Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio
Fred WIGGINS, as Trustee of the Wiggins Revocable Trust, Appellant
Jeffrey A. GLOVER and Donna S. Glover, Appellees
the 218th Judicial District Court, Karnes County, Texas Trial
Court No. 16-01-00022-CVK Honorable Donna S. Rayes, Judge
Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice, Beth Watkins, Justice,
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice.
Elena D. Chapa, Justice.
Wiggins, as trustee of the Wiggins Revocable Trust, appeals a
summary judgment rendered in favor of Jeffrey and Donna
Glover. He argues the trial court erred by granting the
Glovers' traditional motion for summary judgment and
denying his cross-traditional motion for summary judgment.
Concluding Wiggins's suit is barred by the statute of
limitations, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
appeal arises from a dispute over who owns superior title to
a ½ non-participating royalty interest (NPRI) in real
property in Karnes County. Originally, Wiggins owned the
½ NPRI individually,  but he alleges he placed the
½ NPRI into the Wiggins Revocable Trust, of which he
is the trustee.
2006, to satisfy a judgment against Wiggins, the Karnes
County Sheriff seized the subject property, including the
½ NPRI, and executed a sheriff's deed purporting
to convey the property to Gary Teel. The Glovers opposed the
sheriff's sale because they believed they owned the
property. The Glovers sued Teel, and an agreed judgment was
rendered, declaring the Glovers owned the entire subject
property, including the ½ NPRI. Teel also executed a
quitclaim deed, disclaiming any interest he had in the
subject property in favor of the Glovers.
October 2011, Wiggins, as trustee, sued the Glovers in a
trespass to try title action. In that lawsuit, Wiggins
challenged the Glovers' claim to title to the ½
NPRI. The Glovers filed a motion for summary judgment in that
lawsuit and, instead of filing a response, Wiggins filed a
notice of nonsuit in December 2011.
four years later, on January 18, 2016, Wiggins, as trustee,
filed the underlying lawsuit against the Glovers. In his
pleadings in the trial court, and on appeal, Wiggins
characterizes the underlying lawsuit as a suit to quiet
title. As per his trial court pleadings, Wiggins sought to
remove the clouds on his alleged title caused by the 2006
sheriff's deed and the agreed judgment in the Teel-Glover
lawsuit. The parties filed traditional cross-motions for
summary judgment, arguing about the merits of Wiggins's
suit. In a separate ground, the Glovers argued the underlying
lawsuit is barred by limitations. The trial court granted the
Glovers' motion, denied Wiggins's cross- motion, and
rendered a final judgment against Wiggins without specifying
the basis for its judgment. Wiggins timely appealed.
review summary judgments de novo. Rife, 513 S.W.3d
at 609. "To prevail on a traditional motion for summary
judgment, the movant must show there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and the [movant] is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). "We take as true all evidence favorable
to the nonmovant, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in
the non-movants' favor, and indulge every reasonable
inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's
favor." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
"When parties file competing motions for summary
judgment, and the trial court grants one and denies the
other, we review all issues presented and render the judgment
the trial court should have rendered." Id.
sole issue is, "The trial court erred in granting the
Glovers' motion for summary judgment and denying the
Trust's; alternatively, it erred in granting the
Glovers' motion." "Where, as here, the trial
court's judgment does not specify the grounds, we must
affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories presented
to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are
meritorious." C ...