IN THE COMMITMENT OF RICHARD A. DUNSMORE, Appellant
Appeal from the 412th Judicial District Court Brazoria
County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 84023-CV
consists of Justices Lloyd, Kelly, and Landau.
Richard A. Dunsmore appeals the trial court's denial of
his motion to vacate the commitment order. We dismiss.
was convicted of attempted sexual assault and the State filed
a petition to have him civilly committed as a sexually
violent predator. A jury found Dunsmore to be a sexually
violent predator and the trial court signed a final judgment
on November 10, 2016 directing him to be civilly committed
for treatment and supervision. See In re Commitment of
Dunsmore, 562 S.W.3d 732, 735-36 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] Oct. 18, 2018, no pet.). Dunsmore appealed that order
which was affirmed by this Court on October 18, 2018. See
filed a motion to vacate his commitment order in May 2018,
long after the commitment order was signed. There is no
provision in the statute for a motion to vacate. Because
Dunsmore sought release from commitment by moving the trial
court to vacate the commitment order, the trial court could
have construed this motion to be an unauthorized petition for
release. Under the statutory scheme, a committed person may
file an annual unauthorized petition for
review. See Tex. Health & Safety Code
§ 841.122. The trial court may deny the petition without
a hearing if the petition is frivolous. See Tex.
Health & Safety Code § 841.123(c). The trial court
denied Dunsmore's motion to vacate on June 15, 2018 by
written order, finding it to be frivolous.
determine whether this Court has jurisdiction over the denial
of Dunsmore's unauthorized petition for release, we turn
to Chapter 841 of the Health and Safety Code. When construing
statutes, our primary objective is to give effect to the
Legislature's intent as shown by the statutory text.
See Colorado Cty. v. Staff, 510 S.W.3d 435, 444
(Tex. 2017). If the text is clear, the text is determinative
of the Legislature's intent. See id. When
considering the language of the particular statutory
provisions at issue, we do not consider them in isolation but
view them in the context of the statute as a whole. See
Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 562
appeal is permitted from the initial determination that a
person is a sexually violent predator. See Tex.
Health & Safety Code § 841.062(a). Once a sexually
violent predator is committed, Chapter 841 provides for
periodic commitment reviews. Section 841.122 permits a
sexually violent predator to file with the court a petition
for release without the authorization of the Texas Civil
Commitment Office. Tex. Health & Safety Code §
841.122. The committed person is entitled to judicial review
of this unauthorized petition for release, but is not
necessarily entitled to a hearing on this petition.
See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§
held in In the Commitment of Dunsmore, No.
01-18-00183-CV, 2019 WL 2180446, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] May 21, 2019, no pet. h.), the denial of an
unauthorized petition for release is an interlocutory order
for which there is no statutory permission to appeal. There
is no indication that the trial court intended this order to
be final because Dunsmore remains civilly committed as a
sexually violent predator and the trial court retains
continuing jurisdiction as long as the commitment order
remains in effect. See id.; In re Commitment of
Adams, 408 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2013, no
jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal only if
authorized by statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code § 51.014; Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d
352, 352-53 (Tex. 1998). The June 15, 2018 order is not one
for which an interlocutory appeal is statutorily authorized,
either by Chapter 841 or by Section 51.014. See Tex.
Health & Safety Code §§ 841.122, 841.123; Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014. Because we have
determined that the order appealed is interlocutory, we have
we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Any pending
motions are dismissed as moot.
 The original order of commitment was
signed on November 10, 2016. Dunsmore filed a timely
post-judgment motion to vacate on November 18, 2016, along
with a motion for new trial. All of his post-judgment motions
were apparently overruled by operation of law because the
clerk's record in the appeal from the original commitment
order contains no ruling on those motions. Thus, the motion