the
review the trial court's ruling on a plea to the
jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks &
Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we
determine if the pleader has alleged facts affirmatively
showing the court's jurisdiction. Id. We
construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiffs
and look to the pleader's intent. Id. When the
parties submit evidence regarding the jurisdictional
question, we consider the evidence under a summary judgment
type standard. See id. at 228.
review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Exxon Corp.
v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C., 331 S.W.3d 419, 422
(Tex. 2010). A party moving for traditional summary judgment
has the burden to prove that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein &
Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848
(Tex. 2009). "When reviewing a summary judgment, we take
as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we
indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in
the nonmovant's favor." Valence Operating Co. v.
Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).
both parties move for summary judgment, each party bears the
burden of establishing it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22
S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000). When the trial court grants one
motion and denies the other, we review the summary judgment
evidence presented by both parties and determine all
questions presented. S. Crushed Concrete, LLC v. City of
Houston, 398 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. 2013).
Plea to the Jurisdiction
first issue, the City argues Bowman failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies relating to the Compliance Claims
because the administrative hearing officer has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine Bowman's liability for the
civil penalty. The City contends that because Bowman did not
exhaust these administrative remedies, the trial court did
not have jurisdiction to consider Bowman's Compliance
Claims and should have granted the partial plea to the
jurisdiction. The City argues in its second issue that, if
the trial court had jurisdiction over the Compliance Claims,
the City was not required to comply with section 707.003
because the contract for the installation of the red light
camera system was entered into before the effective date of
Exclusive Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of
concepts of exclusive jurisdiction and the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies are closely related.
When the Legislature expressly or impliedly grants an
administrative agency sole authority to make an initial
determination in a matter, the agency has exclusive
jurisdiction over the matter. Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2016); Subaru of
Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212,
221 (Tex. 2002). "[I]f an agency has exclusive
jurisdiction, a party must exhaust all administrative
remedies before seeking judicial review of the agency's
action." Subaru of Am., 84 S.W.3d at 221. This
is commonly known as the
exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine. See
Marquez, 487 S.W.3d at 544. Until a complaining party
has exhausted administrative remedies, the trial court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss without
prejudice those claims within the agency's exclusive
jurisdiction. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tex. v.
Duenez, 201 S.W.3d 674, 675 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam);
Subaru of Am., 84 S.W.3d at 221. Only after
exhaustion has occurred may a plaintiff seek judicial review
of the administrative decision, and then he may do so
"only at the time and in the manner designated by
statute." Cash Am. Int'l, Inc. v. Bennett,
35 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Tex. 2000). An agency has exclusive
jurisdiction when a pervasive regulatory scheme indicates
that the Legislature "intended for the regulatory
process to be the exclusive means of remedying the problem to
which the regulation is addressed." In re Sw. Bell
Tel. Co., 235 S.W.3d 619, 624-25 (Tex. 2007) (orig.
proceeding); see also In re Entergy Corp., 142
S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) ("An
agency has exclusive jurisdiction when the Legislature has
granted that agency the sole authority to make an initial
determination in a dispute."). Exclusive jurisdiction is
a question of statutory interpretation. See Marquez,
487 S.W.3d at 544. Our primary goal in construing a statute
is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Tex.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex.
2012); TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340
S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). We defer to the plain meaning of
a statute as the best indication of the Legislature's
intent unless a different meaning is apparent from the
context of the statute or the plain meaning would yield
absurd results. Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407,
411 (Tex. 2011). Moreover, we determine legislative intent
from the entire act, not merely from isolated portions.
Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d at 454; TGS-NOPEC, 340
S.W.3d at 439. Therefore, we look to the operative statute to
determine whether it expressly or impliedly grants the
administrative agency sole authority to make an initial
determination of disputes within the agency's regulatory
expertise. See Marquez, 487 S.W.3d at 544; City
of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013).
these principles in mind, we turn to the language of the
statute. Chapter 707 of the Texas Transportation Code
authorizes local authorities to enact ordinances to impose
civil penalties on owners of vehicles photographed running a
red light by a red light camera. See Tex. Transp.
Code Ann. § 707.002; see also id. §
544.007(d) (West Supp. 2017) (requiring operator of motor
vehicle to stop when facing a steady red signal). The civil
penalty may not exceed $75 and a late payment penalty may not
exceed $25. Id. § 707.007.
707.003 authorizes a city to contract for the installation,
operation, administration, and enforcement of the traffic
signal enforcement system. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §
707.003. If the city contracts for the administration and
enforcement of the system, it may not agree to pay the
contractor a percentage of or a dollar amount from each civil
penalty collected. Id. § 707.003(b). Before
installing a system at an intersection approach, the city
must conduct a traffic engineering study of the intersection
and report the results to a citizens advisory committee.
Id. § 707.003(c)-(e). A city may not impose a
civil penalty on an owner of a motor vehicle if the city
fails to comply with subsection (b) or (c). Id.
§ 707.003(f). The city must install signs at the
intersection clearly indicating the presence of a
photographic monitoring system. Id. §
707.003(g). Section 707.003, however, "applies only to a
contract entered into on or after the effective date of [the]
Act." Act of May 27, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1149,
§ 9, 2007 Tex. Gen Laws 3924, 3931; see Ward v. ACS
State & Local Sols., Inc., 328 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.). The City contends section 707.003
does not apply in this case because it entered into a
contract with Redflex before the effective date of Chapter
707 requires that an ordinance adopted by a city provide that
the person subject to a civil penalty is entitled to a
hearing, provide the period in which the hearing must be
held, and provide for appointment of a hearing officer with
authority to administer oaths and issue orders compelling the
attendance of witnesses and the production of documents. Tex.
Transp. Code Ann. § 707.009. The ordinance must
designate the department or agency responsible for
enforcement and administration of the ordinance or provide
that the contractor is responsible for enforcement and
administration of the ordinance. Id.
notice of a violation of the ordinance must contain specific
information about the violation, including a copy of the
recorded image of the violation, the amount of the civil
penalty, and the time for paying or contesting the civil
penalty, and the notice must notify the owner of the vehicle
of the owner's right to contest the imposition of the
civil penalty at an administrative adjudication hearing.
Id. § 707.011. It must also state that the
civil penalty may be contested by submitting a written
request for an administrative adjudication hearing before the
707 establishes an administrative adjudication hearing
process for challenging liability for the civil penalty and
permits a de novo appeal to the appropriate municipal or
justice court after a finding of liability. Id.
§§ 707.014, 707.016. A person receiving notice of a
violation may contest the civil penalty by filing a written
request for an administrative hearing within thirty days
after the notice was mailed or received. Id.
§§ 707.014(a), 707.015. The hearing officer
designated by the city shall conduct the hearing, where
issues must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id. § 707.014(c), (d). The statute authorizes
the use of affidavits regarding the reliability of the
photographic traffic signal enforcement system. Id.
§ 707.014(e), (f). The hearing officer shall enter a
written finding of liability or no liability for the civil
penalty at the conclusion of the hearing. Id. §
707.014(g). An owner who fails to timely pay the civil
penalty or request an administrative hearing, or to appear
for the administrative hearing after one is timely requested,
admits liability for the full amount of the civil penalty and
waives the right to appeal. Id. § 707.012.
the administrative hearing, the owner may appeal a finding of
liability by trial de novo to the justice court of the county
where the local authority is located or to the municipal
court if the local authority is a city. Id. §
707.016(a), (e). The appeal must be filed before the
thirty-first day after the hearing officer's finding and
be accompanied by payment of costs of the court. Id.
§ 707.016(b). An appeal stays enforcement of the civil
penalty. Id. § 707.016(d). The owner
"shall file a notarized statement of personal financial
obligation to perfect the owner's appeal."
Id. A municipal court has "exclusive appellate
jurisdiction" within the city's territorial limits
of cases arising under Chapter 707. Tex. Gov't Code Ann.
§ 29.003(g). A justice court has original jurisdiction
of cases arising under Chapter 707 outside a
municipality's territorial limits. Id. §
27.031(a)(4) (West Supp. 2017).
707 further provides that if the owner is delinquent in
paying a civil penalty, the county assessor-collector or the
department of motor vehicles may refuse to register the
vehicle involved in the violation. Tex. Transp. Code Ann.
§ 707.017 (West Supp. 2017). However, the imposition of
a civil penalty under Chapter 707 is not a conviction and may
not be considered a conviction for any purpose, an arrest
warrant may not be issued for failure to pay a civil penalty,
and a civil penalty may not be recorded on the owner's
driving record. Id. §§ 707.018, .019. Nor
may the city provide information about a civil penalty to a
credit bureau. Id. § 707.003(h).
on its detailed structure and requirements and the express
creation of an administrative procedure to determine
liability, we conclude Chapter 707 creates a pervasive
regulatory scheme indicating the Legislature's intent
that claims arising out of the use of red light camera
systems would be resolved at the administrative level and
that the administrative hearing officer has the sole
authority to make an initial determination in a dispute
involving the use of the camera system. See In re Entergy
Corp., 142 S.W.3d at 321; In re Sw. Bell Tel.
Co., 235 S.W.3d at 624-25. Other courts that have
addressed the issue agree. See City of Willis v.
