United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division
OPINION AND ORDER
R. MEANS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under
U.S.C. § 2241 filed by petitioner Timothy Greene, a
federal prisoner confined at FCI-Seagoville in Seagoville,
Texas. After considering the pleadings and relief sought by
Petitioner, the related briefs and the applicable law, the
Court concludes that the § 2241 petition must be
BACKGROUND/CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Timothy Greene was convicted in this Court of three counts of
bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and
carrying a firearm during and in relation to the commission
of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). United States v. Greene,
No.4:04-CR-005-Y(1)(N.D. Tex. August 31, 2014). Greene was
sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 222 months.
At this time, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) shows
Greene's projected release date as August 6, 2019. See
www.bop.gov/inmate locator (last visited
April 5, 2019).
petition, Greene alleges that his current scheduled release
date of August 6, 2019, is no longer correct. Specifically,
he cites to the passage of the First Step Act of 2018
(“FSA 2018") as entitling him to additional days
of good-conduct time (“GCT”) credits. (Pet. (doc.
1) at 5.) Greene writes:
The BOP has my release scheduled for [8/6/2019], but by law I
must be released on 3/29/2019. The BOP has refused to make
this change. Anticipated continued custody beyond that date
will comprise illegal detention. On 8/30/2004 I was sentenced
to an aggregate 222-month term of imprisonment, which
calculation commenced on 10/5/2004 with 467 days' prior
credit time (the sentencing Court reaffirmed this to the BOP
on 8/9/2018). Based on the old GCT (good time) law I was
entitled to 870 days' credit and my PRD (projected
release date) was 8/6/2019. The passage of the FIRST STEP Act
entitled me instead to 999 days' GCT (i.e., 54 days X
18½ years), and as I've earned every one of those
days my PRD ought to be 3/29/2019.
Id. at 5. The Respondent has filed a response
arguing that Greene has failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, that his sentence calculation is correct under
existing law, and that the portion of the FSA 2018 regarding
GCT calculation is not yet effective. (Resp. (doc. 11) at
9-16.) Greene has filed a reply and an amended reply, and he
seeks expedited disposition. (Docs. 13 and 14.)
102(b)(1) of the First Step Act of 2018, Public Law No.
115-391, amended 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) to permit federal
inmates to earn 54 days of good conduct time for each year of
the prisoner's sentence imposed by the court, rather than
for each year of the sentence served, effectively abrogating
Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 476 (2010)(upholding
the BOP's method of awarding good-time credit at the end
of each year the prisoner served). See Public Law
115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, § 102(b)(1). But the good-time
calculation provisions of the FSA 2018 amending §
3624(b) did not become effective when the law was signed on
December 21, 2018. See Banegas v. Wilson, No.
4:19-CV-178-A (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2019) (McBryde, J.);
Roy v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 2:19-CV-59-RMP, 2019
WL 1441622, at *1 (E.D. Wash. April 1, 2019). Rather, the
good-time-credit change will not take effect until the
attorney general completes the “risk and needs
assessment system” required to be completed within 210
days after the December 21, 2018 enactment, as provided by
§§ 101(a) and 102(b)(2) of the FSA 2018. See
Schmutzler v. Quintana, No.5:19-046-DCR, 2019 WL 727794,
at *2 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 20, 2019). Therefore, § 102(b)(1)
will not take effect until approximately mid-July 2019.
Id.; Banegas, No. 4:19-CV-178-A (doc. 7.)
courts are limited under Article III of the Constitution to
deciding “cases” and “controversies.”
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “In order to give
meaning to Article III's case-or-controversy requirement,
the courts have developed justiciability doctrines, such as
the standing and ripeness doctrines.” Sample v.
Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2005)(citing
United Transp. Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 857
(5th Cir. 2000) and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 650 (1992)). The ripeness doctrine is designed
“to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to
protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects
felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.”
Id. (quoting Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v.
Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08
(2003)(internal citations omitted).
the BOP does not presently have the authority to recalculate
Greene's good-time credit until the relevant provisions
of the FSA 2018 take effect in approximately mid-July 2019,
the question of whether the BOP has erred in the calculation
of Greene's sentence is premature. Accord Banegas v.
Wilson, No.4:19-CV-178-A (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26,
2019)(dismissing § 2241 petition seeking re-calculation
of good-time credits as premature) (McBryde, J.); Gossman
v. Underwood, No.3:19-CV-351-G (BK) (N.D. Tex. April 1,
2019)(Fish, J.) (adopting findings, conclusions, and
recommendation to dismiss § 2241 petition seeking
recalculation of good-time without prejudice as premature);
Roy v. BOP, 2019 WL 1441622 at *2 (discussing
“ripeness” doctrine and finding that § 2241
petition challenging good-time under the FSA was premature).
Accordingly, Greene's present petition under § 2241
must be dismissed without prejudice.
reasons discussed herein, petitioner Timothy Greene's
petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § ...