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Phenix Longhorn, LLC v. Wistron Corp.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Marshall Division

June 21, 2019

PHENIX LONGHORN, LCC, Plaintiff,
v.
WISTRON CORPORATION, Defendant. PHENIX LONGHORN, LCC, Plaintiff,
v.
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS, INC., Defendant. Phenix Wistron TI Phenix Defendants Phenix Wistron TI Phenix Wistron TI Phenix Wistron TI Phenix Wistron TI

          CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          ROBERT W. SCHROEDER, III UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         Before the Court is Plaintiff Phenix Longhorn, LLC's opening claim construction brief (Docket No. 100), Defendants Texas Instruments and Wistron Corporation's joint response (Docket No. 104) and Plaintiff's reply (Docket No. 106). The Court held a hearing to determine the proper construction of the disputed claim terms in the U.S. Patent No. 7, 233, 305 (the “ '305 Patent”). Docket No. 123. Based on the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, the Court construes the disputed terms in this Memorandum and Order. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015).

         BACKGROUND

         Phenix Longhorn, LLC (“Phenix”) asserts the '305 Patent against Wistron Corporation and Texas Instruments, Inc. (“TI”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The asserted claims are independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2, 4 and 5. The '305 Patent was previously asserted in Phenix, LLC v. Integrated Memory Logic, Ltd., et al., No. 6:15-cv-00436-JRG-KNM (“IML”); however, that case settled prior to the court reaching a ruling on claim construction.

         The '305 Patent relates generally to techniques to adjust the brightness of pixels of a liquid crystal display (“LCD”). The '305 Patent discloses a circuit and method for generating reference voltages to be used in such displays. More particularly, the '305 Patent describes using sets of gamma correction reference voltage to provide correction curves for correcting display characteristics. '305 Patent at 1:10-27. The Abstract of the '305 Patent recites:

A programmable buffer integrated circuit which can be programmed to output a set of gamma correction reference voltages to be used in LCD displays. Once programmed, the buffers will continuously output the programmed value. The device incorporates a programming interface to allow the programming of the buffer outputs to the desired values during manufacturing and test of the panel. Multiple sets of values can be programmed to provide different gamma correction curves for different user or application requirements.

Id. at Abstract.

         Figure 1 of the '305 Patent shows a prior art “diagram illustrating a conventional gamma reference circuit” in which resistors are used to fine-tune the reference voltages. Id. at 1:28-31, 1:46-47.

         (Image Omitted)

         Id. at Figure 1. The '305 Patent describes the prior art approaches as too costly, too complex or not easily changeable due to being non-programmable. Id. at 1:31-2:10. The '305 Patent distinguishes its invention from the prior art as being programmable such that the output set of gamma correction reference voltages may be programed. Id. at Abstract, 2:15-20. The programmed value may be stored in non-volatile, programmable memory that maintains the programmed value even if power is removed. Id. at 2:19-22. Figure 2 illustrates an embodiment in which the circuitry is formed in first gamma reference controller 210, second gamma reference controller 220 and programming interface 230.

         (Image Omitted)

         Id. at Figure 2. A block diagram of a gamma reference controller is provided in Figure 3. As shown in Figure 3, elements 330-337 are programmable analog floating gate memory cells.

         (Image Omitted)

         Id. at Figure 3. The memory cells may be programmed to provide the desired correction reference voltages to the LCD display. Id. at 3:48-4:21. Different sets of reference voltage values may be programmed for particular applications. Id. at 7:20-32. In one embodiment, the programmable gamma reference generator may be implemented in one integrated circuit (AG1818) as shown in Figure 4B.

         (Image Omitted)

         Id. at Figure 4B. The integrated circuit is capable of storing eight independent groups of reference voltages, which may be stored in different banks of memory so that different gamma correction settings can be stored for different dynamic or application specific corrections. Id. at 5:50-59. Figure 6 provides a block diagram of the AG1818 integrated circuit.

         (Image Omitted)

         Id. at Figure 6.

         LEGAL PRINCIPLES

         “It is a ‘bedrock principle' of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.' ” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start by considering the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1313; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc'ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, the specification and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 861. The general rule-subject to certain specific exceptions discussed infra-is that each claim term is construed according to its ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

         “The claim construction inquiry . . . begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[I]n all aspects of claim construction, ‘the name of the game is the claim.' ” Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). A term's context in the asserted claim can be instructive. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the claim's meaning because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id. Differences among the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term's meaning. Id. For example, when a dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that the independent claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314-15.