Garcia, 523 S.W.3d 729, 742 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2017,
pet. filed); Edwards v. City of Tomball, 343 S.W.3d
213, 221-22 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.);
see also Hunt v. City of Diboll, No. 12-17-00001-CV,
2017 WL 7663041, at *6-8 (Tex. App.-Tyler Nov. 8, 2017, pet.
filed) (reversing order granting plea to the jurisdiction
where city failed to publish red light camera ordinance
before adoption as required by city charter). Therefore, the
Legislature granted exclusive jurisdiction to the
administrative hearing officer to make an initial
determination of liability, and Bowman was required to
exhaust his administrative remedies on his Compliance Claims.
argues exhaustion is not required where the agency's
action is without authority or in violation of a statute,
relying on City of Sherman v. Public Utility Commission
of Texas, 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983). According to
Bowman, the City's attempt to impose a civil penalty on
him is without authority or in violation of statute because
the City did not conduct an engineering study and present it
to a citizens advisory committee before installing the red
light camera. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §
not agree that City of Sherman supports Bowman's
position. In City of Sherman, the supreme court
concluded the public utility commission did not have
jurisdiction over a municipally owned water utility because
the Public Utility Regulatory Act expressly excluded
municipal corporations from the definition of public utility.
See City of Sherman, 643 S.W.2d at 684. Here,
Chapter 707 does not exclude or limit the jurisdiction of the
administrative hearing officer when a city fails to conduct
an engineering study. Rather, it prohibits the city from
imposing a civil penalty if the city violates the
requirement. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 707.003(f)
("A local authority may not impose a civil penalty under
this chapter on the owner of a motor vehicle if the local
authority violates Subsection (b) or (c)."). This
statute does not deprive the hearing officer of jurisdiction.
Indeed, in making the determination of whether the owner is
liable for a civil penalty under Chapter 707, the hearing
officer must necessarily consider whether section 707.003
applies and whether "the local authority
[has] violate[d] Subsection (b) or (c)." Id.
§§ 707.003(f), .014(g) (authorizing hearing officer
to enter a finding of liability or no liability for the civil
Edwards and City of Willis rejected the
assertion that a city's alleged failure to conduct a
traffic engineering study excused the owner from exhausting
administrative remedies. One of the procedural complaints
raised in Edwards was that "Tomball did not
conduct the traffic study required by section
707.003(c)." Edwards, 343 S.W.3d at 219. The
court of appeals rejected the argument that failure to
conduct the study, as well as other procedural problems,
rendered the administrative hearing procedure void:
[Appellant] argues that the manner in which Tomball enforced
the Red Light Camera Ordinance against her does not fully
comply with all of the procedural requirements established by
Chapter 707 of the Transportation Code and the Tomball Red
Light Camera Ordinance. We hold these deficiencies do not
render those efforts void, but voidable. We further hold that
if appellant wished to contest imposition of the civil
penalty for violating Tomball's Red Light Camera
Ordinance based on these procedural deficiencies, she was
required to do so through the administrative procedure
established by Chapter 707 of the Texas Transportation Code
and the Red Light Camera Ordinance and if still dissatisfied,
she was required to appeal to Tomball Municipal Court for a
trial de novo.
Id. at 222 (citations omitted).
City of Willis, the owners asserted claims almost
identical to those of Bowman in this case, including the
claim that the city failed to conduct an engineering study as
required by section 707.003. See City of Willis, 523
S.W.3d at 732, 736. The court of appeals concluded:
[T]aking the allegations in Plaintiffs' pleading as true
and assuming without deciding that the City of Willis failed
to conduct a traffic engineering study as provided for in
section 707.003I [sic] before it installed the red light
cameras, we conclude that such irregularity does not allow a
party to completely circumvent or ignore the administrative
procedures in the City's Red Light Camera Ordinance.
Id. at 742. Specifically, the Beaumont Court of
Appeals concluded that even if the city failed to conduct the
required engineering study,
the failure to strictly comply with that provision of the
statute would, under the facts of this case, be insufficient
to trigger the ultra vires exception to the exhaustion
requirement because such allegations would be nothing more
than allegations that the officials have failed to
"fully comply" with regulatory requirements, which
would not make the actions of the official ultra vires.
Id. at 744.
agree with our sister courts on this point. The mere claim
that an administrative agency acted outside its authority
does not authorize litigation before administrative remedies
are exhausted, "nor does failure to perfectly comply
with all of the intricacies of the administrative process
necessarily constitute extra-jurisdictional action by an
agency." Appraisal Review Bd. of Harris Cty.
Appraisal Dist. v. O'Connor & Assocs., 267
S.W.3d 413, 419 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no
pet.). The alleged failure of the City to conduct a traffic
engineering study and present it to a citizens advisory
committee does not exempt Bowman from exhausting his
administrative remedies. See City of Willis, 523
S.W.3d at 744; Edwards, 343 S.W.3d at 222.
Bowman argues that the administrative procedures in Chapter
707 do not create exclusive jurisdiction because section
707.014(a) says an owner who desires to challenge the civil
penalty "may" contest the violation through an
administrative hearing. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann.
