United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Marshall Division
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
W. SCHROEDER, III UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is Plaintiff Phenix Longhorn, LLC's opening
claim construction brief (Docket No. 100), Defendants Texas
Instruments and Wistron Corporation's joint response
(Docket No. 104) and Plaintiff's reply (Docket No. 106).
The Court held a hearing to determine the proper construction
of the disputed claim terms in the U.S. Patent No. 7, 233,
305 (the “ '305 Patent”). Docket No. 123.
Based on the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, the Court
construes the disputed terms in this Memorandum and Order.
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135
S.Ct. 831 (2015).
Longhorn, LLC (“Phenix”) asserts the '305
Patent against Wistron Corporation and Texas Instruments,
Inc. (“TI”) (collectively,
“Defendants”). The asserted claims are
independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2, 4 and 5. The
'305 Patent was previously asserted in Phenix, LLC v.
Integrated Memory Logic, Ltd., et al., No.
6:15-cv-00436-JRG-KNM (“IML”); however,
that case settled prior to the court reaching a ruling on
'305 Patent relates generally to techniques to adjust the
brightness of pixels of a liquid crystal display
(“LCD”). The '305 Patent discloses a circuit
and method for generating reference voltages to be used in
such displays. More particularly, the '305 Patent
describes using sets of gamma correction reference voltage to
provide correction curves for correcting display
characteristics. '305 Patent at 1:10-27. The Abstract of
the '305 Patent recites:
A programmable buffer integrated circuit which can be
programmed to output a set of gamma correction reference
voltages to be used in LCD displays. Once programmed, the
buffers will continuously output the programmed value. The
device incorporates a programming interface to allow the
programming of the buffer outputs to the desired values
during manufacturing and test of the panel. Multiple sets of
values can be programmed to provide different gamma
correction curves for different user or application
Id. at Abstract.
1 of the '305 Patent shows a prior art “diagram
illustrating a conventional gamma reference circuit” in
which resistors are used to fine-tune the reference voltages.
Id. at 1:28-31, 1:46-47.
at Figure 1. The '305 Patent describes the prior art
approaches as too costly, too complex or not easily
changeable due to being non-programmable. Id. at
1:31-2:10. The '305 Patent distinguishes its invention
from the prior art as being programmable such that the output
set of gamma correction reference voltages may be programed.
Id. at Abstract, 2:15-20. The programmed value may
be stored in non-volatile, programmable memory that maintains
the programmed value even if power is removed. Id.
at 2:19-22. Figure 2 illustrates an embodiment in which the
circuitry is formed in first gamma reference controller 210,
second gamma reference controller 220 and programming
at Figure 2. A block diagram of a gamma reference controller
is provided in Figure 3. As shown in Figure 3, elements
330-337 are programmable analog floating gate memory cells.
at Figure 3. The memory cells may be programmed to provide
the desired correction reference voltages to the LCD display.
Id. at 3:48-4:21. Different sets of reference
voltage values may be programmed for particular applications.
Id. at 7:20-32. In one embodiment, the programmable
gamma reference generator may be implemented in one
integrated circuit (AG1818) as shown in Figure 4B.
at Figure 4B. The integrated circuit is capable of storing
eight independent groups of reference voltages, which may be
stored in different banks of memory so that different gamma
correction settings can be stored for different dynamic or
application specific corrections. Id. at 5:50-59.
Figure 6 provides a block diagram of the AG1818 integrated
at Figure 6.
is a ‘bedrock principle' of patent law that
‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which
the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.' ”
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v.
Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115
(Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims,
courts start by considering the intrinsic evidence.
Id. at 1313; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical
Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl.
Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc'ns Group, Inc.,
262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence
includes the claims themselves, the specification and the
prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314;
C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 861. The general
rule-subject to certain specific exceptions discussed
infra-is that each claim term is construed according
to its ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one
of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in
the context of the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1312-13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
claim construction inquiry . . . begins and ends in all cases
with the actual words of the claim.” Renishaw PLC
v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248
(Fed. Cir. 1998). “[I]n all aspects of claim
construction, ‘the name of the game is the claim.'
” Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286,
1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Hiniker Co.,
150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). A term's context
in the asserted claim can be instructive. Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1314. Other asserted or unasserted claims can
also aid in determining the claim's meaning because claim
terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent.
Id. Differences among the claim terms can also
assist in understanding a term's meaning. Id.
For example, when a dependent claim adds a limitation to an
independent claim, it is presumed that the independent claim
does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314-15.
‘must be read in view of the specification, of which
they are a part.' ” Id. (quoting
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,
979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). “[T]he specification
‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction
analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best
guide to the meaning of a disputed term.' ”
Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996));
Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d
1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But, “ ‘[a]lthough
the specification may aid the court in interpreting the
meaning of disputed claim language, particular embodiments
and examples appearing in the specification will not
generally be read into the claims.' ” Comark
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced
Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1988)); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
“[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred
embodiment described in the specification-even if it is the
only embodiment-into the claims absent a clear indication in
the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to
be so limited.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad,
Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper
context for claim construction because, like the
specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of
how the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
and the inventor understood the patent. Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1317. However, “because the prosecution
history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and
the applicant, rather than the final product of that
negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification
and thus is less useful for claim construction
purposes.” Id. at 1318; see also Athletic
Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (ambiguous prosecution history may be
“unhelpful as an interpretive resource”).
extrinsic evidence can also be useful, it is “
‘less significant than the intrinsic record in
determining the legally operative meaning of claim
language.' ” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317
(quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862).
Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a court
understand the underlying technology and the manner in which
one skilled in the art might use claim terms, but technical
dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are
too broad or may not be indicative of how the term is used in
the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony
may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology
and determining the particular meaning of a term in the
pertinent field, but an expert's conclusory, unsupported
assertions as to a term's definition are entirely
unhelpful to a court. Id. Generally, extrinsic
evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its
prosecution history in determining how to read claim
terms.” Id. The Supreme Court explained the
role of extrinsic evidence in claim construction:
In some cases, however, the district court will need to look
beyond the patent's intrinsic evidence and to consult
extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the
background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant
art during the relevant time period. See,
e.g., Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 546
(1871) (a patent may be “so interspersed with technical
terms and terms of art that the testimony of scientific
witnesses is indispensable to a correct understanding of its
meaning”). In cases where those subsidiary facts are in
dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings
about that extrinsic evidence. These are the
“evidentiary underpinnings” of claim construction
that we discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary
fact finding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal.
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct.
831, 841 (2015).
Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term
are “only two exceptions to [the] general rule”
that claim terms are construed according to their plain and
ordinary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a
definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the
patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term either in
the specification or during prosecution.” Golden Bridge
Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (quoting Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm't
Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see
also GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750
F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he specification
and prosecution history only compel departure from the plain
meaning in two instances: lexicography and
disavowal.”). The standards for finding lexicography or
disavowal are “exacting.” GE Lighting
Solutions, 750 F.3d at 1309.
as his own lexicographer, the patentee must “clearly
set forth a definition of the disputed claim term, ”
and “clearly express an intent to define the
term.” Id. (quoting Thorner, 669 F.3d
at 1365); see also Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249. The
patentee's lexicography must appear “with
reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.”
Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249.
disavow or disclaim the full scope of a claim term, the
patentee's statements in the specification or prosecution
history must amount to a “clear and unmistakable”
surrender. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561
F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Thorner,
669 F.3d at 1366 (“The patentee may demonstrate intent
to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a
claim term by including in the specification expressions of
manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear
disavowal of claim scope.”). “Where an
applicant's statements are amenable to multiple
reasonable interpretations, they cannot be deemed clear and
unmistakable.” 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar
Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Functional Claiming and 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6
(pre-AIA) / § 112(f) (AIA)
patent claim may be expressed using functional language.
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6; Williamson v.
Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347-49 & n.3
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant portion). Section 112
¶ 6 provides that a structure may be claimed as a
“means . . . for performing a specified function”
and that an act may be claimed as a “step for
performing a specified function.” Masco Corp. v.
United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
§112 ¶ 6 does not apply to all functional claim
language. There is a rebuttable presumption that § 112
¶ 6 applies when the claim language includes
“means” or “step for” terms, and that
it does not apply in the absence of those terms. Masco
Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326; Williamson, 792 F.3d
at 1348. The presumption stands or falls according to whether
one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim
with the functional language, in the context of the entire
specification, to denote sufficiently definite structure or
acts for performing the function. See Media Rights
Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (§ 112 ¶ 6 does not apply
when “the claim language, read in light of the
specification, recites sufficiently definite structure”
(citing Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349; Robert
Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1099 (Fed.
Cir. 2014))); Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (section
112 ¶ 6 does not apply when “the words of the
claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art
to have sufficiently definite meaning as the name for
structure”); Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326
(section 112 ¶ 6 does not apply when the claim includes
an “act” corresponding to “how the function
is performed”); Personalized Media Communications,
L.L.C. v. International Trade Commission, 161 F.3d 696,
704 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (section 112 ¶ 6 does not apply
when the claim includes “sufficient structure,
material, or acts within the claim itself to perform entirely
the recited function . . . even if the claim uses the term
‘means.' ” (internal citation omitted)).
applies, § 112 ¶ 6 limits the scope of the
functional term “to only the structure, materials or
acts described in the specification as corresponding to the
claimed function and equivalents thereof.”
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347. Construing a
means-plus-function limitation involves multiple steps.
“The first step . . . is a determination of the
function of the means-plus-function limitation.”
Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys.,
Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “[T]he
next step is to determine the corresponding structure
disclosed in the specification and equivalents
thereof.” Id. A “structure disclosed in
the specification is ‘corresponding' structure only
if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or
associates that structure to the function recited in the
claim.” Id. The focus of the
“corresponding structure” inquiry is not merely
whether a structure is capable of performing the recited
function, but rather whether the corresponding structure is
“clearly linked or associated with the [recited]
function.” Id. The corresponding structure
“must include all structure that actually performs the
recited function.” Default Proof Credit Card Sys.
v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed.
Cir. 2005). However, § 112 does not permit
“incorporation of structure from the written
description beyond that necessary to perform the claimed
function.” Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem.
Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
§ 112 ¶ 6 limitations implemented by a programmed
general purpose computer or microprocessor, the corresponding
structure described in the patent specification must include
an algorithm for performing the function. WMS Gaming Inc.
v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
1999). The corresponding structure is not a general purpose
computer but rather the special purpose computer programmed
to perform the disclosed algorithm. Aristocrat Techs.
Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328,
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Definiteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 (pre-AIA) /
§ 112(b) (AIA) 
claims must particularly point out and distinctly claim the
subject matter regarded as the invention. 35 U.S.C. §
112 ¶ 2. A claim, when viewed in light of the intrinsic
evidence, must “inform those skilled in the art about
the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.”
Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct.
2120, 2129 (2014). If it does not, the claim does not satisfy
§ 112 ¶ 2 and is therefore invalid as indefinite.
Id. at 2124. Whether a claim is indefinite is
determined from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in
the art as of the time the application for the patent was
filed. Id. at 2130. As it is a challenge to the
validity of a patent, the failure of any claim in suit to
comply with § 112 must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. at 2130 n.10. “[I]ndefiniteness
is a question of law and in effect part of claim
construction.” ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software,
Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 517 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
context of a claim governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6,
the claim is invalid as indefinite if the claim fails to
disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform the
claimed functions. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351-52.
The disclosure is inadequate when one of ordinary skill in
the art “would be unable to recognize the structure in
the specification and associate it with the corresponding
function in the claim.” Id. at 1352.
hearing, the parties agreed to the construction for the
multiplexer (claim 1)
one or more circuits that couple (1) one input (or
one set of inputs) to one of many outputs (or one
set of many sets of outputs) or (2) one of many
inputs (or one set of many sets of inputs) to one
output (or one set of outputs)
No. 123 at 99-100.
