United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J. BOYLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Plaintiff Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC's
(“Plaintiff” or “Ocwen”) Motion for
Default Judgment (Doc. 7), filed April 15, 2019. For the
reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS
January 10, 2019, Ocwen filed a complaint against Armando
Martinez and Benita Martinez, alleging that Armando Martinez
and Benita Martinez (“Individual Defendants”)
defaulted on a mortgage agreement held by Ocwen. Doc. 1,
Pl.'s Compl., ¶¶ 18-19. Ocwen's complaint
also alleges that BBVA Compass Bank (“BBVA”)
failed to extinguish its own lien on Individual
Defendants' real property commonly known as 2918 Bay Oaks
Drive, Dallas, Texas 75229, and more particularly described
LOT 4, BLOCK 34/6461 OF WALNUT HILLS ADDITION, FOURTH
INSTALLMENT, AN ADDITION TO THE CITY OF DALLAS, DALLAS
COUNTY, TEXAS, ACCORDING TO THE MAP THEREOF RECORDED IN
VOLUME 23, PAGE 215, MAP RECORDS, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS.
Id. ¶¶ 9, 30. Ocwen alleges that
BBVA's lien on the property was already satisfied in full
by proceeds from the loan agreement on May 26, 1999.
Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff seeks a judgment allowing
foreclosure and quieting title on the property. Id.
¶¶ 26, 30.
quiet-title claim relies on the following allegations:
Plaintiff claims that on July 31, 1990, the property's
prior owners executed a deed of trust on the property to
Capitol Mortgage Bankers, Inc., with the agreement entered
into official public records in Dallas County, Texas under
the name “Document Number 6480.” Id.
¶ 15. Plaintiff also claims that Capitol Mortgage
Bankers Inc., merged into Temple-Inland Mortgage Corporation
on July 16, 1992, which then changed its name to Guaranty
Residential Lending, Inc. on June 7, 2001. Id.
¶ 16. Plaintiff also asserts that Guaranty Residential
Lending, Inc. was subsequently acquired by Guaranty Bank.
Id. Finally, Plaintiff claims that the FDIC assumed
control over Guaranty Bank, at which point the FDIC sold
Guaranty Bank's interest in the property to BBVA.
Id. Plaintiff asserts “upon information and
belief” that the Capitol deed of trust was satisfied
prior to March 26, 1999. Id. ¶ 15. Based on
these events, Plaintiff seeks a judgment against BBVA
declaring that Plaintiff holds a superior lien on the
property, and requests that BBVA's lien is released as a
cloud on title. Id. ¶ 30.
foreclosure request relies on three sets of allegations: the
issuance of the original mortgage, the assignments of the
deed of trust, and the subsequent default. First, as to the
original mortgage, Individual Defendants borrowed $94, 951
from the Shelter Mortgage Company on or about May 26, 1999.
Doc. 1-1, Pl.'s App., 3 (Ex. A) (note). As collateral for
the loan, Individual Defendants agreed that their lender was
allowed to invoke power of sale and other remedies against
the property should Individual Defendants fail to pay.
Id. at 12 (Ex. B) (deed of trust). The agreement
stated that should Individual Defendants fail to make
required monthly payments within 30 days, Individual
Defendants would be in default and the lender could exercise
a right to accelerate the date of the Note's maturity by
mailing notice of the default to the borrowers and demand
that the entire amount owed be paid within 30 days. See
Id. at 9. If the lender accelerated the debt and
demanded payment in full, the lender was authorized to
exercise power of sale on the property. See Id. at
as to the assignments of the deed of trust, Plaintiff alleges
that on June 4, 1999, the Shelter Mortgage Company assigned
the deed of trust to the Corinthian Mortgage Corporation.
Id. 16 (Ex. C) (first assignment of the deed of
trust). The Corinthian Mortgage Company then assigned the
deed of trust to the GMAC Mortgage Corporation on March 1,
2000. Id. 19 (Ex. C) (the second assignment). The
GMAC Mortgage Corporation then assigned the deed of trust to
its own successor entity, GMAC Mortgage, LLC, on November 11,
2011. Id. at 22 (Ex. C) (the third assignment).
Finally, GMAC Mortgage LLC assigned the deed of trust to
Plaintiff on May 22, 2013. Id. at 24 (Ex. C) (the
Plaintiff's foreclosure request also relies on the
Individual Defendants' alleged default. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that on September 25, 2018, Plaintiff
mailed the notice of default to Individual Defendants.
Id. at 27-38 (Ex. D) (notices of default). After
Individual Defendants failed to cure the default, Plaintiff
sent Individual Defendants notices of acceleration, stating
that the note was due in full on December 28, 2018.
Id. at 40-43 (Ex. E) (notices of acceleration).
January 30, 2019, Plaintiff served all Defendants with copies
of its complaint. Doc. 5, Return of Summons. To date,
Defendants have neither answered nor otherwise made an
appearance in this case. On April 15, 2019, Plaintiff
requested the clerk enter default (Doc. 6) and moved for
default judgment (Doc. 7). Plaintiff served Defendants copies
of both documents. Doc. 6, Request for Default, 4; Doc. 7,
Mot., 5. The clerk has since entered default (Doc. 8).
Defendants failed to respond to Plaintiff's motion and
the time to do so has passed. The Court now considers the
motion for default judgment.
Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides for the entry of default
judgments in federal court. According to Rule 55,
“[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, . .
. the clerk must enter the party's default.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Once default has been entered, the Court