Court of Appeals of Texas, Twelfth District, Tyler
from the 4th District Court of Rusk County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No.
consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
protracted struggle for possession and control of certain
property, Jerry Byrom, Dimple Byrom, and Dorothy Berry appeal
from an injunction and order of eviction and an order
approving a contract and sale, denying an easement, and
enforcing the prior injunction order rendered in favor of
Jill Campbell Penn, in her capacity as court appointed
receiver of the property at issue. In two issues, Appellants
contend the receiver lacked authorization for the relief she
obtained in the 4th District Court of Rusk County and allege
that certain prior orders of the County Court of Cherokee
County are void because that court did not affirmatively
adjudicate the homestead status of the real property. We
2005, Jerry Byrom was appointed executor of his mother's
estate by the Cherokee County court, and later, he was
removed due to gross mismanagement, misappropriation of
funds, and gross misconduct. After finding that Byrom breached
his fiduciary duty to the estate by using estate funds to
build a house, the court imposed a constructive trust on the
home, and, when Byrom failed to deposit the required funds
into the court's registry, the court ordered the home to
2012, the court appointed Penn receiver, and she filed a
petition to partition the property in Rusk County where the
property is located. The district court of Rusk County
authorized Penn to sell the property. In March 2018, the
trial court granted Penn's application for a permanent
injunction enjoining Appellants from interfering with the
sale of the property or destroying the property. The court
further ordered Appellants to vacate the property. In August
2018, the trial court approved the contract and sale of the
property, denied an easement requested by Appellants, and
granted Penn's motion to enforce the prior injunction
order. This appeal followed.
their first issue, Appellants assert that Penn acted beyond
her authority in seeking and obtaining orders of injunction,
eviction, and denial of their requested easement. They
contend that because Penn was not authorized to seek the
relief sought, the Rusk County trial court lacked
jurisdiction to render its March 7, 2018, permanent
injunction and order on eviction and its August 14, 2018,
order approving the contract and sale, denying the easement,
and enforcing the prior injunction order.
receiver has only that authority conferred by the court's
order appointing him, and the order must comply with the
statute authorizing the appointment. Ex parte
Hodges, 625 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. 1981). Subject to the
control of the court, a receiver may (1) take charge and keep
possession of the property; (2) receive rents; (3) collect
and compromise demands; (4) make transfers; and (5) perform
other acts in regard to the property as authorized by the
court. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 64.031
(West 2008). Once a receiver is appointed, the property is
in custodia legis, or in the custody of the court.
Tex. Am. Bank/West Side v. Haven, 728 S.W.2d 102,
104 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ denied). By virtue of an
order of appointment a receiver becomes invested with full
right to the possession and control of the property.
Sligh v. Stanley, 204 S.W. 700, 701 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1918, no writ). The receiver must
protect her possession of the property as long as the order
requiring her to hold it remains in force. Haven,
728 S.W.2d at 104. In case of any interference, the receiver
must bring the matter to the attention of the court.
Id. The court may then enjoin any interference with
the property in the receiver's hands. Id.
argue that Penn was not authorized to do anything more than
take possession of the property, file for partition, oversee
the listing and sale of the property, and make disbursements
of the proceeds from the sale. We disagree.
Cherokee County court rendered orders on September 4, 2012,
and May 13, 2013, appointing Penn receiver and ordering that
she "is authorized, subject to control of this court, to
do any and all acts necessary" to the proper and lawful
conduct of the receivership. As receiver, Penn has full ...