         “[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.' ” Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). “[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.' ” Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But, “ ‘[a]lthough the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.' ” Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. “[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the specification-even if it is the only embodiment-into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

         The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim construction because, like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) and the inventor understood the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. However, “because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.” Id. at 1318; see also Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (ambiguous prosecution history may be “unhelpful as an interpretive resource”).

         Although extrinsic evidence can also be useful, it is “ ‘less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.' ” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might use claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too broad or may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert's conclusory, unsupported assertions as to a term's definition are entirely unhelpful to a court. Id. Generally, extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Id. The Supreme Court explained the role of extrinsic evidence in claim construction:

In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent's intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period. See, e.g., Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 546 (1871) (a patent may be “so interspersed with technical terms and terms of art that the testimony of scientific witnesses is indispensable to a correct understanding of its meaning”). In cases where those subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic evidence. These are the “evidentiary underpinnings” of claim construction that we discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary fact finding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal.

Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 841 (2015).

         A. Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term

         There are “only two exceptions to [the] general rule” that claim terms are construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.”[1] Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm't Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he specification and prosecution history only compel departure from the plain meaning in two instances: lexicography and disavowal.”). The standards for finding lexicography or disavowal are “exacting.” GE Lighting Solutions, 750 F.3d at 1309.

         To act as his own lexicographer, the patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term, ” and “clearly express an intent to define the term.” Id. (quoting Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365); see also Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249. The patentee's lexicography must appear “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249.

         To disavow or disclaim the full scope of a claim term, the patentee's statements in the specification or prosecution history must amount to a “clear and unmistakable” surrender. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366 (“The patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.”). “Where an applicant's statements are amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations, they cannot be deemed clear and unmistakable.” 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

         B. Functional Claiming and 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 (pre-AIA) / § 112(f) (AIA)[2]

         A patent claim may be expressed using functional language. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6; Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347-49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant portion). Section 112 ¶ 6 provides that a structure may be claimed as a “means . . . for performing a specified function” and that an act may be claimed as a “step for performing a specified function.” Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

         But §112 ¶ 6 does not apply to all functional claim language. There is a rebuttable presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 applies when the claim language includes “means” or “step for” terms, and that it does not apply in the absence of those terms. Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326; Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. The presumption stands or falls according to whether one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim with the functional language, in the context of the entire specification, to denote sufficiently definite structure or acts for performing the function. See Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (§ 112 ¶ 6 does not apply when “the claim language, read in light of the specification, recites sufficiently definite structure” (citing Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349; Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2014))); Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (section 112 ¶ 6 does not apply when “the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure”); Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326 (section 112 ¶ 6 does not apply when the claim includes an “act” corresponding to “how the function is performed”); Personalized Media Communications, L.L.C. v. International Trade Commission, 161 F.3d 696, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (section 112 ¶ 6 does not apply when the claim includes “sufficient structure, material, or acts within the claim itself to perform entirely the recited function . . . even if the claim uses the term ‘means.' ” (internal citation omitted)).

         When it applies, § 112 ¶ 6 limits the scope of the functional term “to only the structure, materials or acts described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed function and equivalents thereof.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347. Construing a means-plus-function limitation involves multiple steps. “The first step . . . is a determination of the function of the means-plus-function limitation.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “[T]he next step is to determine the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Id. A “structure disclosed in the specification is ‘corresponding' structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Id. The focus of the “corresponding structure” inquiry is not merely whether a structure is capable of performing the recited function, but rather whether the corresponding structure is “clearly linked or associated with the [recited] function.” Id. The corresponding structure “must include all structure that actually performs the recited function.” Default Proof Credit Card Sys. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005). However, § 112 does not permit “incorporation of structure from the written description beyond that necessary to perform the claimed function.” Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

         For § 112 ¶ 6 limitations implemented by a programmed general purpose computer or microprocessor, the corresponding structure described in the patent specification must include an algorithm for performing the function. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The corresponding structure is not a general purpose computer but rather the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

