United States District Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division
JUAN B. MANCIAS, Plaintiff,
ONEMAIN FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Defendant.
RODRIGUEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
date, the Court considered Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (docket no.
12). Although Plaintiff did not respond, the Court will
evaluate the motion and applicable law. After careful
consideration, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.
9, 2007, Plaintiff Juan Mancias executed a Loan Agreement and
Disclosure Statement (“the Note”) for $32, 400,
payable to American General Financial Services, Inc., and a
Deed of Trust securing the repayment of the Note with the
property at 1250 Roemer Lane, Unit D, Floresville, Texas
loan was transferred to Springleaf Financial Services, Inc.
on December 30, 2015. OneMain is the successor to Springleaf
and the current mortgagee and holder of the Note. Plaintiff
has defaulted and the Note is past due for the February 3,
2013, payment and all subsequent payments. On March 2, 2015,
Plaintiff was sent a Notice of Default. On December 11, 2017,
Plaintiff was sent a Notice of Acceleration.
state court, Defendant filed an Application for an Expedited
Order under Rule 736 on a Home Equity Loan. Seeking to stop
the foreclosure, Plaintiff filed, on October 11, 2018, his
Original Petition in the 81st Judicial District Court of
Wilson County, Texas. Plaintiff, seeking declaratory relief,
alleges that Defendant's Rule 736 application was filed
more than four years after the alleged breach and was thus
barred by the statute of limitations. On October 26,
Defendant removed to this Court. On June 13, Defendant filed
the motion now before the Court (docket no. 12). Although
Plaintiff's response deadline has passed, Plaintiff did
not file a response.
is entitled to summary judgment only if it demonstrates that
there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). In order to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue
of material fact, a movant either has to negate the existence
of a material element of the non-movant's claim or
defense or point out that the evidence in the record is
insufficient when the non-movant bears the burden of proof
for that element at trial. Lavespere v. Niagra Machine
& Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir.
1990). To satisfy its initial responsibility, a movant
without the burden of proof at trial need only point out that
there is an absence of evidence to support the
non-movant's claim to shift the burden to the non-movant
to show that summary judgment is not proper. See Fields
v. City of S. Hous., 922 F.2d 1183, 1187 (5th Cir.
is a genuine issue of material fact when the evidence allows
a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-movant.
Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 347,
350 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In order to conclude
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must
be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could have
found for the non-movant. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at
250 n.4. A court on summary judgment must review the summary
judgment record taken as a whole, but the court is not
permitted to make “credibility determinations or weigh
the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). The court must review
“all facts and inferences in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party.” Dillon v. Rogers, 596
F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010).
Defendant moves, in the alternative to summary judgment, for
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c), the Court determines that summary judgment
is appropriate. The Court will first consider the central
arguments of Plaintiff's Petition-namely, that the
limitations period has run on Defendant's right to
foreclose and that Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory
relief on this point. Then, the Court turns to
Defendant's counter-claim for an order authorizing
Statute of Limitations
Texas law, a secured lender “must bring suit for . . .
the foreclosure of a real property lien not later than four
years after the day the cause of action accrues.”
Boren v. U.S. Nat. Bank Ass'n, 807 F.3d 99, 104
(5th Cir. 2015) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 16.035(a).) If the applicable note is payable in
installments and secured by a real property lien, the
limitations period does not begin until the “maturity
date of the last note, obligation, or installment, ”
id., but if the deed of trust contains an optional
acceleration clause, the limitations period does not begin
until the holder actually exercises its option to accelerate,
Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf 44 S.W.3d
562, 566 (Tex. 2001). To do so, the holder must send
“both a ...