The Preamble of Claim 1 (“An integrated circuit for
producing voltage signals on a plurality of outputs
The preamble of Claim 1 is a limitation reciting
one integrated circuit
No construction needed / not limiting
Agrees with Phenix
contends that the preamble is not a limitation while Phenix
and TI contend the preamble is a limitation that limits the
claim to a single integrated circuit.
of the Parties
first notes the basic preamble law: a preamble is a
limitation “if it recites essential structure or steps,
or if it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and
vitality' to the claim.” Catalina Mktg.
Int'l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801,
808 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Phenix notes that the term “said
integrated circuit” is also found at the end of claim 1
and that the specification described “the
invention” as being an integrated circuit. Docket No.
100 at 10-11 (citing '305 Patent at 7:60-61). Phenix
further contends that the specification distinguished the
invention from multi-component solutions, quoting the
specification as follows: “the present invention
advantageously allows a stand-alone solution such that it is
not necessary to incorporate a micro controller unit
(MCU).” '305 Patent at 2:33-35. Phenix also points
to the examiner's statements in the Notice of
Allowability as repeatedly referencing an integrated circuit.
Docket No. 100 at 14. Phenix further notes that the experts
of both Phenix and Wistron agreed that the ordinary meaning
of “integrated circuit” refers to a single
semiconductor chip. Id. at 15.
quotes the well-understood principle that “[g]enerally,
the preamble does not limit claims.” Allen
Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336,
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Wistron contends that the preamble
here does not give “life, meaning, and vitality to the
claim” and does not include any essential component of
the invention. Docket No. 104 at 4.
responds that even when a preamble claim term is found in the
body, that does not necessarily mean the preamble is always
limiting. Id. at 5 (citing Am. Med. Sys., Inc.
v. Biolitec, Inc., 618 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2010)). Wistron states that the term must still provide
“context essential to understanding” the meaning
of the term in the body of the claim. Id. (quoting
Seachange Int'l, Inc. v. C-Cor, Inc., 413 F.3d
1361, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Wistron contends that the usage
of “integrated circuit” in the body does not
provide essential context to the invention.
acknowledges that claim 1 of “the '305 patent
recites ‘means to switch between the banks based on one
or more external signals is provided on
said integrated circuit,'
” but argues that “this use can hardly be said to
provide “essential context.” Docket No. 104 at 6.
According to Wistron, the “means to switch between
banks” limitation was added to claim 1 from a dependent
claim and, thus, cannot be said to be essential context since
the term was not in claim 1 originally. Docket Id.
at 5-6. Wistron further notes that the “integrated
circuit” is only found in the specification three
times. Id. at 6.
also argues that limiting the claim to a single integrated
circuit would exclude the preferred embodiment of Figure 2.
Specifically, Wistron contends that the Figure 2 embodiment
discloses multiple semiconductor chips, specifically gamma
reference controller 210, gamma reference controller 220 and
programming interface 230. Wistron asserts that Phenix's
expert, Robert Murphy, agrees on this point. Id. at
6-7. According to Wistron, however, this position clashes
with requiring claim 1 to be a single integrated circuit.
also argues that the embodiment of Figure 6 would also be
excluded under Phenix's construction. Docket No. 104 at
7. Specifically, Wistron argues that the AG1818 embodiment of
Figure 6 includes a programmable interface and elsewhere the
specification teaches that the programmable interface may be
a personal computer-based interface. '305 Patent at
7:13-14 (“PC based programming interface is available
for prototyping and gamma optimization.”).
In general, a preamble limits the invention if it recites
essential structure or steps, or if it is “necessary to
give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claim.
Conversely, a preamble is not limiting where a patentee
defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body
and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use
for the invention.
