from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas
HAYNES, GRAVES, and HO, Circuit Judges.
HAYNES, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
Campos appeals the district court's imposition of an
eight-year supervised release term based on its conclusion
that eight years was the mandatory minimum term. For the
reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court's
imposition of an eight-year supervised release term and
REMAND for resentencing to a new term, if any, of supervised
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute heroin within 1000 feet of a vocational
school and college, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846, and 860(a). He was sentenced in
July 2014 to sixty months of imprisonment and an eight-year
term of supervised release. Campos's supervision began
January 29, 2016.
2016, the probation office reported that Campos had violated
the conditions of his supervised release by failing to report
to his probation officer as directed, truthfully answer his
probation's officer's inquiries, and follow his
probation officer's instructions. The probation officer
completed a Violation Worksheet stating that the
"[p]eriod of supervised release to be served following
release from imprisonment" was "[no less than] 8
years to Life."
hearing, the district court revoked Campos's supervised
release. It stated that the relevant supervised release term
was "not less than eight years up to life." Campos
did not object. The district court sentenced Campos to nine
months of imprisonment and an eight-year term of supervised
release. It did not explain its reasons for the eight-year
supervised release term.
statement that Campos was subject to a mandatory minimum term
of supervised release in this context was incorrect. While
the minimum supervised release sentence for Campos's
underlying drug conviction was eight years, see 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), 860(a), that floor did not
apply to Campos's post-revocation supervised release,
see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (stating that
"[w]hen a term of supervised release is revoked . . .
the court may include a requirement that the
defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after
imprisonment" (emphasis added)); U.S.S.G. §
7B1.3(g)(2). Campos's supervised release was subject only
to a maximum of "the term of supervised release
authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the
original term of supervised release, less any term of
imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised
release." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h); U.S.S.G. §
7B1.3(g)(2). Here, that is a life term less Campos's
nine-month post-revocation imprisonment. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(h).
appealed his supervised release sentence.
Campos did not object to the district court's
supervised-release determination, we review his sentence for
plain error. United States v. Putnam, 806 F.3d 853,
855 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). To
establish plain error, a petitioner must show: (1) an error,
(2) which is "clear or obvious," that (3)
"affected [his] substantial rights."
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1338,
1343 (2016). A petitioner generally satisfies the third prong
by showing "'a reasonable probability that, but for
the error,' the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different." Id. (quoting United States v.
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76 (2004)).
petitioner satisfies the first three prongs, we will
"exercise [our] discretion to correct the forfeited
error if the error 'seriously affects the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.'" Molina-Martinez, 136 S.Ct.
at 1343 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 736 (1993)). The petitioner bears the burden of showing
plain error. United States v. Huor, 852 F.3d 392,
398 (5th Cir. 2017).