United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
FITZWATER, SENIOR JUDGE.
Elena Cram (“Cram”), now proceeding pro
se, sues defendants La Mirada Owners Association, Inc.
(“La Mirada”), Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, a
division of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells
Fargo”), and Flight 2010, LLC (“Flight
2010”), asserting various state-law claims and alleging
against Wells Fargo a claim for violation of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (“RESPA”), 12
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617. La Mirada and Wells Fargo move
for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the court
grants Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment on
Cram's RESPA claim and dismisses this claim with
prejudice. The court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and
dismisses these claims without prejudice. Consequently, the
court does not reach the merits of La Mirada's motion for
citizen of Texas, filed this lawsuit in state court alleging
state-law claims against defendants Wells Fargo and La
Mirada. Wells Fargo, a citizen of South Dakota, removed the
case to this court based on diversity jurisdiction, alleging
that La Mirada, a Texas citizen, had been improperly joined.
On March 1, 2017 Cram filed a motion to dismiss La Mirada
from the case. The court granted the motion, dismissing
Cram's claims against La Mirada without prejudice. On
January 16, 2018 Cram filed, and the court granted, an
unopposed motion for leave to file an amended complaint. In
her amended complaint, Cram joins La Mirada and Flight
as defendants, and alleges claims against Wells Fargo for
violations of RESPA and the Texas Debt Collection Act, Tex.
Fin. Code Ann. § 392.001 et seq. (West 2016);
against Wells Fargo and La Mirada for breach of contract,
breach of duty of cooperation, negligent misrepresentation,
promissory estoppel, and declaratory judgment; and against
Flight 2010 for quiet title and trespass to try title. Wells
Fargo and La Mirada move for summary judgment. Cram has not
responded to the motions.
filed their motions for summary judgment on April 29, 2019.
Cram's responses were due 21 days after defendants filed
their motions. See N.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7.1(e)
(“A response and brief to an opposed motion must be
filed within 21 days from the date the motion is
filed.”). Cram's responses were due by May 20,
2019. She has not responded, and the motions are ripe for
failure to respond to the summary judgment motions filed by
La Mirada and Wells Fargo does not permit the court to enter
“default” summary judgments, but the court may
accept as true all of defendants' undisputed facts.
See Tutton v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 733 F.Supp.
1113, 1117 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (Fitzwater, J.). Moreover,
“[a] summary judgment nonmovant who does not respond to
the motion is relegated to her unsworn pleadings, which do
not constitute summary judgment evidence.” Bookman
v. Shubzda, 945 F.Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996)
(Fitzwater, J.) (citing Solo Serve Corp. v. Westowne
Assocs., 929 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1991)). In
[i]f a party fails . . . to properly address another
party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the
court may . . . (2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes
of the motion [and] (3) grant summary judgment if the motion
and supporting materials-including the facts considered
undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it[.]
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)-(3).
pro se status does not excuse her failure to respond
to defendants' motions. As the court stated in
There is a point at which even pro se litigants must
become responsible for the prosecution of their own cases if
their claims are to warrant the court's attention. It is
not unjustifiably onerous to require pro se parties
to respond to proper motions for summary judgment. All
summary judgment nonmovants shoulder the same obligation.
District courts can make appropriate allowances for pro
se responses that may be somewhat less-artfully written
than those of represented parties. This can be accomplished,
however, without excusing them from the most basic
requirement that they file a response.
Bookman, 945 F.Supp. at 1005.
court considers, first, whether Wells Fargo is entitled to
summary judgment on Cram's RESPA claim, which is the only