IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF SHERRIE LEHMAN AND DOUGLAS LEHMAN
Appeal from the 344th District Court Chambers County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CV29104
consists of Justices Christopher, Donovan, and Jewell.
an appeal from a judgment of divorce between Sherrie Lehman
and Doug Lehman. Sherrie asks us to consider one issue:
whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as
to whether Sherrie voluntarily signed the premarital
agreement. We find no error in the trial court's judgment
December 17, 2005, Sherrie and Doug were married in Las
Vegas, Nevada. One day earlier, the parties executed a
premarital agreement in Harris County, Texas, that precluded
the acquisition of community property during their marriage.
In attached schedules A and C to the premarital agreement,
the separate property of Doug and the separate property of
Sherrie, respectively, was identified.
years later, in January 2015, Sherrie filed for divorce,
asserting the marriage had become insupportable because of
discord in conflict of personalities. Doug filed an amended
partial motion requesting both traditional and no evidence
summary judgment on Sherrie's claims for a "Separate
Property Agreement," including reimbursement,
post-divorce maintenance, and her challenge to the premarital
agreement as involuntary and unconscionable. The trial court
conducted a hearing, and on February 12, 2016, the trial
court granted partial summary judgment on these claims in
favor of Doug. In its order the trial court stated,
"Petitioner may not allege any of the theories on
recovery for which summary judgment has been granted in the
trial of this matter."
December 16, 2016, the court called the matter to trial and
entered a final divorce decree, finding that no community
property had been accumulated by the parties except for a
travel trailer that was awarded to Sherrie. Sherrie timely
appeal, Sherrie asserts one issue, claiming the trial court
erred in granting Doug's partial motion for summary
judgment because Sherrie's response to the motion
"clearly raised [a] genuine issue of material fact as to
whether [Sherri] voluntarily signed the premarital
Standard of review
summary judgment standards of review are well-known. We
review de novo the trial court's order granting summary
judgment. Ferguson v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of
Am., 295 S.W.3d 642, 644 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam);
Wyly v. Integrity Ins. Solutions, 502 S.W.3d 901,
904 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). We
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-movant, and indulge reasonable inferences and resolve all
doubts in its favor. See City of Keller v. Wilson,
168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005); Wyly, 502 S.W.3d at
904. "We credit evidence favorable to the non-movant if
reasonable fact finders could and disregard contrary evidence
unless reasonable fact finders could not."
Wyly, 502 S.W.3d at 904.
prevail on a no-evidence summary judgment, the movant must
allege that no evidence exists to support one or more
essential elements of a claim for which the non-movant bears
the burden of proof at trial. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(i); Kane
v. Cameron Int'l Corp., 331 S.W.3d 145, 147 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.). A no-evidence
motion may not be conclusory, but must instead give fair
notice to the non-movant as to the specific element of the
non-movant's claim that is being challenged. See
Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310-11
(Tex. 2009). The non-movant must then present evidence
raising a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged
elements. Kane, 331 S.W.3d at 147. A fact issue
exists where there is more than a scintilla of probative
evidence. See Buck v. Palmer, 381 S.W.3d 525, 527
(Tex. 2012) (per curiam). More than a scintilla of evidence
exists if the evidence rises to a level that would allow
reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their
conclusions as to the existence of a vital fact.
Dworschak v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling,
Inc., 352 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th
Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (citing Ford Motor Co. v.
Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004)).
prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, a
movant must establish that no genuine issue of material fact
exists so that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein &
Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848
(Tex. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant