United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
CARRILLO RAMIREZ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Special Order 3-251, this habeas case has been
automatically referred for findings, conclusions, and
recommendation. Based on the relevant findings and applicable
law, the Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to Vacate,
Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal
Custody, received on June 7, 2018, should be
DENIED with prejudice.
Suter (Movant) challenges his federal conviction in Cause No.
3:17-CR-0046-N-1. The respondent is the United States of
6, 2017, Movant pleaded guilty to perjury in a federal
proceeding under oath, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1621(2), and his plea was accepted on July 7, 2017.
(See No. 3:17-CR-0046-N-1, docs. 47, 51.) He was
sentenced to time served and a one-year term of supervised
release on November 6, 2017, and judgment was entered on that
same date. (See id., docs. 64, 65.) His conditions
of supervised release provided that “if ordered
deported or removed, the defendant shall remain outside the
United States.” (See Id. at 5.) Movant
initially filed a notice of appeal but voluntarily withdrew
it. (See id., docs. 67, 74, 75.)
serving his one-year term of supervised release, Movant
mailed his § 2255 motion from Lucerne, Switzerland, on
May 31, 2018, approximately six months after he was deported
on December 12, 2017. (See id., doc. 65 at 3; No.
3:18-CV-1474-N, doc. 2 at 1, 16, 18.) It contends that he was
entrapped by a United States Marshal, he was illegally
incarcerated on a separate civil matter, the attorneys
conspired against him, and he was coerced into confessing.
(See No. 3:18-CV-1474-N, doc. 2 at 7-8,
11-14.) It also claims that certain documents were
not filed in his criminal case “due to ignorance of the
appointed defenders, ” and his reply brief alleges
ineffective assistance of counsel on numerous other grounds.
(See docs. 2 at 14; 12 at 3.) Finally, Movant
asserts civil claims and requests “relief of not less
than $50 million.” (See docs. 2 at 15; 12 at
§ 2255 motion is a petition for relief from a conviction
or sentence made by a prisoner under a federal sentence. A
“movant is no longer in federal custody for the purpose
of § 2255 relief where the sentence imposed for that
conviction has expired.” United States v.
Esogbue, 357 F.3d 532, 534 (5th Cir.2004) (citing
Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497 (1994)).
However, if a movant has been released from federal prison,
federal courts maintain jurisdiction over his § 2255
motion if he remains subject to a term of supervised release.
See United States v. Bejarano, 751 F.3d 280, 285 n.4
(5th Cir. 2014).
condition of supervised release that prohibits a person who
is deported from reentering the country remains in effect
after the person is deported. See United States v.
Heredia-Holguin, 823 F.3d 337, 341-42 (5th Cir. 2016)
(en banc); see also United States v.
Fuentes-Cruz, 669 Fed.Appx. 255, 256 (5th Cir. 2016)
(citing United States v. Brown, 54 F.3d 234, 238-39
(5th Cir. 1995) (stating that “a term of supervised
release remains in effect after a person is
deported.”). Because Movant was subject to supervised
release at the time he filed his § 2255 motion, the
Court maintains jurisdiction to review it. See
Bejarano, 751 F.3d at 285 n.4; Pack v. Yusuff,
218 F.3d 448, 454 n.5 (stating that § 2255 requires that
at the time a prisoner files the motion, “he must be
‘in custody' for the conviction or sentence he
wishes to challenge in order for the habeas court to have
jurisdiction. Usually, ‘custody' signifies
incarceration or supervised release, but in general it
encompasses most restrictions on liberty resulting from a
SCOPE OF RELIEF AVAILABLE UNDER § 2255
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of
constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that
could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if
condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.”
United States v. Gaudet, 81 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir.
1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It is
well-established that “a collateral challenge may not
do service for an appeal.” United States v.
Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 165 (1982)).
failure to raise a claim on direct appeal may procedurally
bar an individual from raising the claim on collateral
review. United States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 595
(5th Cir. 2001). Defendants may only collaterally attack
their convictions on grounds of error omitted from their
direct appeals upon showing “cause” for the
omission and “actual prejudice” resulting from
the error. Shaid, 937 F.2d at 232. However,
“there is no procedural default for failure to raise an
ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal” because
“requiring a criminal defendant to bring [such] claims
on direct appeal does not promote the objectives” of
the procedural default doctrine, “to conserve judicial
resources and to respect the law's important interest in
the finality of judgments.” Massaro v. United
States, 538 U.S. 500, 503-04 (2003).
asserts that his initial arrest was improper because he was
entrapped by a United States Marshal, his incarceration on a
civil matter violated his due process rights, his attorney
conspired with the U.S. Attorney's Office “to
construe a criminal charge” against him, and he was
coerced into confessing. (See doc. 2 at 7-8, 11-14.)