Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Krupa v. Davis

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

April 2, 2019

JOHN D. KRUPA Petitioner,
LORIE DAVIS, Director Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.



         Petitioner John D. Krupa, at one time a Texas prisoner, has filed, from a free-world address, a pro se application for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Dkt. Nos. 3 & 4. His action has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade. Because Krupa's habeas application is an unauthorized successive petition, the Court should transfer it to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for appropriate action.

         Applicable Background

          As recounted in a previous decision concerning Krupa, [o]n December 20, 2001, Petitioner was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and sentenced to thirty years confinement. State of Texas v. John Damon Krupa, No. F-983221-PN (195th Crim. Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex., Dec. 20, 2001). On January 14, 2003, Petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Krupa v. State, No. 05-02-00116-CR (Tex. App. - Dallas, pet. ref'd). On June 11, 2003, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for discretionary review.

On February 20, 2003, Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition. Ex parte Krupa, No. 56, 048-01. On July 30, 2003, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the petition because Petitioner's direct appeal was still pending. On November 17, 2005, Petitioner filed his second state habeas petition. Ex parte Krupa, No. 56, 048-02. On February 22, 2006, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied the petition without written order. On August 18, 2009, September 25, 2009, and January 21, 2010, Petitioner filed his third fourth and fifth state habeas petitions. Ex parte Krupa, Nos. 56, 048-03, -04, -05. Those petitions were dismissed as subsequent petitions.
On May 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a federal § 2254 petition. Krupa v. Thaler, No. 3:11-CV-288-L (N.D. Tex.). On July 31, 2012, the district court dismissed the petition as barred by the statute of limitations. On February 1, 2013, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a certificate of appealability. Krupa v. Thaler, No. 12-10835 (5th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013).

Krupa v. Stephens, No. 3:13-cv-2906-L, 2013 WL 5763243, at *1-*2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2013) (transferring unauthorized successive petition to the Fifth Circuit).

         To the extent that he meets the “in custody” requirement of Section 2254(a), see, e.g., Claybon v. Texas, No. 3:16-cv-2479-K-BN, 2016 WL 5793767, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2016) (“A prisoner need not be physically confined to be ‘in custody' for the purposes of Section 2254. But, ‘once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual “in custody” for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it.'” (quoting Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989); citation omitted)), rec. accepted, 2016 WL 5717532 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2016), Krupa again raises claims challenging his 2001 Dallas County conviction, see, e.g., Dkt. No. 3 at 2.

         Legal Standards and Analysis

         The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) limits the circumstances under which a state prisoner may file a “second or successive” application for federal habeas relief, see generally 28 U.S.C. § 2244, and “was enacted in part to bring finality to state court judgments, ” Leal Garcia v. Quarterman, 573 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000)). As the Fifth Circuit has explained,

Section 2244 lays out the requirements for filing successive petitions, serving as gate-keeper by preventing the repeated filing of habeas petitions that attack the prisoner's underlying conviction. The statute does not define “second or successive, ” however, and we have made clear that a petition is not “second or successive” merely because it is numerically second. In In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1998), we defined a “second or successive” petition as one that “1) raises a claim challenging the petitioner's conviction or sentence that was or could have been raised in an earlier petition; or 2) otherwise constitutes an abuse of the writ.” Section 2244 specifies when a later-in-time petition will be heard. Despite its strictures, the case law clarifies that there is a category of petitions that, even though later in time, are outside the confines of § 2244 and will be heard because they are not “second or successive” within the meaning of AEDPA.

Id. (footnotes omitted and internal citation modified).

         Where multiple Section 2254 petitions attack the same judgment(s), a court “‘look[s] to pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ principles in determining whether [a] petition is successive.'” Hardemon v. Quarterman, 516 F.3d 272, 275 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Crone v. Cockrell, 324 F.3d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 2003)); see Id. (“We held that Crone's petition was successive because he ‘knew of all of the facts necessary to raise his [second] claim before he filed his initial federal petition.' This holding aligned with our ‘strong policy against piecemealing claims.'” (quoting Crone, 324 F.3d at 837)).

         The Court must determine whether a subsequent federal habeas application is second or successive within the meaning of AEDPA to ensure that there is subject matter jurisdiction. See Leal Garcia, 573 F.3d at 219 (“AEDPA requires a prisoner to obtain authorization from the federal appellate court in his circuit before he may file a ‘second or successive' petition for relief in federal district court. Without such authorization, the otherwise-cognizant district court has no jurisdiction to entertain a successive § 2254 petition.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Crone, 324 F.3d at 836 (collecting cases); cf. Linzy v. Faulk, No. 14-cv-00962-BNB, 2014 WL 5355293, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 21, 2014) (โ€œ[t]he one-year limitation period in 28 U.S.C. ยง 2244(d) is not jurisdictional, โ€ and โ€œ[t]here is no language in ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.