United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Austin Division
PITMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is Plaintiff Rebecca Gallogly's
(“Gallogly”) motion for relief from judgment.
(Mot., Dkt. 19). Gallogly seeks a reversal of the Court's
order dismissing her claims without prejudice, (Order, Dkt.
15), on grounds of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect” and for “any other reason that
justifies relief, ” (Mot., Dkt. 19, at 1-2 (citing
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) & (6)). The Court finds that
Gallogly is not entitled to relief from the Court's
Gallogly argues that she was “surprised” because
the Order did not “articulate any understanding or
recognition of Dr. Gallogly's de novo arguments
in her objection to some of Magistrate Judge Lane's
recommendations.” (Mot., Dkt. 19, at 3 (citing
“Legal Dictionary”)). To the contrary, the Court
expressly stated that it reviewed each of Gallogly's
objections de novo in concluding that they were
without merit. (Order, Dkt. 15, at 2).
Gallogly argues that her due process rights were violated
because she was not appointed counsel. (Mot., Dkt. 19, at 4).
Not so: it is well-settled that there is no right to
appointment of counsel in civil cases. Delaughter v.
Woodall, 909 F.3d 130, 140 (5th Cir. 2018). As Judge
Lane explained to Gallogly, appointment of counsel in such
cases is a matter of the court's discretion.
(See R. & R., Dkt. 11, at 23). He concluded, and
the Court agrees, that Gallogly should not be appointed
counsel in this case. (See id.). The circumstances
under which a litigant is entitled to counsel are limited,
Lee v. Postal Servs., 882 F.Supp. 589, 593 (E.D.
Tex. 1995), and Gallogly “has shown herself able to
sufficiently articulate her claims and represent herself in
this lawsuit, ” (R. & R., Dkt. 11, at 23). That
Gallogly “was not articulate enough to state any
actionable claims in her initial complaint, ” (Mot.,
Dkt. 19, at 4), does not bear on her ability to
represent herself, and in any event, it does not follow that
Gallogly is “inarticulate” merely because she
failed to state a claim for which relief could be
further argues that the Court made a mistake in dismissing
her claims because the dismissal is evidence that her
complaint was not liberally construed. (Id. at 5).
Just because the Court dismissed Gallogly's claims does
not mean that her claims were not liberally construed. The
Court agreed with Judge Lane that Gallogly's claims, even
liberally construed, failed to state a cause of action or
were based on “indisputably meritless legal
theories.” (R. & R., Dkt. 11, at 22). The Court
affirms that conclusion here; all of Gallogly's claims
the Court finds that Gallogly has not shown that she is
entitled to relief under Rule 60(b). IT IS THEREFORE
ORDERED that Gallogly's motion for relief from
judgment, (Dkt. 19), is DENIED.
 Gallogly also argues that her due
process rights are violated because, she speculates,
“many actionable claims” do not come to fruition
due to “[t]he intimidation of potentially adversarial
interactions with people possessing power and expertise
beyond that of a pro se litigant” in the
adversarial process. (Mot., Dkt. 4, at 7). She cites no
authority for this proposition, and the Court is aware of
none. The Court is unpersuaded by this speculative
 Gallogly's remaining claims in the
instant motion are also meritless. She claims that the fact
that she is expected “to continue applying for jobs in
lieu of receiving interim monetary relief”
“constitute[s] torture under the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment [(“CAT”)]”; this claim is
completely meritless, even liberally construed. (Mot., Dkt.
19, at 6). So is her claim that the same expectation of
applying for jobs constitutes a violation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
(Id. at 7). Gallogly offers no explanation that
these international treaties apply to her or her
“conditioned aversion” to applying for jobs,