United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
Londer B. Davis, Plaintiff,
City of Grand Prairie, et al., Defendants.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
HARRIS TOLIVER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this
case was referred to the United States magistrate judge for
case management, including findings and a recommended
disposition. The Court granted Plaintiff Londer B. Davis'
motion to proceed in forma pauperis but did not
issue order that process issue pending the completion of
judicial screening. Doc. 13. Upon review of the relevant
pleadings and applicable law, this case should be summarily
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to
state a claim.
November 5, 2018, Davis, proceeding without the assistance of
counsel, initiated this action by filing a Complaint
against the City of Grand Prairie, Chief of Police Dye, and
Dallas County District Attorney Faith Johnson. Doc. 2 at 1.
He avers in toto:
I was racially profiled, when on 3 Apr. 2k16 I witnessed
roll-over, I report it to Police, but I went to Jail because
of my race, I went to court for almost 1 ½
yrs. Grand Prairie Police never show. These Document that
I'm sending is violation of American Disability Act. I
suffer from “P.T.S.D.”
at 1 (emphasis and misspelling in original); see
also Doc. 6 (77-page supplemental document).
as the Court can glean from the Complaint, Davis
asserts constitutional violations stemming from his arrest on
April 3, 2016, after he witnessed a rollover accident. Doc.
2. He alleges racial profiling, false arrest and
imprisonment, and violations of the American with Disability
Act (ADA). Doc. 2 at 1. Davis also appears to claim malicious
prosecution as a result of being charged with a misdemeanor
offense-intentionally giving false information to a police
officer-that was dismissed on July 10, 2018. Doc. 6 at 2-4;
State v. Davis, No. M1630931 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 1,
Dallas Cty., Tex., filed Apr. 4, 2016).
Answers to Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire,
Davis avers: “I was bullied by police, held against my
will on bogus charges, that's call[ed] kidnapping, they
fail[ed] to get me mental health treatment!” Doc. 10 at
6. He further asserts that he (1) was “called a
fugitive by the Police of Grand Prairie, ” (2) was
incarcerated from April 3 to April 5, 2016, and (3) suffered
from anxiety during the time he was jailed because he was
unable to contact anyone, his truck was towed with his
medicines inside, and he was denied medical attention. Doc.
10 at 2-5; Doc. 6 at 3. Davis also invokes the ADA, due to
his purported mental health condition and Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD). Doc. 10 at 4. He avers, “[i]f
you are mentally ill and black, you already have two strikes
against you, when you come into contact with ‘only
white police.'” Doc. 10 at 4. Davis seeks
“2.5 million dollars for each year from 3 Apr.
2016.” Doc. 10 at 6.
Davis is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint
is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
That statute provides for the sua sponte dismissal
of a complaint if the Court finds that it (1) is frivolous or
malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief. A complaint is frivolous when
it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law when it is
“based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory.” Id. at 327. A complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Court must always liberally construe pleadings filed by
pro se litigants. See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting pro se pleadings
“must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Cf. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so
as to do justice.”). Even under this most liberal
construction, however, Davis fails to state a viable claim.
Claims Accruing On or Before April 5, 2016 are Time
maintains that he was racially profiled and unlawfully
arrested on April 3, 2016, and that he was subsequently
denied medical treatment for PTSD for approximately two days
following his arrest. Based on these allegations, the latest
Davis could have timely filed Section 1983 civil rights
action was April 5, 2018. See Owens v. Okure,
488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989) (applying state forum's
personal injury statute of limitations in a section
1983 case); Stanley v. Foster, 464 F.3d 565, 568
(5th Cir. 2006) (holding Texas Section 1983 actions are
governed by the two-year personal injury limitations period);
Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 237 (5th
Cir. 2011) (same as to ADA action); Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (West 2019). However,
Davis' complaint was filed November 5, 2018, well outside
of the two-year limitations' period.
does not allege, much less demonstrate, that he is entitled
to equitable tolling of the limitations' period due to a
“legal disability.” SeeTex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 16.001(a) (West 2019)
(“a person is under a legal disability if the person
is: (1) younger than 18 years of age, regardless of whether
the person is married; or (2) of unsound mind.”). And
his imprisonment does not provide a basis to toll the statute
of limitations under Texas law. See Gonzales v. Wyatt,
157 F.3d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1998). Accordingly,
Davis' Complaint wholly fails to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face, thus, his civil
rights claims should be dismissed with prejudice for failure
to state a claim. Jones v. Bock,549 U.S. 199, 215
(2007) (holding that when “relief is barred by the