Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6 Collin County,
Texas Trial Court Cause No. 006-02636-2018
Chief Justice Burns, Justice Brown, and Justice Nowell
D. BURNS, III CHIEF JUSTICE
Jay Cooper has been declared a vexatious litigant and is
prohibited from filing pro se any new litigation in a court
of this State without first obtaining permission from the
local administrative judge. See Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code Ann. §§ 11.102(a), 11.103(a).
Cooper filed this appeal without first obtaining the required
permission. See id. § 11.102(a); see also
id. § 11.001(2) (defining "litigation" as
"a civil action commenced, maintained, or pending in any
state or federal court."); Id. § 11.103(a)
(the clerk of a court "may not file a[n] ... appeal, ...
presented, pro se, by a vexatious litigant subject to a
prefiling order" unless the litigant first obtains
permission); Donohue v. Martinez, No.
04-18-00588-CV, 2018 WL 4608240, at *1 (Tex. App.- San
Antonio Sept. 26, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("The
statute applies to appeals filed in Texas appellate
courts" except for "an appeal from a prefiling
order entered under Section 11.101 designating a person a
vexatious litigant or a timely filed writ of mandamus under
order dated January 24, 2019, we ordered Cooper to file a
copy of the order from the local administrative judge giving
permission to file this appeal by February 4, 2019. After
granting three extensions, we cautioned Cooper that no
further extensions would be granted and that failure to
provide the requested documentation by April 1, 2019 would
result in dismissal of this appeal without further notice.
April 1, 2019, the local administrative judge denied
Cooper's request for permission to appeal, and Cooper
filed a copy of the written order in this proceeding. On
April 2, 2019, Cooper filed an "Emergency Opposed Plea
in Abatement" and an "Emergency Opposed Motion for
Temporary Stay" in which he asked the Court to abate the
appeal and stay the order denying him permission to appeal so
that he could seek mandamus relief from the denial of
permission to appeal. By order dated April 3, 2019, we denied
those motions but confirmed that Cooper was permitted under
section 11.102(f) of the civil practice and remedies code to
seek mandamus relief from the April 1, 2019 order by filing a
petition for writ of mandamus by May 1, 2019. See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.102(f)
(allowing litigant to seek mandamus review of a decision
denying permission to appeal not later than the 30th day
after the date of the decision). We cautioned Cooper that we
would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction if he
failed to file a petition for writ of mandamus by May 1,
2019. On April 26, 2019, Cooper filed an "Emergency
Motion for Temporary Stay and Abatement" in which Cooper
asked the Court to stay the April 1, 2019 order denying
permission to appeal and to abate the May 1, 2019 deadline to
file the petition for writ of mandamus. We denied that motion
on April 29, 2019.
thereafter filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking
review of the April 1, 2019 order denying permission to
appeal. That original proceeding was docketed as cause number
05- 19-00549-CV. By opinion dated May 22, 2019, this Court
denied the petition for writ of mandamus.
the local administrative judge has issued an order denying
Cooper permission to file this appeal and this Court denied
Cooper's petition for writ of mandamus, we conclude this
court does not have jurisdiction over Cooper's attempted
appeal and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
11.1035(b) (the court "shall dismiss the litigation
unless the [vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order]
. . . obtains an order from the appropriate local
administrative judge described by Section 11.102(a)
permitting the filing of the litigation"); see also
Moody v. Success Holding, LLC, No. 01-17-00492-CV, 2018
WL 650274, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 1, 2018,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal where local
administrative judge denied appellant's request to pursue
appeal); Tex.R.App.P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).
dismiss as moot Cooper's motion to review excessiveness
of supersedeas bond. We also lift this Court's January
24, 2019 stay of the trial court's October 19, 2018
judgment, of all efforts to enforce that judgment, and of the
January 3, 2019 order setting supersedeas bond.
accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the
appeal is DISMISSED for want of
jurisdiction, appellant's motion to review excessiveness
of supersedeas bond is DISMISSED AS MOOT,
and this Court's January 24, 2019 stay of the trial
court's October 19, 2018 judgment, of all efforts to
enforce that judgment, and of the January 3, 2019 order
setting supersedeas bond is hereby LIFTED.
ORDERED that each party bear its own ...