STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE EIGHTH
COURT OF APPEALS EL PASO COUNTY
HERVEY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which
KEASLER, ALCALA, RICHARDSON, YEARY, NEWELL, KEEL, and WALKER,
KELLER, P.J., concurred.
court entered two orders granting shock probation. The orders
were identical except that the second order was styled
an"Amended Order," it contained additional findings
of fact, and it was signed at a later time. Both orders
suspended further implementation of Appellee's (Crispen
Hanson) prison sentence and placed him on probation. The
State appealed from the second order, and the court of
appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction,
concluding that only the first order granting shock probation
was appealable. The issue is whether the court of appeals
erred when it decided that the second order was not an
appealable order. Because we conclude that it is an
appealable order under Article 44.01(a)(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, we reverse the judgment of the court of
appeals and remand the cause for the court of appeals to
consider the merits of the State's appeal.
trial court signed an order on June 15, 2015 granting shock
probation. When the trial court signed the order, it also
signed an amended judgment and imposed conditions of
probation. On June 25, 2015, the trial court signed an
"Amended Order." There were slight variations in
the order. The style was different, additional findings of
were added, and it was signed on June 25, 2015. Both orders
suspended execution of Hanson's prison sentence and
placed him on probation. The State filed a notice of appeal
from the amended order on July 13, 2015, eighteen days after the
trial court signed the order.
COURT OF APPEALS
court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of
jurisdiction. State v. Hanson, No. 08-15-00205-CR,
2017 WL 3167484, at *1 (Tex. App.-El Paso July 26, 2017) (not
designated for publication). According to the court of
appeals, "[w]hile the trial court signed an amended
order on June 25, 2015 for the ostensible purpose of adding
additional findings of fact, the amended order did not
include any substantive changes to the initial order placing
Hanson on community supervision for eight years."
Id. at *2. Based on this and because the trial court
contemporaneously signed orders establishing the terms and
conditions of Hanson's probation and signed an amended
judgment relating only to the first order granting shock
probation, the court concluded that the "Amended
Order" was not an appealable order. Id. at *3.
argues that we should adopt the reasoning of the court of
appeals. The State makes two arguments for reversing the
judgment of the court of appeals. It first argues that the
amended order granting shock probation is appealable based on
the plain language of Article 44.01 in that the amended order
was an (1) "order" and (2) it "modifie[d] a
judgment." Alternatively, it argues that we should
adopt a civil line of cases, see SLT Dealer Group, Ltd.
v. AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc., 336
S.W.3d 822, 831-32 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no
pet.), which have held that a second order is treated as a
modified or reformed judgment that implicitly vacates and
supersedes the prior judgment, unless the record evinces a
contrary intent. Id.; see Tex. R. Civ. P.
301, 306a, 329b(e). Here, the State asserts, the
record does not show a contrary intent, so the "Amended
Order" vacated the first and was, thus, appealable.
SLT Dealer Group, Ltd., 226 S.W.3d at 831-32;
see City of Westlake Hills v. State ex rel. City of
Austin, 466 S.W.2d 722, 726-27 (Tex. 1971).
agree with the court of appeals (and Hanson) that the body of
law developed by civil courts is inapplicable because this
case deals with construing a statute, not judicial precedent
or construction of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Hanson, 2017 WL 3167484, at *2. However, for the
reasons that follow, we ultimately agree with the State that
the "Amended Order" was an appealable order.
court of appeals erred when it decided that the second order
did not "modify a judgment" under Article 44.01
because there was no substantive difference between the
orders. It also erred in reaching that conclusion by
reasoning that the "Amended Order" did not
"modify a judgment" because the trial judge did not