Catalina Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com,
Inc., 239 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations
the term “integrated circuit” is not merely found
in the preamble but also in the body of the claim. '305
Patent at Claim 1 (“means to switch between the banks
based on one or more external signals is provided on said
integrated circuit”). The means to switch “on
said integrated circuit” provides essential context to
what is claimed, and the term “said” clearly
references the preamble's disclosure of “an
integrated circuit.” Id. In this context, the
“means to switch” is “on said integrated
circuit, ” within which the other claimed elements are
the limitation that added “integrated circuit” to
the body of the claim was added during prosecution by
incorporating the subject matter of an allowable dependent
claim (application claim 6) into claim 1. This highlights the
importance of the limitation in the body of the claim.
See Docket No. 100-3 at 67, 79, 99.
argues that this would exclude the embodiment of Figure 2 and
that excluding embodiments is rarely correct. However, the
body of claim itself makes the exclusion. As Wistron notes,
the term “integrated circuit” is only utilized a
few times in the specification; however, in one instance, it
is utilized in relation to the single device embodiment of
Figure 4B (as opposed to the separate devices of Figure 2):
In one embodiment of the invention, the integrated circuit,
termed the AG1818, is a programmable gamma reference
generator with integrated output buffers to directly drive
the source driver inputs of a display; in one embodiment the
display is a TFT LCD. The circuit requires a single 3.3 volt
supply, 1.5 mA operating current and consumes 10 uA in
standby mode. FIGS. 4A and 4B show an alternative pin out of
'305 Patent at 5:30-37. In context of this passage and by
noting the contrast between Figures 2 and 4B, it is clear
that the '305 Patent discloses alternative embodiments,
including single integrated circuits and multiple-devices
configurations. Thus, the usage of “integrated
circuit” in the claims provides further life and
vitality to what is being claimed.
also argues that the '305 Patent provides that a
programming interface that is PC-based may be utilized for
prototyping. '305 Patent at 7:7-19. In light of the
reference to a single integrated circuit provided in Figures
4A, 4B, 5 and 6 and the description that the programming
interface of Figure 6 “allows the device to be
programmed in-situ” ('305 Patent at 6:22-23), it is
clear that: (1) the PC-based programming interface is
provided as an alternative embodiment and (2) the prototyping
that provides an “alternate source” of Vpp does
not alter the integrated circuit implementation of the
figures and description of the '305 Patent. '305
Patent at 7:7-19, 5:30-7:6. In the briefing and during oral
argument, Wistron further argued that it is not clear if
“integrated circuit” is known to those in the art
to refer to circuitry being formed on only one circuit, such
as a single semiconductor chip. See Docket No. 123
at 37-38. However, such assertions conflict with the clear
teaching of the specification, including the embodiments of
Figures 4A, 4B, 5 and 6.
extrinsic expert evidence, including that of Wistron's
own expert, contradicts Wistron's argument as to what was
generally well-known in the art at the time of the invention
with respect to an integrated circuit being formed as a
single device. See Docket No. 100-4 ¶¶ 31-
33, 43; see Docket No. 100-8 at 89:23-90:11; see
also Docket No. 100-17 ¶ 29. On balance, the Court
finds Phenix's expert's interpretation of the meaning
of “integrated circuit” to be correct and rejects
Wistron's contention that an integrated circuit is not
integrated on one semiconductor chip. See Teva
Pharm., 135 S.Ct. at 841.
context of the claim itself and the specification, the
preamble provides life, vitality and meaning to the claim,
and thus, is properly included as a limitation of the claim.
Court finds that the preamble of claim 1 is a limitation
reciting one integrated circuit.
“non-volatile storage cells” (claims 1, 2,
Cells of a semiconductor memory that retain their
stored data after power is removed and that restore
the data when power is returned to the system, such
as, for example, cells found in the following
memories: analog floating gate non-volatile memory,
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
(EEPROM), Flash EEPROM, Ultraviolet EPROM
(UVEPROM), and Non-Volatile Random Access Memory
Memory cells storing analog voltages, which retain
the stored voltages even when power is removed
analog non-volatile storage cells
primary dispute is whether the term “storage
cells” encompasses both analog and digital cells or if
it is limited to analog cells.