Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Allen v. United States

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

July 9, 2019

RODNEY B. ALLEN, Movant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          ED KINKEADE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Before the Court is Rodney B. Allen's (Movant) motion to vacate, set-aside, or correct sentence pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the following reasons, the Court denies the motion.

         I. BACKGROUND

         After a jury trial, Movant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). He was subject to a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because he had a conviction for Texas robbery and two convictions for Texas aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to 293 months' imprisonment. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Allen, 136 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1399 (1998). Movant's first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion was dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Allen v. United States, No. 3:05-CV-1477-K (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2006).

         The Fifth Circuit authorized a successive § 2255 motion on the issue of whether his sentence under the ACCA was proper in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). In re Allen, No. 16-10399 (5th Cir. Jul. 19, 2016). Although Movant is now on supervised release, his § 2255 motion is not moot, because if a ground regarding alleged sentencing error has merit and the movant is on supervised release, a court may grant relief in the form of a reduction in the term of supervised release. See Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006) (the possibility that the district court may alter the period of supervised release based on the petitioner having served excess prison time, prevents a habeas petition from being moot).

         II. SCOPE OF RELIEF AVAILABLE UNDER § 2255

          “Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Gaudet, 81 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It is well-established that “a collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal.” United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982)).

         III. ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT

         Movant contends that his sentence should not have been enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) for his prior Texas robbery and aggravated robbery convictions.

         Federal law forbids certain people-such as convicted felons, persons committed to mental institutions, and drug users-to ship, possess, and receive firearms. § 922(g). In general, the law punishes violation of this ban by up to 10 years' imprisonment. § 924(a)(2). But if the violator has three or more earlier convictions for a “serious drug offense” or a “violent felony, ” [Section 924 of ] the Armed Career Criminal Act increases his prison term to a minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life. § 924(e)(1); Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 136, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010). The Act defines “violent felony” as follows”

any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that-
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2555-56. Subsection (i) is known either as the force clause, UnitedStates v. Lerma, 877 F.3d 628, 630 (5th Cir. 2017), or as the elements clause, UnitedStates v. Taylor, 873 F.3d 476, 477 n.1 (5th Cir. 2017). The four offenses listed in subsection (ii) are referred to as the “enumerated offenses, ” see United States v. Davis, 487 F.3d 282, 285 (5th Cir. 2007), or as the “enumerated offenses clause, ” Taylor, 873 F.3d at 477 n.1. ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.