United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
JOHN D. KRUPA Petitioner,
LORIE DAVIS, Director Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
L. HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
John D. Krupa, at one time a Texas prisoner, has filed, from
a free-world address, a pro se application for writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See
Dkt. Nos. 3 & 4. His action has been referred to the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial
management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order
of reference from United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade.
Because Krupa's habeas application is an unauthorized
successive petition, the Court should transfer it to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for
recounted in a previous decision concerning Krupa, [o]n
December 20, 2001, Petitioner was convicted of aggravated
sexual assault of a child and sentenced to thirty years
confinement. State of Texas v. John Damon Krupa, No.
F-983221-PN (195th Crim. Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex., Dec.
20, 2001). On January 14, 2003, Petitioner's conviction
and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Krupa v.
State, No. 05-02-00116-CR (Tex. App. - Dallas, pet.
ref'd). On June 11, 2003, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for discretionary
On February 20, 2003, Petitioner filed his first state habeas
petition. Ex parte Krupa, No. 56, 048-01. On July
30, 2003, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the
petition because Petitioner's direct appeal was still
pending. On November 17, 2005, Petitioner filed his second
state habeas petition. Ex parte Krupa, No. 56,
048-02. On February 22, 2006, the Court of Criminal Appeals
denied the petition without written order. On August 18,
2009, September 25, 2009, and January 21, 2010, Petitioner
filed his third fourth and fifth state habeas petitions.
Ex parte Krupa, Nos. 56, 048-03, -04, -05. Those
petitions were dismissed as subsequent petitions.
On May 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a federal § 2254
petition. Krupa v. Thaler, No. 3:11-CV-288-L (N.D.
Tex.). On July 31, 2012, the district court dismissed the
petition as barred by the statute of limitations. On February
1, 2013, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a
certificate of appealability. Krupa v. Thaler, No.
12-10835 (5th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013).
Krupa v. Stephens, No. 3:13-cv-2906-L, 2013 WL
5763243, at *1-*2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2013) (transferring
unauthorized successive petition to the Fifth Circuit).
extent that he meets the “in custody” requirement
of Section 2254(a), see, e.g., Claybon v.
Texas, No. 3:16-cv-2479-K-BN, 2016 WL 5793767, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2016) (“A prisoner need not be
physically confined to be ‘in custody' for the
purposes of Section 2254. But, ‘once the sentence
imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the
collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves
sufficient to render an individual “in custody”
for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it.'”
(quoting Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989);
citation omitted)), rec. accepted, 2016 WL 5717532
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2016), Krupa again raises claims
challenging his 2001 Dallas County conviction, see,
e.g., Dkt. No. 3 at 2.
Standards and Analysis
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) limits the circumstances under which a
state prisoner may file a “second or successive”
application for federal habeas relief, see generally
28 U.S.C. § 2244, and “was enacted in part to
bring finality to state court judgments, ” Leal
Garcia v. Quarterman, 573 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2009)
(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436
(2000)). As the Fifth Circuit has explained,
Section 2244 lays out the requirements for filing successive
petitions, serving as gate-keeper by preventing the repeated
filing of habeas petitions that attack the prisoner's
underlying conviction. The statute does not define
“second or successive, ” however, and we have
made clear that a petition is not “second or
successive” merely because it is numerically second. In
In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1998), we
defined a “second or successive” petition as one
that “1) raises a claim challenging the
petitioner's conviction or sentence that was or could
have been raised in an earlier petition; or 2) otherwise
constitutes an abuse of the writ.” Section 2244
specifies when a later-in-time petition will be heard.
Despite its strictures, the case law clarifies that there is
a category of petitions that, even though later in time, are
outside the confines of § 2244 and will be heard because
they are not “second or successive” within the
meaning of AEDPA.
Id. (footnotes omitted and internal citation
multiple Section 2254 petitions attack the same judgment(s),
a court “‘look[s] to pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ
principles in determining whether [a] petition is
successive.'” Hardemon v. Quarterman, 516
F.3d 272, 275 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Crone v.
Cockrell, 324 F.3d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 2003)); see
Id. (“We held that Crone's petition was
successive because he ‘knew of all of the facts
necessary to raise his [second] claim before he filed his
initial federal petition.' This holding aligned with our
‘strong policy against piecemealing claims.'”
(quoting Crone, 324 F.3d at 837)).
Court must determine whether a subsequent federal habeas
application is second or successive within the meaning of
AEDPA to ensure that there is subject matter jurisdiction.
See Leal Garcia, 573 F.3d at 219 (“AEDPA
requires a prisoner to obtain authorization from the federal
appellate court in his circuit before he may file a
‘second or successive' petition for relief in
federal district court. Without such authorization, the
otherwise-cognizant district court has no jurisdiction to
entertain a successive § 2254 petition.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also Crone, 324 F.3d at
836 (collecting cases); cf. Linzy v. Faulk, No.
14-cv-00962-BNB, 2014 WL 5355293, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 21,
2014) (“[t]he one-year limitation period in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d) is not jurisdictional, ” and
“[t]here is no language in ...