§ 707.014(a) ("A person who receives a notice of
violation under this chapter may contest the imposition of
the civil penalty specified in the notice of violation by
filing a written request for an administrative adjudication
hearing."). Bowman asserts that because the term
"may" is permissive, an owner wanting to contest
the civil penalty is not required to request an
administrative hearing, but may file suit in district court
to challenge the penalty.
words "shall" and "must" in a statute are
generally understood as mandatory terms. Helena Chem. Co.
v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex. 2001). Conversely,
the word "may" is generally understood as
indicating discretion or granting permission. Tex. Gov't
Code Ann. § 311.016(1) (West 2013). But these words must
be read in context. Id. Rather than focusing on the
word "may" in isolation, we consider the statute as
a whole. See Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d at 454;
Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d at 493.
707.014(a) states a person may contest the imposition of the
civil penalty, but it provides only one method of doing so:
"by filing a written request for an administrative
hearing." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 707.014(a). It
further mandates that the "request for a hearing
must be filed on or before the date specified in the
notice of violation," which may not be less than thirty
days after the notice was mailed. Id. (emphasis
added). In determining the Legislature's intent, we must
consider the statutory consequence for failing to contest the
civil penalty by requesting an administrative hearing within
the time allowed. See Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d at 495.
Section 707.012 provides that a person who fails to pay the
civil penalty or "to contest liability for the penalty
in a timely manner or who requests an administrative hearing
. . . and fails to appear at that hearing" admits
liability for the full amount of the civil penalty stated in
the notice and waives the person's right to appeal the
imposition of the civil penalty. Tex. Transp. Code Ann.
consequences for failing to timely request an administrative
hearing indicate the Legislature intended the statute to be
mandatory. If, as Bowman suggests, an owner may contest
liability for the civil penalty by filing suit in a district
court, possibly long after the deadline to request an
administrative hearing, the owner could easily avoid the
admission of liability established by the Legislature as the
consequence for failing to timely request an administrative
hearing or appear at a requested hearing. This would render
section 707.012 meaningless. Accordingly, we reject
Bowman's assertion that an owner who wishes to challenge
the civil penalty may, but is not required to, request an
administrative hearing. We conclude that if an owner desires
to contest liability, he must do so in accordance with the
method established by the statute: filing a timely written
request for an administrative hearing. See id.
supplemental brief, Bowman for the first time argues he was
not required to exhaust administrative remedies because the
justice court has exclusive jurisdiction over civil cases
where the amount in controversy is $200 or less. See
Tex. Const. art. V, § 19 ("Justice of the peace
courts shall have . . . exclusive jurisdiction in civil
matters where the amount in controversy is two hundred
dollars or less, and such other jurisdiction as may be
provided by law."). Therefore, he contends, neither the
hearing officer nor the municipal court have jurisdiction
over red light camera violations because the civil penalty is
limited to $75 plus a possible $25 late fee.
new argument, however, does not support the trial court's
denial of the plea to the jurisdiction. Rather, it indicates
the district court lacks jurisdiction over Bowman's
Compliance Claims because the amount in controversy is below
the jurisdictional minimum of the district court.
See Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 (district court
jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and original
jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies,
"except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original
jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other
law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative
body"); id. § 19; Sultan v.
Mathew, 178 S.W.3d 747, 756 n.24 (Tex. 2005) (Hecht, J.,
dissenting) (noting split in courts of appeals over whether
constitutional jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy
is $200.01 or $500.00); Arnold v. West Bend Co., 983
S.W.2d 365, 366 n.1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no
pet.). Were we to accept Bowman's argument, the result
would be the same-the district court would lack subject
matter jurisdiction over the Compliance Claims. Thus,
Bowman's belated argument does not change the outcome of
as it may, the Legislature has constitutional power to create
such other courts as it deems necessary and to conform the
jurisdiction of the district and inferior courts thereto.
Tex. Const. art. V, § 1 ("The Legislature may
establish such other courts as it may deem necessary and
prescribe the jurisdiction and organization thereof, and may
conform the jurisdiction of the district and other inferior
courts thereto."); Jordan v. Crudgington, 231
S.W.2d 641, 644-45 (Tex. 1950) (discussing the history of
article V, section 1 of the constitution); Reasonover v.
Reasonover, 58 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex. 1933) (holding
article V, section 1 authorizes Legislature to take from the
district court "the exclusive nature of its jurisdiction
over the subjects mentioned in section 8, article 5, and
permits the Legislature to give jurisdiction over them also
to other courts"). The Legislature has preserved the
jurisdiction of justice courts for Chapter 707 cases arising
outside the territorial limits of a city. Tex. Gov't Code
Ann. § 27.031(a)(4). Accordingly, we reject Bowman's