Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
RIDGECREST HOLDINGS, LLC AND 400 SOUTH WALTON WALKER BOULEVARD, DALLAS, TEXAS, Appellants
CITY OF DALLAS, Appellee
Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court Dallas County,
Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-12419
Chief Justice Burns, Justice Molberg, and Justice Nowell
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON MOTION TO REVIEW
D. BURNS, III CHIEF JUSTICE
the Court is Ridgecrest Holdings, LLC and 400 South Walton
Walker Boulevard, Dallas, Texas's motion to review the
trial court's order summarily denying supersedeas and to
enter temporary orders. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the trial court's order denying supersedeas and
decline to enter temporary orders.
underlying appeal follows the trial court's temporary
injunction compelling Ridgecrest to take, for health and
safety reasons, twenty-five remedial steps to address
multiple Dallas City Code violations at its property at 400
South Walton Walker Boulevard ("the Property"), a
multi-family apartment complex. After the injunction was
signed, Ridgecrest and the Property filed a motion seeking to
establish the terms of supersedeas. In the motion, they
sought suspension of the judgment pursuant to rule of
appellate procedure 24.2(a)(3), which governs suspension of
judgments for something other than money, and rule of
appellate procedure 29.2, which governs suspension of
interlocutory orders. See Tex. R. App. P.
24.2(a)(3), 29.2. They argued they had "an absolute
right to supersede" the temporary injunction and,
"because the Temporary Injunction [compelled them] to
breach their tenant leases and violate the regulations of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, enforcement of
the Temporary Injunction pending appeal would cause [them]
substantial damages[.]" They attached no supporting
documentation to their motion, and no evidence was offered at
the hearing on the motion.
their motion before the Court, Ridgecrest and the Property
argue the purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve
the status quo until a trial on the merits, but the trial
court's injunction "instead effectively grants"
the City's requested final relief to compel them to
comply with the code. They contend a stay of the injunction
is needed "to preserve the rights of the parties in this
case" because, without a stay, the City could seek to
enforce the injunction, rendering the appeal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 29 provides the procedures for
suspension of interlocutory orders pending appeal.
See Tex. R. App. P. 29. Rule 29.1 provides, in
relevant part, that an appeal from an order granting
interlocutory relief does not suspend the appealed order
unless the order is suspended in accordance with rule 29.2.
See id. 29.1(a). Rule 29.2 in turn grants the trial
court discretion to suspend an interlocutory order in
accordance with appellate rule 24. See id. 29.2. If
the trial court denies supersedeas, the appellant may seek
appellate review. See id. Under rule 29.3, an
appellate court may also "make any temporary orders
necessary to preserve the parties' rights until
disposition of the appeal and may require appropriate
security." See id. 29.3. The rule, however,
prohibits the appellate court from suspending the trial
court's order "if the appellant's rights would
be adequately protected by supersedeas or another order made
under Rule 24." See id.
provides different procedures for suspending a judgment based
on the type of judgment being appealed. See id. 24.
Although appellants sought suspension of the injunction
pursuant to rule 24.2(a)(3), rule 24.2(a)(5) is the
applicable rule because it governs judgments in favor of a
governmental entity in its governmental capacity and in which
the entity has no pecuniary interest. See Tex. R.
App. P. 24.2(a)(5); In re S. Tex. Coll. of Law, 4
S.W.3d 219, 220 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (Hecht, J.,
dissenting to denial of mandamus). In determining whether to
suspend enforcement under rule 24.2(a)(5), the trial court
must take into account the harm that is likely to result to
the judgment debtor if enforcement is not suspended, and the
harm that is likely to result to others if enforcement is
suspended. See Tex. R. App. P. 24.2(a)(5).
stated, Ridgecrest and the Property argued before the trial
court they had "an absolute right to supersede" the
temporary injunction and that the injunction compelled them
"to breach their tenant leases and violate the
regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development." Here, they argue that a stay is necessary
to preserve the parties' rights.
the arguments made to the trial court, rule 29 grants the
trial court discretion to supersede the temporary injunction;
no absolute right exists. See id. 29.2. Moreover,
Ridgecrest and the Property provided no supporting
documentation, and no evidence was introduced at the hearing.
Without evidence, the trial court could not conduct the
balancing test required under rule 24.2(a)(5), and we cannot
conclude the trial court abused its discretion by denying
supersedeas. See id. 24.2(a) (5); Downer v.
Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.
1985) (trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in
arbitrary or unreasonable manner or "without reference
to any guiding rules or principles").
extent Ridgecrest and the Property's rights may not be
adequately protected by supersedeas or any other order under
rule 24, we decline to exercise our discretion to suspend a
temporary injunction rendered for health and safety reasons.
See Tex. R. App. P. 29.3. The merits of the
injunction are not before us, and no evidence was offered in
support of suspension. We will not second-guess the trial
 We note that, at the time Ridgecrest
and the Property filed the motion before us, the date for
completing eleven of the twenty-five remedial steps ordered
in the temporary injunction had passed. Ridgecrest and the
Property did not seek an emergency stay of the temporary
injunction pending review of the order denying supersedeas
and, since the filing of the motion, the time for completing
an additional twelve steps has passed. Accordingly, the issue
of whether to suspend the injunction as it pertains to those
steps appears to have become moot. See In re Sierra
Club, 420 ...