Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth
Appeal from the 352nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 352-301866-18
Drue Allen Hollis, a former involuntarily-committed mental
health patient, filed a pro se civil rights lawsuit against
Appellees, which include Acclaim Physician Group, Inc.;
Tarrant County Hospital District d/b/a JPS Health Network;
Probate Court No. 1 of Tarrant County; Probate Court No. 2 of
Tarrant County; University of North Texas Health Science
Center; ProPath Associates, P.L.L.C.; Tarrant County Sheriff,
Bill E. Waybourn; and Mesa Springs, L.L.C. After holding a
hearing on Appellees' motions to dismiss and to declare
Hollis a vexatious litigant, the trial court signed an order
declaring Hollis a vexatious litigant, requiring him to post
security, and prohibiting him from filing any new pro se
litigation without first obtaining the local administrative
judge's permission. Hollis appeals from this order,
alleging numerous issues in the "Issues Presented"
section of his brief.
the issues in the "Issues Presented" section of
Hollis's brief have been waived due to inadequate
briefing. The two issues in his brief for which he provided
some analysis include an issue arguing that 42 U.S.C. §
1988 preempts chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code and an issue arguing that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction because 42 U.S.C. § 1988 preempted
the vexatious-litigant statutes and did not confer
jurisdiction on the trial court. Because Hollis waived his
choice-of-law preemption argument by failing to raise it in
the trial court and because the trial court properly
exercised jurisdiction under the Texas vexatious-litigant
statutes, we affirm the prefiling portion of the
vexatious-litigant order. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
any portion of Hollis's appeal that could be construed as
challenging the amount of the bond that the trial court
ordered him to post.
twelve separate proceedings between 2009 and 2018, Hollis was
involuntarily committed for observation and treatment because
he was likely to cause serious harm to himself or to others;
was unable to make a rational and informed decision as to
whether to submit to treatment; was suffering severe and
abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress; and was
experiencing substantial mental or physical deterioration of
his ability to function independently. Hollis's twelve
mental health proceedings were filed in the two Tarrant
County statutory probate courts. In connection with the
mental health proceedings, Hollis received treatment or
services from the following entities: Acclaim Physician
Group, Inc.; Tarrant County Hospital District d/b/a JPS
Health Network; University of North Texas Health Science
Center; ProPath Associates, P.L.L.C.; and Mesa Springs,
2015, Hollis filed his first of six lawsuits against the two
statutory probate courts, his mental healthcare providers,
and others. All six of Hollis's lawsuits were dismissed.
Hollis appealed two of the dismissals, and the appeals were
dismissed. See Hollis v. Mental Health Mental
Retardation, No. 02-18-00134-CV, 2018 WL 3763702, at *1
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth Aug. 9, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(granting Hollis's motion to dismiss appeal); Hollis
v. Tarrant Cty. Probate Court One, No. 08-17-00091- CV,
2017 WL 2889059, at *1 (Tex. App.-El Paso July 7, 2017, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal for want of prosecution).
2018, Hollis filed the underlying lawsuit. Hollis also filed
a lawsuit against MHMR. Hollis thus filed eight lawsuits in
less than five years.
Probate Court No. 1 of Tarrant County and Probate Court No. 2
of Tarrant County filed a joint motion to dismiss and to
declare Hollis a vexatious litigant. Appellee Tarrant County
Sheriff Bill E. Waybourn filed a similar motion. All other
Appellees joined in the motion filed by the two statutory
trial court held a hearing on the motions to dismiss and
granted the motions the following day. The trial court found
that Hollis met the criteria established by chapter 11 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to be declared a
vexatious litigant. After determining that Hollis was a
vexatious litigant, the trial court ordered Hollis to provide
security to Appellees in the amount of $7, 000 and stated
that the failure to post a bond within thirty days would
result in the lawsuit's dismissal with prejudice. The
trial court's vexatious-litigant order also includes a
prefiling order prohibiting Hollis from filing any new
litigation without the written permission of the local
administrative judge. Hollis posted a $7, 000 cash bond and
filed a notice of appeal of the trial court's
This Court's Jurisdiction
court recently set forth the law concerning this court's
jurisdiction over appeals from vexatious-litigant orders that
arise under chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Chapter 11 of the civil practice and remedies code provides
two different methods for restricting vexatious litigation.
See [Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.]
§§ 11.051-.104. See generally Leonard v.
Abbott, 171 S.W.3d 451, 457 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet.
denied) ("The purpose of chapter eleven is to restrict
frivolous and vexatious litigation."); Devoll v.
State, 155 S.W.3d 498, 501 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004,
no pet.) ("Chapter Eleven of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code provides a framework for courts and
attorneys to curb vexatious litigation."). The first,
available under section 11.051, provides that a defendant
may-within 90 days of filing an original answer or making a
special appearance-move for an order determining that the
plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and requiring him to
furnish security. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
11.051. If, after notice and hearing, the trial court
determines that the plaintiff is vexatious, the trial court
must order the plaintiff to furnish security "for the
benefit of the moving defendant" and must
"determine the date by which the security must be
furnished." See id. §§ 11.053-.055.
If the plaintiff fails to furnish the ordered security, the
trial court must dismiss the plaintiff's claims as to the
moving defendant. Id. § 11.056. There is no
interlocutory appeal available from an order declaring a
plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant and requiring him to
furnish security. See, e.g., Restrepo v.
Alliance Riggers & Constructors, Ltd., No.
08-15-00011-CV, 2015 WL 999950, at *1 (Tex. App.-El Paso Mar.
4, 2015, no pet.) (mem. ...