In re Geomet Recycling LLC, Richard Goldberg, Kenneth Goldberg, Josh Applebaum, Alicia McKinney, Eloisa Medina, Lee Wakser, Spencer Lieman, Mikel Shecht, Laura Myers, Henry Jackson, and Kelly Couch, Relators
Argued
March 12, 2019
ON
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
OPINION
James
D. Blacklock Justice
During
certain interlocutory appeals, section 51.014(b) of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code "stays the commencement of a
trial in the trial court pending resolution of the
appeal." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
51.014(b). For a subset of these interlocutory appeals,
including appeals from the denial of a motion to dismiss
under the Texas Citizens Participation Act
("TCPA"), section 51.014(b) "also stays all
other proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of
that appeal." Id. In this case, while an
interlocutory TCPA appeal was pending, the court of appeals
granted the appellees' motion to lift the stay "for
the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to conduct a
hearing on appellees' request for temporary injunction
and motion for contempt." The appellant filed a petition
for writ of mandamus in this Court, arguing that by
authorizing further trial court action the court of
appeals' order violates the statutory stay of "all
other proceedings in the trial court." For the reasons
explained below, we conclude that the court of appeals'
order violates the statutory stay and that the relator has no
adequate remedy by appeal. We therefore conditionally grant
the mandamus petition.
I.
Background
The
relators are Geomet Recycling LLC, a scrap metal recycling
business, and several affiliated individuals (collectively
"Geomet"). The real parties in interest are EMR
(USA Holdings) Inc., also a scrap metal recycling business,
and affiliated entities (collectively "EMR"). In
mid-2017, some of EMR's employees left EMR to start
Geomet, a competing company. A few months later, EMR sued
Geomet for trade secret misappropriation, breach of fiduciary
duty, and related claims. EMR alleged that Geomet was
unlawfully using EMR's trade secrets to advance its new
business. Early in the case, the trial court issued a
temporary restraining order directing Geomet not to use
EMR's trade secrets and confidential information.
Geomet
filed a motion to dismiss under the TCPA. Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code § 27.003. The trial court ordered
limited discovery on the motion. Meanwhile, EMR moved for
contempt, alleging that Geomet was violating the TRO. EMR
also moved for a temporary injunction. The trial court set
EMR's contempt motion for a hearing. Before that hearing,
the parties signed an agreed scheduling order that delayed
both the contempt hearing and the temporary-injunction
hearing. The scheduling order provided for additional
continuances of the contempt and temporary-injunction
hearings in case of an interlocutory appeal on Geomet's
TCPA motion to dismiss. The order stated:
In the event that the Court denies [Geomet's] TCPA Motion
To Dismiss, in whole or in part, and [Geomet] files an
interlocutory appeal of the Court's denial . . . the
Parties have agreed to extend, and shall extend, the
Court's TRO . . . . The Parties hereby agree that the
automatic stay under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Section
51.014(b) (the "Statutory Stay") shall be partially
waived for the sole and limited purpose of allowing the
Parties to sign, and the Court to enter, one or more agreed
extensions of the TRO and Temporary Injunction hearing, as
provided in this Order, to maintain the TRO in place until
the time of the Temporary Injunction hearing. Otherwise, the
Statutory Stay shall be in effect per its terms and
applicable case law.
The
trial court denied Geomet's TCPA motion to dismiss.
Geomet took an interlocutory appeal pursuant to section
51.014(a)(12) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. That
appeal triggered a stay of "all other proceedings in the
trial court pending resolution of that appeal." Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(b). Less than three
weeks after Geomet filed its notice of appeal, EMR filed a
motion in the court of appeals requesting the stay be lifted
so the trial court could entertain EMR's request for a
temporary injunction and its motion for contempt. EMR argued
that while section 51.014(b) prohibits a trial court from
conducting proceedings on its own, it does not deprive a
court of appeals of authority to lift the stay for a limited
purpose. Geomet opposed the motion. The court of appeals
sided with EMR and issued an order lifting the statutory stay
"for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to
conduct a hearing on appellees' request for temporary
injunction and motion for contempt." Geomet's
mandamus petition to this Court challenges the court of
appeals' order lifting the stay for a limited purpose.
II.
Analysis
Section
51.014(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides:
An interlocutory appeal under Subsection (a), other than an
appeal under Subsection (a)(4) or in a suit brought under the
Family Code, stays the commencement of a trial in the trial
court pending resolution of the appeal. An interlocutory
appeal under Subsection (a)(3), (5), (8), or (12) also
stays all other proceedings in the trial court pending
resolution of that appeal.
(emphasis added). Because Geomet's appeal of the denial
of its TCPA motion is "[a]n interlocutory appeal under
Subsection . . . (12)," the appeal automatically
resulted in a stay of "all other proceedings in the
trial court." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
51.014(b). The parties do not dispute this. The dispute
concerns whether and to what extent the court of appeals may
lift the statutory stay during the appeal.
Our
analysis of that question begins with the statutory text
imposing the stay. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v.
Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 445 (Tex 2009) (Hecht, J,
concurring) ("Ascertaining the meaning of a statutory
text (or any text for that matter) begins with the language
used, and if that language is plain enough, absent some
obvious error or an absurd result, that is where the task
ends."). Other than certain timing provisions in section
51.014(c), which are not applicable here, the statute itself
contains no exceptions to its mandatory stay of "all
other proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of
that appeal." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
51.014(b). Neither section 51.014 nor any other statute to
which we are directed authorizes a court of appeals to lift
the stay, whether altogether or for a limited purpose. It is
not our place to "judicially amend the statute to add an
exception not implicitly contained in the language of the
statute." Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation
Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex. 1999). And
"[w]e have no right to engraft upon the statute any
conditions or provisions not placed there by the
legislature." Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74,
80-81 (Tex. 2011). Courts cannot add equitable or practical
exceptions to section 51.014(b) that the legislature did not
see fit to enact. The statute creates a clear and definite
rule, and its text admits of no exceptions to that
rule.[1] The stay is of "all other
proceedings in the trial court," and the text dictates
that the stay lasts until "resolution of th[e]
appeal," not until the court of appeals lifts the stay.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ยง 51.014(b) (emphasis
added). Here, the court of appeals' order lifted the stay
only for a limited purpose, but the statute contains no
indication that courts ...