United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LAKE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Carlos Renfrew (TDCJ #1929324) has filed a Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody
("Petition") (Docket Entry No. 1) to challenge a
conviction entered against him in Harris County, Texas. He
has also filed a Memorandum in Support of the Petition
("Memorandum") (Docket Entry No. 2) and a Motion
for an Evidentiary Hearing (Docket Entry No. 3) . After
considering all of the pleadings and the applicable law
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Proceedings in the United States District Courts, this case
will be dismissed for the reasons explained below.
7, 2014, Renfrew entered a guilty plea to charges of driving
while intoxicated as a third offender ("felony
DWI") in Harris County Cause No. 1412939. According to
Renfrew, his indictment was enhanced with allegations that he
had at least one other prior felony conviction for theft,
which elevated the charged offense to a second degree felony
under the Texas habitual offender statute. See Tex.
Penal Code § 12.42(a). The 337th District Court for
Harris County, Texas, accepted Renfrew's guilty plea and
sentenced him to 16 years' imprisonment. Because he did
not pursue an appeal, Renfrew's conviction became final
thirty days later on or about June 7, 2014.
Petition that was executed on March 19, 2019,  Renfrew now
contends that he is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because his 16-year prison
sentence was improperly enhanced by prior convictions that
were not sufficiently documented or proven by the State and
exceeded the range of punishment allowed under Texas
Renfrew also asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object or properly challenge the documents
used to elevate the charges against him to a felony,
resulting in an enhanced sentence.
The One-Year Statute of Limitations
to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(the "AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996), all federal habeas corpus petitions filed after April
24, 1996, are subject to a one-year limitations period found
in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which provides as follows:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because the pending Petition was
filed well after April 24, 1996, the one-year limitations
period clearly applies. See Flanagan v. Johnson, 154
F.3d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)).
noted above, Renfrew challenges a state court judgment
entered against him on May 7, 2014. Because he did not pursue
an appeal, the limitations period began to run pursuant to
§ 2244(d) (1) (A) no later than June 7, 2014, when his
time to pursue a direct appeal expired. See Roberts v.
Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2003) (observing
that a conviction becomes final for purposes of §
2244(d) (1) (A) "when the time for seeking further
direct review in the state court expires"). That date
triggered the statute of limitations, which expired one year
later on June 7, 2015. The pending Petition, ...