United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
L. HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
pro se employment-related action filed by Plaintiff
D'lon Vincent Johnson has been referred to the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial
management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order
of reference from United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade.
Court granted Mr. Johnson leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”), see Dkt. No. 7,
and issued a notice of deficiency regarding the complaint as
filed [Dkt. No. 8] (the “NOD”). And he responded
to the NOD by filing an amended complaint. See Dkt.
undersigned now enters these findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and recommendation that, for the reasons explained
below, the Court should dismiss this action with prejudice.
Johnson's complaint as filed consisted of two pages of
difficult-to-decipher handwritten allegations and a Dismissal
and Notice of Rights letter from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. See Dkt. No. 3. This filing
prompted the undersigned to issue the NOD, which informed Mr.
Johnson that his
complaint does not [ ] comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a), which requires that a plaintiff's
complaint “must contain” “a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court's
jurisdiction”; “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in
the alternative or different types of relief.”
Dkt. No. 8 at 1-2. After informing Mr. Johnson of the
applicable pleading standards, see Id. at 2 - also
set out below - he filed an amended complaint on the
court-provided form Complaint For Employment Discrimination,
see Dkt. No. 9.
the amended complaint, Mr. Johnson adds several individual
defendants he identifies as managers at his former employer.
See Id. at 2. He then invokes Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Federal Rico Statute. See
id. at 3. And he identifies the following conduct as
discriminatory: that he was terminated after being out for
“surgery 2 days”; a manager yelled and cursed at
him; another manager told “the only black manager
follow the process of get the [indecipherable]”; his
computer was unplugged to take [him] away from computer they
even had the workers and made me do all the hard work.
Confirming appointments.” Id. at 4.
district court is required to screen a civil action filed IFP
and may summarily dismiss that action, or any portion of the
action, if, for example, it fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
for failure to state a claim “turns on the sufficiency
of the ‘factual allegations' in the
complaint, ” Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 615
Fed.Appx. 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting
Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S., 135
S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam); emphasis added by
Smith), and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for
imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim
asserted, ” Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 346.
to survive dismissal under the framework of Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a plaintiff need
only “plead facts sufficient to show” that the
claims asserted have “substantive plausibility”
by stating “simply, concisely, and directly
events” that she contends entitle her to relief.
Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 347 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); see Harold H. Huggins Realty,
Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011)
(“A claim for relief is implausible on its face when
‘the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct.'” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679)); Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th
Cir. 2010) (a court need “not accept as true conclusory
allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal
conclusions” (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess
Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005); citation
rationale has even more force here, as the Court “must
construe the pleadings of pro se litigants
liberally, ” Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d
538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006), “to prevent the loss of
rights due to inartful expression, ” Marshall v.
Eadison, 704CV123HL, 2005 WL 3132352, at *2 (M.D. Ga.
Nov. 22, 2005) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9
(1980)); but see Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No.
3:12- cv-2465-B, 2013 WL 2291886, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 23,