         C. Definiteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 (pre-AIA) / § 112(b) (AIA) [3]

         Patent claims must particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter regarded as the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2. A claim, when viewed in light of the intrinsic evidence, must “inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). If it does not, the claim does not satisfy § 112 ¶ 2 and is therefore invalid as indefinite. Id. at 2124. Whether a claim is indefinite is determined from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art as of the time the application for the patent was filed. Id. at 2130. As it is a challenge to the validity of a patent, the failure of any claim in suit to comply with § 112 must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 2130 n.10. “[I]ndefiniteness is a question of law and in effect part of claim construction.” ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 517 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

         In the context of a claim governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, the claim is invalid as indefinite if the claim fails to disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform the claimed functions. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351-52. The disclosure is inadequate when one of ordinary skill in the art “would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the corresponding function in the claim.” Id. at 1352.

         AGREED TERMS

         At the hearing, the parties agreed to the construction for the “multiplexer” term.

Term

Agreed Construction

multiplexer (claim 1)

one or more circuits that couple (1) one input (or one set of inputs) to one of many outputs (or one set of many sets of outputs) or (2) one of many inputs (or one set of many sets of inputs) to one output (or one set of outputs)

         Docket No. 123 at 99-100.

         DISPUTED TERMS

         1. The Preamble of Claim 1 (“An integrated circuit for producing voltage signals on a plurality of outputs comprising:”)

Phenix

Wistron

TI

The preamble of Claim 1 is a limitation reciting one integrated circuit

No construction needed / not limiting

Agrees with Phenix

         Wistron contends that the preamble is not a limitation while Phenix and TI contend the preamble is a limitation that limits the claim to a single integrated circuit.

         Positions of the Parties

         Phenix first notes the basic preamble law: a preamble is a limitation “if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality' to the claim.” Catalina Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Phenix notes that the term “said integrated circuit” is also found at the end of claim 1 and that the specification described “the invention” as being an integrated circuit. Docket No. 100 at 10-11 (citing '305 Patent at 7:60-61). Phenix further contends that the specification distinguished the invention from multi-component solutions, quoting the specification as follows: “the present invention advantageously allows a stand-alone solution such that it is not necessary to incorporate a micro controller unit (MCU).” '305 Patent at 2:33-35. Phenix also points to the examiner's statements in the Notice of Allowability as repeatedly referencing an integrated circuit. Docket No. 100 at 14. Phenix further notes that the experts of both Phenix and Wistron agreed that the ordinary meaning of “integrated circuit” refers to a single semiconductor chip. Id. at 15.

         Wistron quotes the well-understood principle that “[g]enerally, the preamble does not limit claims.” Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Wistron contends that the preamble here does not give “life, meaning, and vitality to the claim” and does not include any essential component of the invention. Docket No. 104 at 4.

         Wistron responds that even when a preamble claim term is found in the body, that does not necessarily mean the preamble is always limiting. Id. at 5 (citing Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc., 618 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Wistron states that the term must still provide “context essential to understanding” the meaning of the term in the body of the claim. Id. (quoting Seachange Int'l, Inc. v. C-Cor, Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Wistron contends that the usage of “integrated circuit” in the body does not provide essential context to the invention.

         Wistron acknowledges that claim 1 of “the '305 patent recites ‘means to switch between the banks based on one or more external signals is provided on said integrated circuit,' ” but argues that “this use can hardly be said to provide “essential context.” Docket No. 104 at 6. According to Wistron, the “means to switch between banks” limitation was added to claim 1 from a dependent claim and, thus, cannot be said to be essential context since the term was not in claim 1 originally. Docket Id. at 5-6. Wistron further notes that the “integrated circuit” is only found in the specification three times. Id. at 6.

         Wistron also argues that limiting the claim to a single integrated circuit would exclude the preferred embodiment of Figure 2. Specifically, Wistron contends that the Figure 2 embodiment discloses multiple semiconductor chips, specifically gamma reference controller 210, gamma reference controller 220 and programming interface 230. Wistron asserts that Phenix's expert, Robert Murphy, agrees on this point. Id. at 6-7. According to Wistron, however, this position clashes with requiring claim 1 to be a single integrated circuit.

         Wistron also argues that the embodiment of Figure 6 would also be excluded under Phenix's construction. Docket No. 104 at 7. Specifically, Wistron argues that the AG1818 embodiment of Figure 6 includes a programmable interface and elsewhere the specification teaches that the programmable interface may be a personal computer-based interface. '305 Patent at 7:13-14 (“PC based programming interface is available for prototyping and gamma optimization.”).

