United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Tyler Division
ORDER ADOPTING IN PART THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JEREMYD. KERNODLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
action was referred to United States Magistrate Judge John D.
Love pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. Plaintiff Kendra
Hankerd (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro
se, filed a Complaint (Docket No. 1) on May 10, 2018,
against Defendant Federal Bureau of Investigations
(“FBI”) and Defendant Christopher Wray, Director
of the FBI (“Wray”) (collectively referred to as
“Defendants”). On March 8, 2019, the Magistrate
Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (Docket No. 64),
recommending that the Court grant Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 62). Plaintiff
filed Objections (Docket No. 66) to the Report and
Recommendation on April 1, 2019.
Court reviews de novo the portions of the Magistrate
Judge's findings to which objections have been raised. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Having reviewed the Magistrate
Judge's findings and Plaintiff's objections, the
Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's Objections
(Docket No. 66) and ADOPTS IN PART the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Docket No.
64) as the findings of the Court. As the Magistrate Judge
found, Plaintiff's claims against the FBI and against
Wray in his official capacity fail for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. To the extent Plaintiff is bringing claims
against Wray in his individual capacity, she has not properly
stated a claim. The Court therefore dismisses this action
Court reviews objected-to portions of the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation de novo.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(“A judge of the court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made.”). A court conducting a de novo review
examines the entire record and makes an independent
assessment under the law. Douglass v. United States
Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996)
(en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds,
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file
objections from ten to fourteen days).
Complaint (Docket No. 1), Plaintiff has alleged thirty
different “claims” against Defendants. The
Magistrate Judge reviewed Plaintiff's pleadings and the
record and found that Plaintiff failed to identify a basis
for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
Magistrate Judge recommended this action be dismissed without
has raised a variety of issues in her Objections (Docket No.
66). The Court understands these issues to include: (1)
Plaintiff was never properly served with a copy of the Report
and Recommendation; (2) Plaintiff alleged sufficient factual
allegations in her Complaint; and (3) the Court engaged in
corruption and broke laws.
Plaintiff alleges that “[d]ue to fraud” she never
received a “certified copy” of the Report and
Recommendation, but instead just a “regular envelope
copy.” Docket No. 66 at 1. Mailing a paper to a
person's last known address, however, is proper service.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(C). Moreover, Plaintiff's Objections
filed with the Court confirm that Plaintiff has received the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff was properly
served with a copy of the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Plaintiff makes various allegations in what appears to be an
attempt to support the factual basis of her claim. Plaintiff
alleges that on January 16, 2016, she contacted the FBI with
information regarding a fourteen-year-long “Comcast
Hacking.” Docket No. 66 at 2. According to Plaintiff,
one of the four hackers was Daniel Hankerd, who had also
confessed a murder to Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff then
claims that she reported the hacking and the murder to the
FBI and the State of Tennessee, but neither took any action
on the alleged criminal activity. Id.
also claims she was previously a paid informant for both the
FBI and the State of Tennessee. Id. at 2-3. During
that time, Plaintiff claims to have had a relationship with
Detective Andre Davis. Id. at 2. Plaintiff alleges
that when the FBI learned about the relationship, the FBI
launched a campaign of stalking and harassment against
Plaintiff. Id. at 2-4. In particular, Plaintiff
states that the FBI manipulated electronic devices, used
products and companies (including Disney World and country
music singer Reba McEntire), installed video cameras to
monitor Plaintiff, and sent men and photos to intimidate
Plaintiff. Id. at 3-4.
Plaintiff claims that at some point she died and went to
heaven. Id. at 4. She states that she then had an
encounter with Jesus, who sent Plaintiff back to earth to
“help build his Kingdom” and to spread
information that Jesus provided to her so that lives could be
saved. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff also claims that she
can call over 100 witnesses in support of her claims.
Finally, Plaintiff requests $800 billion and a restraining
order as relief for her alleged injuries. Id. at 9.
objections, however, do not address the problems with her
Complaint. As the Magistrate Judge explained in his Report,
absent clear congressional consent providing a basis for
jurisdiction, the United States as sovereign is immune from
suit. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538
(1980) (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584, 586-88 (1941)). The Court therefore lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over claims against the FBI and against Wray in
his official capacity. Id. Plaintiff has not
identified any basis for waiving sovereign immunity or
otherwise invoking the Court's subject jurisdiction for
extent that Plaintiff alleges constitutional claims against
Wray in his individual capacity, those claims would not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. These claims, however,
fail because Plaintiff did not properly state a claim. A
supervisory official like Wray “may be held liable only
upon two bases”: (1) “personal involvement in the
acts causing the deprivation of a person's constitutional
rights creates personal liability”; and (2) “if
he implements a policy so deficient that the policy itself
acts as a deprivation of constitutional rights.”
Cronn v. Buffington, 150 F.3d 538, 544 (5th Cir.
1998). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating
personal involvement by Wray or the existence of policies