United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
L. HORAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Elaine Whigham Williams has filed a pro se complaint
asserting causes of action under 18 U.S.C. §§
2261A, 242, and 1621, alleging that her Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process was violated, and presenting factual
content substantially the same as that presented in the
complaint that she filed in Williams v. Marsh McLennan
Cos., No. 3:18-cv-1035-N-BN, 2018 WL 2773380 (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 26, 2018), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 2766148 (N.D.
Tex. June 8, 2018) (“Williams I”), a
case that the Court dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
resulting action has been referred to the undersigned United
States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a
standing order of reference from Chief Judge Barbara M. G.
Lynn. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”). And the undersigned
now enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendation that, for the reasons explained below, the
Court should dismiss this case with prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
Standards and Analysis
district court may summarily dismiss a complaint filed IFP if
it concludes that the action:
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either
law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Brewster v. Dretke,
587 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009) (“A claim may be
dismissed as frivolous if it does not have an arguable basis
in fact or law.”). And a complaint is without an
arguable basis in law if it is grounded upon an untenable,
discredited, or indisputably meritless legal theory,
including alleged violations of a legal interest that clearly
does not exist. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326-27;
Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999).
Claims within a complaint lack an arguable basis in fact if
they describe “fantastic or delusional scenarios,
” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, and such claims
may be dismissed
as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are clearly
baseless, a category encompassing allegations that are
fanciful, fantastic, and delusional. As those words suggest,
a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the
facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the
wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially
noticeable facts available to contradict them.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
for failure to state a claim “turns on the sufficiency
of the ‘factual allegations' in the
complaint, ” Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 615
Fed.Appx. 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting
Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S.__, 135
S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam); emphasis added by
Smith), and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for
imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim
asserted, ” Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 346.
to survive dismissal under the framework of Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a plaintiff need
only “plead facts sufficient to show” that the
claims asserted have “substantive plausibility”
by stating “simply, concisely, and directly
events” that she contends entitle her to relief.
Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 347 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); see Harold H. Huggins Realty,
Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011)
(“A claim for relief is implausible on its face when
‘the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct.'” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679)); Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th