         Analysis

In general, a preamble limits the invention if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claim. Conversely, a preamble is not limiting where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.

Catalina Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

         Here, the term “integrated circuit” is not merely found in the preamble but also in the body of the claim. '305 Patent at Claim 1 (“means to switch between the banks based on one or more external signals is provided on said integrated circuit”). The means to switch “on said integrated circuit” provides essential context to what is claimed, and the term “said” clearly references the preamble's disclosure of “an integrated circuit.” Id. In this context, the “means to switch” is “on said integrated circuit, ” within which the other claimed elements are also found.

         Further, the limitation that added “integrated circuit” to the body of the claim was added during prosecution by incorporating the subject matter of an allowable dependent claim (application claim 6) into claim 1. This highlights the importance of the limitation in the body of the claim. See Docket No. 100-3 at 67, 79, 99.

         Wistron argues that this would exclude the embodiment of Figure 2 and that excluding embodiments is rarely correct. However, the body of claim itself makes the exclusion. As Wistron notes, the term “integrated circuit” is only utilized a few times in the specification; however, in one instance, it is utilized in relation to the single device embodiment of Figure 4B (as opposed to the separate devices of Figure 2):

In one embodiment of the invention, the integrated circuit, termed the AG1818, is a programmable gamma reference generator with integrated output buffers to directly drive the source driver inputs of a display; in one embodiment the display is a TFT LCD. The circuit requires a single 3.3 volt supply, 1.5 mA operating current and consumes 10 uA in standby mode. FIGS. 4A and 4B show an alternative pin out of this embodiment.

'305 Patent at 5:30-37. In context of this passage and by noting the contrast between Figures 2 and 4B, it is clear that the '305 Patent discloses alternative embodiments, including single integrated circuits and multiple-devices configurations. Thus, the usage of “integrated circuit” in the claims provides further life and vitality to what is being claimed.

         Wistron also argues that the '305 Patent provides that a programming interface that is PC-based may be utilized for prototyping. '305 Patent at 7:7-19. In light of the reference to a single integrated circuit provided in Figures 4A, 4B, 5 and 6 and the description that the programming interface of Figure 6 “allows the device to be programmed in-situ” ('305 Patent at 6:22-23), it is clear that: (1) the PC-based programming interface is provided as an alternative embodiment and (2) the prototyping that provides an “alternate source” of Vpp does not alter the integrated circuit implementation of the figures and description of the '305 Patent. '305 Patent at 7:7-19, 5:30-7:6. In the briefing and during oral argument, Wistron further argued that it is not clear if “integrated circuit” is known to those in the art to refer to circuitry being formed on only one circuit, such as a single semiconductor chip. See Docket No. 123 at 37-38. However, such assertions conflict with the clear teaching of the specification, including the embodiments of Figures 4A, 4B, 5 and 6.

         The extrinsic expert evidence, including that of Wistron's own expert, contradicts Wistron's argument as to what was generally well-known in the art at the time of the invention with respect to an integrated circuit being formed as a single device. See Docket No. 100-4 ¶¶ 31- 33, 43; see Docket No. 100-8 at 89:23-90:11; see also Docket No. 100-17 ¶ 29. On balance, the Court finds Phenix's expert's interpretation of the meaning of “integrated circuit” to be correct and rejects Wistron's contention that an integrated circuit is not integrated on one semiconductor chip. See Teva Pharm., 135 S.Ct. at 841.

         In context of the claim itself and the specification, the preamble provides life, vitality and meaning to the claim, and thus, is properly included as a limitation of the claim.

         The Court finds that the preamble of claim 1 is a limitation reciting one integrated circuit.

         2. “non-volatile storage cells” (claims 1, 2, 4)

Phenix

Wistron

TI

Cells of a semiconductor memory that retain their stored data after power is removed and that restore the data when power is returned to the system, such as, for example, cells found in the following memories: analog floating gate non-volatile memory, Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM), Flash EEPROM, Ultraviolet EPROM (UVEPROM), and Non-Volatile Random Access Memory (NOVRAM)

Memory cells storing analog voltages, which retain the stored voltages even when power is removed

analog non-volatile storage cells

         The primary dispute is whether the term “storage cells” encompasses both analog and digital cells or if it is limited to analog cells.

         Positions ...


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