Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin
COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO.
C-1-CV-18-007943, THE HONORABLE TODD T. WONG, JUDGE PRESIDING
Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Triana.
D. Triana, Justice.
Bowser, appearing pro se, appeals the county court at
law's judgment awarding Appellees possession of real
property in Travis County. Appellees assert that because
Bowser is no longer in possession of the Property and has no
right to current possession, this appeal of the
forcible-detainer action is moot. We agree.
home at issue had been owned by a man named Owens Houston. In
2009, he took out a reverse mortgage on the property by
executing a Deed of Trust. He died in 2014, and Mary Houston,
as his administrative heir, conveyed the property to Marie
Bowser through a Special Warranty Deed subject to a
vendor's lien. The Special Warranty Deed does not mention
the Deed of Trust, although it refers to the "Reverse
Mortgage Agreement." It appears from the record that the
payments due from Owens Houston or his successors to satisfy
the terms of the reverse mortgage were not made, resulting in
the home being sold at a foreclosure sale in July 2018.
Appellees purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and
sent notice to Bowser to vacate the home. Bowser, who has
maintained insurance on the home and paid the property taxes
from at least 2014 through 2017, refused to vacate, instead
opting to challenge the foreclosure. Appellees requested that
Bowser sign a settlement agreement requiring her to dismiss
her title suit, and although she included a copy of that
proposed agreement in the record, she does not appear to have
signed it. Unable to persuade Bowser to vacate the home,
Appellees filed a suit seeking possession. Appellees
prevailed in the justice court and on appeal to the county
court at law. Bowser filed a notice of appeal, but did not
deposit the $33, 775 required to supersede the judgment. The
writ of possession was executed on October 23, 2018. In a
motion filed the same day, Bowser sought to suspend the writ
until after the appeal, but because the writ had already been
executed, the county court at law denied the motion as moot.
forcible-detainer action is a procedure to determine the
right to immediate possession of real property when there is
not unlawful entry. Williams v. Bank of New York
Mellon, 315 S.W.3d 925, 926 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no
pet.). To prevail in a forcible-detainer action, a plaintiff
need not prove title. Tex.R.Civ.P. 510.3(e) ("The court
must adjudicate the right to actual possession and not
title."); Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle
Co., 61 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001,
pet. dism'd w.o.j.). Instead, the plaintiff need only
present sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a
superior right to immediate possession. Hong Kong Dev.,
Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 433 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Failure to supersede a
forcible-detainer judgment does not divest the appellant of
the right to appeal, but the judgment may be enforced,
including the issuance of a writ of possession evicting the
tenant from the premises. Marshall v. Housing Auth. of
the City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 786-87
(Tex. 2006); Wilder v. MWS Capital, LLC, No.
03-18-00195-CV, 2018 Tex.App. LEXIS 9498, at *4-5 (Tex.
App.-Austin Nov. 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). An appeal
from a forcible-detainer action becomes moot if the appellant
is no longer in possession of the property, unless the
appellant holds and asserts "a potentially meritorious
claim of right to current, actual possession."
Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787.
did not supersede the judgment, and Appellees took possession
of the Property when the writ of possession was executed. To
hold that Bowser's claim is not moot, this Court would
have to determine that she has asserted a potentially
meritorious claim of right to possession. Bowser asserts a
variety of alleged errors on the part of Appellees and the
county court at law that do not bear on her right to
possession of the property. Bowser argues that the Special
Warranty Deed's grant of the property to her shows her
right to possession of the home. But the Special Warranty
Deed also references the "Reverse Mortgage
Agreement," and the Deed of Trust securing the reverse
mortgage was recorded in Travis County, as was a 2012
Assignment of Deed of Trust showing that the loan would
become due on Owens Houston's death. "An instrument
that is properly recorded in the proper county is . . .
notice to all persons of the existence of the
instrument." Tex. Prop. Code § 13.002; see
Texas Dep't of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply,
LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 169 (Tex. 2013) (holding that
grantee was deemed to have notice of all recorded instruments
in the chain of title); Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1982)
(holding that grantee is charged with notice of every matter
set forth within the chain of title). Under the
circumstances, Bowser has not asserted a potentially
meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession.
Consequently, there is no longer a live controversy
concerning the issue of possession for this Court to decide,
and thus, we dismiss Bowser's appeal as moot.
 That suit is on appeal before this
Court under Cause No. 03-18-00726-CV.
 As far as the Court can discern,
Bowser complains that she did not receive the transcript of
the hearing (for which she did not pay), that her eviction
violates the state and federal Fair Housing Acts because it
fails to accommodate her (unspecified) disability, that her
eviction was retaliation by Appellees in response to
complaints she made for repairs to the home, that
Appellees' counsel was deceptive and manipulative, that
the court staff colluded against her by failing to provide a
reporter's record, that she had no notice that a writ of