Appeal from the 21st District Court Washington County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 17841
consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Bourliot and
Thompson Frost Chief Justice.
Braylon Damon Cloud appeals his conviction for failure to
comply with a sex-offender registration requirement. In a
single issue he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
who twice had been convicted of sexual assault of a child,
was required by statute to register as a sex offender and to
meet ongoing sex-offender registration requirements.
Following his release from prison for the second conviction,
appellant moved in with his sister in Brenham, Texas. In
complying with the sex-offender registration requirement that
he verify his registration every 90 days, on April 8, 2016,
appellant verified to the Brenham Police Department that his
sister's home address was the address at which he
resided. Three months later, on July 11, 2016, appellant
again verified to the Brenham Police Department that his
sister's home address was the address at which he
enforcement officials received information from
appellant's sister that appellant had moved to Austin in
June 2016. Appellant was charged by indictment alleging that
appellant "as a person required to register with local
law enforcement where [appellant] resided or intended to
reside for more than seven days. . . because of a reportable
conviction for sexual assault of a child, intentionally or
knowingly fail[ed] to provide the actual address at which the
pleaded "not guilty." In the bench trial that
followed the trial court found appellant guilty as charged.
After finding the enhancement paragraphs to be true, the
trial court assessed punishment at the minimum term of
confinement based on those findings.
Issue and Analysis
sole issue appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction. In evaluating this
challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the finding. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103,
111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The issue on appeal is not
whether we, as a court, believe the State's evidence or
believe that appellant's evidence outweighs the
State's evidence. Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d
137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). We may not overturn the
finding of guilt unless we conclude it is irrational or
unsupported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Matson v.
State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The
trier of fact "is the sole judge of the credibility of
the witnesses and of the strength of the evidence."
Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999). The trier of fact may choose to believe or
disbelieve any portion of the witnesses' testimony.
Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986). When faced with conflicting evidence, we presume the
trier of fact resolved conflicts in favor of the prevailing
party. Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993). If any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt, we must affirm. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d
607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
commits a criminal offense if one is "required to
register and fails to comply with any requirement of"
chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, entitled
"Sex Offender Registration Program." See
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.102(a); Young v.
State, 341 S.W.3d 417, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). A
person with a "reportable conviction" must register
with the relevant local law-enforcement authority where the
person resides or intends to reside more than seven days.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.051(a). A "reportable
conviction" includes a conviction for sexual assault.
Id. art. 62.001(5)(A) (Vernon 2018). A person, like
appellant, convicted of two or more "sexually violent
offenses" is required to "report to the local law
enforcement authority designated as the person's primary
registration authority . . . not less than once in each
90-day period following the date the person first registered
. . . to verify the information in the registration form
maintained by the authority for that person." Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. art. 62.058(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 R.S.).
A person who is required to verify registration must ensure
that the person's registration form is complete and
accurate with respect to each item of information required by
the form in accordance with subsection (c), including the
address at which the person resides. Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
art. 62.051(c), (g) (West, Westlaw through 2017 R.S.). When a
person reports to the local law enforcement authority to
verify registration, the local law enforcement authority must
obtain proof of the person's identity and residence and
then give the person's registration form to the person
for verification. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.058(c). If
the information in the registration form is complete and
accurate, the person must "verify registration by
signing the form." Id. If the information is
not complete or not accurate, the person must make any
necessary additions or corrections before signing the form.
Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded that because Chapter
62's registration requirements are triggered only by a
person's duty to register, an offense under article
62.102(a) requires a culpable mental state only regarding the
circumstances of the conduct. See Robinson v. State,
466 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Although Penal
Code section 6.02(c) generally requires that the culpable
mental states of intent, knowledge, or recklessness apply
when reading mental culpability into the statute under
section 6.02(b), the statutory definition of
"intent" contains no provision for circumstances
surrounding conduct, unlike the definitions of
"knowledge" and "recklessness."
See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 6.02, 6.03
(West, Westlaw through 2017 R.S.); Robinson, 466
S.W.3d at 172. Therefore, the high court has determined that
intent does not apply to offenses under article 62.102(a).
Robinson, 466 S.W.3d at 172. Additionally, the Court
of Criminal Appeals has determined that the culpable mental
states of "knowledge" and "recklessness"
apply to the duty-to-register element but not to the
failure-to-register element of an offense under article
62.102(a). Id. at 172, 173. Thus, for an offense
under article 62.102(a), the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) knew or was reckless
about whether the defendant had a duty to register as a sex
offender, and (2) failed to comply with the Chapter 62
requirement the defendant allegedly violated. Id.;
Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App.
trial, Texas Department of Public Safety's special agent
Rebecca Salazar testified that appellant's prior offenses
required that he register as a sex offender. The trial court
admitted into evidence authenticated copies of two judgments
reflecting appellant's two prior
sexual-assault-of-a-child convictions, each of which states
that appellant was subject to Chapter 62's sex-offender
registration requirements. Agent Salazar testified that
following appellant's release from incarceration, on
April 8, 2016, appellant registered 1008 West 1st Street in
Brenham, Washington County, Texas as his address ("the
Registered Address."). Both Agent Salazar's
testimony and documentary evidence admitted at trial show
that on July 11, 2016, appellant verified his registration
and verified that his address was the Registered Address.
uncontested evidence shows that appellant was a person
required to register, and specifically that he was required
either to verify that the Registered Address remained correct
or provide his correct address before signing the form to