United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
to U.S. Magistrate Judge 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
CARRILLO RAMIREZ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
the Court is Plaintiff s Original Motion to Correct the
Court Records; pursuant to:Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 60(a),
received on November 16, 2018 (doc. 74). Based on the
relevant filings and applicable law, the motion should be
January 7, 2008, Troy Lee Perkins (Plaintiff), an inmate in
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) Estelle Unit,
pled guilty to four charges of aggravated robbery with a
deadly weapon in Nos. F07-00645, F07-71769, F07-71970, and
F07-71990 in the 282nd Judicial District Court of Dallas
County, Texas, and he was sentenced to 12 years'
imprisonment in each case. Perkins v. Thaler, No.
3:10-CV-329-N, 2011 WL 3511043, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 26,
2011), adopted by 2011 WL 3510910 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
2011). His petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 challenging his convictions was dismissed as
barred by the statute of limitations. See Id. He
filed several subsequent § 2254 suits that were
transferred to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit as successive. See Perkins v.
Stephens, No. 3:16-CV-594-B (N.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2016);
Perkins v. Stephens, No. 3:13-CV-4615-B (N.D. Tex.
May 12, 2014); Perkins v. Stephens, No.
3:14-CV-4366-B (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2015); Perkins v.
Stephens, No. 3:16-CV-594-B (N.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2016).
The Fifth Circuit has warned him that future filings of
repetitive or frivolous motions for authorization could
result in the imposition of sanctions. In re
Perkins, No. 14-10001 (5th Cir. Apr. 15, 2014).
has also unsuccessfully sought relief from his criminal
convictions through civil actions under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging violations of his civil rights. See
Perkins v. Stephens, No. 3:16-CV-269-D (N.D. Tex. May
24, 2016) (summarily dismissed as three-strikes barred);
Perkins v. State of Texas, No. 3:13-CV-5047-P, 2013
WL 6869366 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2013) (summarily dismissed as
three-strikes barred); Perkins v. Collins, No.
9:13CV98, 2013 WL 38333195 (E.D. Tex. July 22, 2013)
(summarily dismissed as three-strikes barred); Perkins v.
Chatham, No. 3:12-CV-3651-P, 2012 WL 5471731 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 9, 2012) (naming many of the same defendants as in this
case; summarily dismissed as frivolous under Heck v.
Humphrey), aff'd 538 Fed.Appx. 550 (5th
Cir. 2013); Perkins v. Chatham et al., No.
3:09-CV-1788-G, 2009 WL 3816529 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2009)
(claims against same state judge as in this case dismissed
based on immunity); Perkins v. Martin,
3:09-CV-1731-N-BH, 2009 WL 3816525 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2009)
(claims against same Assistant Public Defender as in this
case dismissed for failure to state a claim).
August 23, 2016, Plaintiff filed this § 1983 action
against multiple individuals and entities, including Lorie
Davis, Director of the TDCJ Correctional Institutions
Division (TDCJ-CID); Tony O'Hare, Senior Warden of the
Estelle Unit; the 282nd Judicial District Court of
Dallas County, Texas; Andrew Martin Chatham, former judge of
the 282nd Judicial District Court; the Dallas County District
Attorney's Office; Assistant District Attorney (ADA)
Hector Garza; the Dallas County Public Defenders Office;
Assistant Public Defender (APD) Brett Eliot Martin; the City
of Dallas, Texas; Dallas Mayor Mike Rawlings; the Dallas
Police Department (DPD); David O. Brown, Chief of DPD; and
Dallas County Deputy Sheriff James David. (doc. 3 at 3,
6-7.) He claimed that the defendants conspired
to hide his identity, hide the fact that he was mentally ill,
deny his request to be transported to a hospital for
treatment, prosecute him in bad faith, falsely imprison and
restrain him under void orders, tamper with government
records, commit violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, and deny him due process of law and equal protection.
(doc. 3 at 3, 6-7; doc. 9 at 3-6.) Most of these defendants had
been named in Plaintiff's prior lawsuits, all of which
arose from the same factual background, and which asserted
many of the same claims, as this case.
second amended complaint was filed on June 29, 2019, and it
only named the 282nd Judicial District Court, Judge Chatham,
ADA Garza, Chief Public Defender Lynn Pride, APD Martin,
Mayor Rawlings, DPD Chief Brown, Sheriff Valdez, and Deputy
Sheriff David as defendants. (See doc. 41 at 2-5.)
The second amended complaint expressly stated that Plaintiff
was “‘narrow[ing] the scope of his
complaint” to a claim that he had been denied a fair
trial because the defendants were on notice that he was an
M.H.M.R. patient but had failed to protect his rights.
(Id.) On September 14, 2018, it was recommended that
this action be dismissed as malicious because it raised the
same claims as a prior action, and in the alternative, as
frivolous because it was barred by Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994). (See doc. 59.) The
recommendation was accepted, and the case was dismissed by
judgment filed on October 3, 2018. (See docs. 61,
62.) Plaintiff then sought to stay the judgment, contending
that his appeal would show that the court had erred in
dismissing his lawsuit. (See doc. 66.) On October 29,
2018, it was recommended that the motion to stay be liberally
construed as a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and
that it be denied. (See doc. 67.) The recommendation
was accepted, and the motion was denied on November 14, 2018.
(See doc. 73.)
now moves to “correct the court records” under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a). (See doc. 74.) He claims that
the record does not correctly reflect the parties to this
lawsuit, and that the docket should read “‘Troy
Lee Perkins, #148-826 v. 282nd Judicial District Court of
Dallas County, Texas, et al.,' without citing, or
reference to any other party that has been intentionally
excluded from or omitted from this suit.” (Id.
at 3.) He also claims the recommendation that the suit be
dismissed was based on his original complaint, rather than
his second amended complaint, and that his claims are not
Heck-barred because his second amended complaint
makes no reference to his sentence or conviction and only
seeks relief from the lack of a fair trial. (Id. at
Corrections Based on Clerical Mistakes; Oversights
and Omissions. The court may correct a clerical
mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission
whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of
the record. The court may do so on motion or on its own, with
or without notice. But after an appeal has been docketed in
the appellate court and while it is pending, such a mistake
may be corrected only with the appellate court's leave.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). “Because the court can exercise
its authority under Rule 60(a) at any time, it may do so only
to provide ‘a specific and very limited type of
relief,' relief that is different in kind from an
alteration or amendment of the judgment under Rule 59(e) or
relief due to mistake or inadvertence under Rule
60(b)(1).” Rivera v. PNS Stores, Inc., 647
F.3d 188, 193 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Rutherford v.
Harris Cty., 197 F.3d 173, 190 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing
James v. Anderson-Tully Co., 722 F.2d 211, 212 (5th
Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (relief is available under Rule 60(a)
only when a mistake is clerical in nature); Harcon Barge
Co., Inc. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., 784 F.2d 665,
668 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (the scope of Rule 60(a) is
“very limited”). The “correction of an
error in substantive judgment is outside the reach of Rule
60(a).” Rutherford, 197 F.3d at 190; see
also Harcon Barge, 784 F.2d at 668-69 (Rule 60(a) may
not be used to correct a legal error or an error of
judgment). As explained in Dura-Wood Treating Co., Div.
of Roy O. Martin Lumber Co. v. Century Forest Indus.,
Inc., 694 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1982):
Such a mistake must not be one of judgment or even of
misidentification, but merely of recitation, of the sort that
a clerk or amanuensis might commit, mechanical in nature. If
of this sort, it matters not whether the magistrate committed
it-as by mistakenly drafting his own judgment-or whether his
clerk did so; the law does not ...