United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division
S. Hanen United States District Judge.
the Court is Defendant Humble Independent School
District's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint
(Doc. No. 11). Plaintiff Jon Doe has not responded, and the
time in which to do so has passed. Having considered the
motion, complaint, and applicable law, the Court hereby
GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Jon Humble ISD-PC Doe (hereinafter "Plaintiff or
"Jon Doe") was a seventh grader at Timberwood
Middle School in the Humble Independent School District
("Humble ISD"). (Doc. No. 9 at 3). According to
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, on February 16, 2018,
Plaintiff was allegedly bullied and assaulted by another
student during their physical education class. (Id.
at 4). Plaintiff claims that none of the educators at the
school intervened in the assault and that, rather than being
treated as the victim, Plaintiff was subsequently questioned
about his role in instigating the assault. (Id.).
The administration at Timberwood ultimately determined that
Plaintiff had made a terroristic threat. (Id. at
4-5). Defendant alleges that this threat involved a statement
about gun violence. (Doc. No. 11 at 1).
days later, Humble ISD held an evidentiary hearing to
determine the consequences of Jon Doe's actions. During
the hearing, Humble ISD determined that the evidence was
sufficient to warrant sending Jon Doe to an alternative
campus for a period of around three months. (Doc. No. 9 at
6). Plaintiff and his parents pursued "every available
remedy" to "clear Jon's name" and prevent
the disciplinary action from going into effect or tainting
his record. (Doc. No. 9 at 6). Plaintiff states that Humble
ISD offered no right to appeal the decision. (Id. at
7). Upon completion of his time at the alternative campus,
Humble ISD issued a "clearance letter," which
stated that Jon Doe was allowed to return to his campus as a
"student in good standing should he wish to do so."
(Id. at 8). Plaintiff instead transferred to a
different school district. (Id.).
alleged terroristic threat also resulted in criminal charges
against the Plaintiff. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff
requested that the school district, in light of the
"clearance letter," abstain from testifying against
him in the juvenile criminal proceedings. (Id. at
9). According to Plaintiff, Humble ISD continues to
participate in the juvenile proceedings and certain employees
have testified against Jon Doe. (Id.).
also claims that on February 16, 2018 at another Humble ISD
school, an unrelated terroristic threat was made.
(Id. at 9). Plaintiff provides no other detail or
explanation as to why or how this is related to the case at
hand, but states that "policies, procedures, and
protocols of Defendant Humble-ISD" were not followed as
a part of a "cover up." (Id. at 9-10).
filed this suit, alleging that Humble ISD has violated his
rights under Title IX (20 U.S.C. § 1681), Section 1983
(42 U.S.C. § 1983), and the Texas Constitution. (Doc.
No. 9 at 3). Jon Doe's allegations relating to the Texas
Constitution include violations of procedural due process,
substantive due process, and equal protection requirements.
(Id. at 18). Plaintiff seeks only actual,
consequential, and exemplary damages (and does not seek
injunctive relief). (Doc. No. 9 at 20). Defendant filed the
pending motion, seeking to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
must dismiss a suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1) where it lacks the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate the case. Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(1); see also Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc.
v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998).
Where "a defendant makes a 'factual attack' upon
the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit
[and] the defendant submits affidavits, testimony, or other
evidentiary materials," the plaintiff is also
"required to submit facts through some evidentiary
method." Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521,
523 (5th Cir. 1981) (delineating the difference between a
"facial attack" and a "factual attack" to
subject matter jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss). In a
"factual attack," the plaintiff also has the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the court
has subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The party
asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the cause falls outside the court's
limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
defendant may also file a motion to dismiss a complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for "failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To defeat a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead "enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a
'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability,
it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief" Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all
well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th
Cir. 2007). The court is not bound to accept factual
assumptions or legal conclusions as true, and only a
complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a
motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. When
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court assumes
their veracity and then determines whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. The court
may also consider documents that a defendant attaches to a
motion to dismiss, if the documents are "referred to in
the plaintiffs complaint and are central to [the]
claim." Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,
224 F.3d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Johnson v.
Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 999 F.Supp.2d 919, 926 (N.D. Tex.