United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Corpus Christi Division
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
B. Libby United States Magistrate Judge
William Rogers is a Texas inmate appearing pro se
and in forma pauperis. Plaintiff is a
prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Criminal Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID) and is currently
housed at the McConnell Unit in Beeville, Texas. Pending
before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. (D.E.
civil rights action, Plaintiff sues the following defendants:
(1) Dr. Isaac Kwarteng; (2) Physician Assistant (PA) Susanna
Corbett; (3) Medical Provider M. Goyel; (4) John Doe Medical
Director from Region IV, University Texas Medical Branch
(UTMB); and (5) the UTMB. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
have acted with deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs by failing to treat his diabetic condition with
Lantus instead of NPH insulin twice per day. Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief in the form of receiving either insulin
three time per day or Lantus to prevent future harm.
January 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend in which
he seeks to add certain retaliation claims. (D.E. 22). He
alleges that, on January 14, 2019, TDCJ officials removed his
work and medical restrictions, forcing him to work despite
his “grave diabetic condition.” (D.E. 22, p. 1).
Plaintiff claims that prison officials engaged in this action
to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing this lawsuit.
Plaintiff further fears that prison officials will transfer
him from the McConnell Unit as another retaliatory act for
filing this lawsuit. (D.E. 22, p. 1).
15(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure provides that a
party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise, a “party may amend
its pleading only with the opposing party's written
consent or the court's leave” [and] [t]he court
should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
when “justice so requires” rests within the sound
discretion of a district court. See Chitimacha Tribe of
La. v. Harry L. Laws Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1162 (5th
Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). A court's discretion to
grant leave is severely limited by the bias of Rule 15(a)
favoring amendment. Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Investment
Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1981). Leave to amend
should not be denied unless there is a substantial reason to
do so. Jacobsen v. Osbourne, 133 F.3d 315, 318 (5th
Cir. 1998). There is a substantial reason to deny leave if
the proposed amendment would cause undue delay or prejudice
to the non-movant, if it is motivated by bad faith or
dilatory motives, if there have been repeated failures to
cure deficiencies with prior amendment, or if the amendment
is futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962);
see also Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond
& Gem Trading, 195 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1999);
Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Corp., et al., 3 F.3d 137, 139
(5th Cir. 1993).
15(d), on the other hand, provides that “[o]n motion
and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a
party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any
transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the
date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
15(d). The Fifth Circuit has indicated that the same factors
that shape a Rule 15(a) motion to amend inquiry also apply to
a Rule 15(d) motion. See Chemetron Corp. v. Business
Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1194 (5th Cir. 1982)
(citation omitted), vacated on unrelated grounds by
460 U.S. 1007 (1983). “Leave to supplement should not
be granted where a plaintiff attempts to present ‘new
and different cause[s] of action.'” Garcia v.
Hackman, No. C-10-311, 2011 WL 2457918, at *19 (S.D.
Tex. Jun. 16, 2011) (quoting Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of
Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 226 (1964)).
allegations in support of his new retaliation claims occurred
after he filed his original complaint. Nevertheless,
regardless whether Plaintiff's motion is evaluated under
Rule 15(a) or Rule 15(d), his motions seeking to add such
claims are without merit.
seeks to present a new and different cause of action in his
current motion against possible additional parties. As such,
leave to supplement under Rule 15(d) is denied. See
Garcia, 2011 WL 2457918, at *19. Furthermore,
substantial reasons exist to deny Plaintiff's motion to
the extent it is construed as a Rule 15(a) motion to amend.
Plaintiff's new retaliation claims arose after the filing
of his amended complaint and out of separate transactions and
occurrences as compared to his deliberate indifference
claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (allowing the
joinder of several parties if the claims arose out of a
single transaction and contain a question of fact or law
common to all the defendants); 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur
R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1583 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that, under Rules 18(a) and
20, if the claims arise out of different transactions and do
not involve all defendants, joinder should not be allowed)
new retaliation claims do not appear to involve all of the
same medical officials named in this case and are not closely
related to the claims in his original complaint. While
Plaintiff may not add his new retaliation claims to this
case, he may seek to pursue such claims in a separate cause
of action. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Amend ...