United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division
Nowak,
Judge
MEMORANDUM ADOPTING REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
AMOS
L. MAZZANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Came on
for consideration the following Reports of the United States
Magistrate Judge in this action, this matter having been
heretofore referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636. On March 7, 2019, the Report of the
Magistrate Judge (Dkt. #89) was entered containing proposed
findings of fact and recommendations that Defendant Judge
Piper McCraw's Motion to Dismiss be granted. On March 8,
2019, the Reports of the Magistrate Judge (Dkts. #92; #93)
were entered containing proposed findings of fact and
recommendations that the Motions to Dismiss filed by
Defendants Justice David Evans and the Clerk of the Court
each be granted. Lastly, on April 2, 2019, the Report of the
Magistrate Judge (Dkt. #103) was entered containing proposed
findings of fact and recommendations that Defendant District
Attorney Greg Willis's (“DA Willis”) Motion
to Dismiss be granted. Having received the Reports and
Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge, having considered
Plaintiff's objections (Dkts. #96; #97; #98; #109), and
having conducted a de novo review, the Court is of the
opinion that the Magistrate Judge's Reports should be
adopted.
RELEVANT
BACKGROUND
The
facts are set out in further detail by the Magistrate Judge
and need not be repeated here in their
entirety.[1] On August 23, 2018, Plaintiff filed suit
in the Northern District of Texas, against her former spouse
Lester John Dahlheimer, Jr. (“Dahlheimer”); the
estate of her former father-in-law Lester John Dahlheimer,
Sr. (“Dahlheimer, Sr.”); Dahlheimer's divorce
counsel Paulette Mueller; Judge Piper McCraw; District
Attorney Greg Willis; Justice David Evans; the Fifth District
Court of Appeals Clerk of the Court; and Court-Appointed
Receivers Craig A. Penfold and Rhonda Childress-Herres (Dkt.
#2). Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants all
relate to or otherwise stem from her underlying divorce
proceeding filed in 2015. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that her former spouse misappropriated Plaintiff's assets
throughout their marriage and divorce proceeding, and that
the remaining Defendants unlawfully participated, in one
manner or another, in either the divorce proceeding or the
subsequent enforcement proceedings. Plaintiff's live
Complaint asserts the Defendants “violat[ed]
Plaintiff's constitutional rights [by] their
participation in conspiracy to unlawfully seize property,
misc. assets, forgery, fraud, cover up of unlawful conduct,
tampering with evidence, FURTHER using threat tactics to
bully Plaintiff into quiet submission” (Dkt. #2 at p.
1) (emphasis in original).
On
March 7, 2019, and March 8, 2019, respectively, the
Magistrate Judge recommended that Judge McCraw and Justice
Evans's Motion to Dismiss be granted because
Plaintiff's claims against these judges: (1) in their
official capacity are barred by sovereign immunity; (2) are
barred by Rooker-Feldman; and (3) are barred by
absolute judicial immunity (Dkts. #89, #92). Also on March 8,
2019, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Clerk of the
Court's Motion to Dismiss be granted because
Plaintiff's claims against the Clerk: (1) are against a
non-jural entity, incapable of being sued; (2) in her
official capacity are barred by sovereign immunity; (3) are
barred by Rooker-Feldman; and (4) fail to state a
violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights under
§ 1983 (Dkt. #93). Plaintiff filed her Objections to
these three Reports on March 21, 2019 (Dkts. #96; #97; #98).
Thereafter, on April 2, 2019, the Magistrate Judge further
recommended that DA Willis's Motion to Dismiss be granted
because Plaintiff's claims against DA Willis: (1) in his
official capacity are barred by sovereign immunity; (2) are
barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity; and (3) fail to
allege any personal involvement of DA Willis, necessary to
state a claim under § 1983 (Dkt. #103). Plaintiff filed
objections to this Report on April 16, 2019 (Dkt. #109).
PLAINTIFF'S
OBJECTIONS
A party
who files timely written objections to a magistrate
judge's report and recommendation is entitled to a de
novo review of those findings or recommendations to which the
party specifically objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2)-(3). Through her filings, Plaintiff has
asserted nine (9) objections to the Magistrate Judge's
recommendations (Dkts. #89; #92; #93; #103): (1) the Report
incorrectly found that Judge McCraw, Justice Evans, the Clerk
of the Court, and DA Willis are entitled to sovereign
immunity (Dkts. #96 at pp. 6-7; #97 at p. 7; #98 at p. 2;
#109 at pp. 4, 7); (2) Rooker-Feldman does not bar
Plaintiff's claims against Judge McCraw, Justice Evans,
and the Clerk of the Court because “there was extrinsic
fraud” (Dkts. #96 at pp. 5, 8-9; #97 at p. 9; #98 at p.
4); (3) Judge McCraw and Justice Evans are not entitled to
absolute judicial immunity because both individuals stepped
outside of their judicial roles (Dkts. #96 at pp. 10-13; #97
at pp. 3, 7); (4) Plaintiff sufficiently stated a § 1983
claim against the agency of the Clerk of the Court, not Lisa
Matz, because “the clerk [] refused to correct the
record, ” thereby “violat[ing] Plaintiff's
due process constitutional right” (Dkt. #98 at p. 3);
(5) DA Willis is not entitled to prosecutorial immunity (Dkt.
#109 at pp. 5-7); (6) Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a
malicious prosecution claim against DA Willis (Dkt. #109 at
pp. 9-10); (7) Plaintiff's claims against DA Willis are
not time-barred because Plaintiff previously “presented
her claims in her second Motion to Recuse Judge McCraw
(7/5/2016), her Appellant Brief (4/2017) and other
motions” (Dkt. #109 at p. 10); (8) the Report
incorrectly recommended dismissal of Plaintiff's
conspiracy claim because “[c]onspiracy isn't a
claim that can be proven by a pleading” (Dkt. #109 at
p. 10); and (9) Plaintiff's allegations support a finding
of punitive damages against DA Willis (Dkt. #109 at pp. 2-3).
The Court now considers these objections.[2]
Sovereign
Immunity
Defendants
Judge McCraw, Justice Evans, the Clerk of the Court, and DA
Willis all asserted sovereign immunity as a bar to
Plaintiff's claims against them in their official
capacities. The Reports found that each were entitled to
sovereign immunity, resulting in dismissal of any claims
against them in their official (but not individual)
capacities (Dkts. #89 at pp. 10-11; #92 at pp. 9-10; #93 at
p. 13; #103 at p. 9).
As to
Judge McCraw, Plaintiff objects that “Judge Nowak
elevates Judge McCraw to have sovereignty only God
possesses” (Dkt. #96 at p. 6), and asserts that an
exception to sovereign immunity are claims brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment, which “provide[s] for private
suits against States or state official which are
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts” (Dkt.
#96 at p. 8). Plaintiff is mistaken that raising a claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment waives Judge McCraw's
sovereign immunity; sovereign immunity is waived and an
individual may sue the state where a state consents or
“Congress abrogates the state's sovereign immunity
pursuant to [section 5 of] the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Sias v. Jacobs, 6:17CV413, 2017 WL 8229544, at *3
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2017), report and recommendation
adopted, 6:17CV413, 2018 WL 1335424 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 14,
2018), appeal dismissed, 18-40280, 2018 WL 4677432
(5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2018) (citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
670 (1999)). There is no such Congressional abrogation before
the Court.
Moreover,
as to Justice Evans, the Clerk of the Court, and DA Willis,
Plaintiff objects that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment limits
official capacity claims against certain state officials (not
all) to prospective injunctive relief, it does not affect
damage claims against those officials in their individual
capacity” (Dkts. #97 at p. 7; #98 at p. 2; #109 at p.
7). This statement is consistent with the findings of the
Reports; the Magistrate Judge found only Plaintiff's
claims against Defendants in their official capacities were
barred by sovereign immunity and continued on to discuss
Plaintiff's remaining claims against Defendants in their
individual capacities. In her objections to the Report
addressing her claims against DA Willis, Plaintiff also
alleges that sovereign immunity “relates to The Texas
Tort Claims Act[, ] which has nothing to do with
Plaintiff's Complaint” and “Judge Nowak
mistranslates Ramming v. U.S. [sic] as applied to proving
‘facts' when it is nothing of the sort” (Dkt.
#109 at p. 4). These statements are nonsensical.
Plaintiff's first objection is overruled.
Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine
The
Reports further found that Plaintiff's claims against
Judge McCraw, Justice Evans, and the Clerk of the Court are
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the extent
that Plaintiff has asserted a collateral attack on the orders
issued in Plaintiff's divorce proceeding. Plaintiff
argues, in her second objection, that “[t]he
Rooker-Feldman doctrine has become perverted” and is
not intended for use in cases like the instant matter (Dkts.
#96 at p. 8; #97 at p. 9; #98 at p. 4). The Reports
specifically addressed this argument:
Plaintiff contends that “[t]he Rooker-Feldman
doctrine has become perverted in that [t]he
Rooker-Feldman doctrine was originally related to
the Anti-Injunction Act. . . Somehow it was twisted, and is
about to be abolished”. . . .Contrary to
Plaintiff's assertions, “[c]ourts in this circuit
have ‘consistently applied [and continue to apply] the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a bar to federal
jurisdiction over matters related to the family disputes of
divorce and child support.'”
(Dkts.
#92 at p. 12; #93 at p. 15). Plaintiff does not raise any new
authority or arguments in support of this contention; the
Court agrees with the assessment of the Magistrate Judge,
courts in this circuit have consistently applied
Rooker-Feldman as a bar to federal jurisdiction over
matters related to divorce.
Plaintiff
next argues Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable because
the Reports failed to consider extrinsic fraud (Dkts. #96 at
p. 8; #97 at p. 9; #98 at p. 4). In support of her
contention, Plaintiff relies on a Ninth Circuit case,
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc.,359 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th
Cir. 2004) (Dkts. #96 at pp. 8-9; #97 at pp. 9-10; #98 at pp.
4-5). The Kougasian court held that
“Rooker-Feldman ‘does not bar
subject matter jurisdiction when a federal plaintiff alleges
a cause of action for extrinsic fraud on a state court and
seeks to set aside a state court judgment obtained by that
fraud.'” Stabler v. Ryan, 949 F.Supp.2d
663, 666-67 (E.D. La. 2013). However, “Fifth Circuit
precedent differs on this point”; “in Truong
v. Bank of America, N.A.,717 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2013),
the Fifth Circuit decided whether the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine applied to a complaint alleging that the
‘unfair and deceptive' acts of two banks resulted
in wrongful foreclosure on the plaintiff's mortgage
loan.” Id. at 667; see also Houston v.
Queen, 8 F.Supp.3d 815, 823-24 (W.D. La. 2014),
aff'd sub nom. Houston v. Venneta Queen, 606
Fed.Appx. 725 (5th Cir. 2015) (“In the Fifth Circuit,
the relevant inquiry is whether fraud allegations are
independent for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. . . .The Houston Brothers' decision to frame
their fraud claim as a civil rights action for injuries
arising from a state court's judgment does not confer
this Court with the jurisdiction necessary to review and
invalidate the Judgment of Possession.”) (citing
Price v. Porter,351 Fed.Appx. 925, 926-27 (5th Cir.
2009)). “In determining whether Rooker-Feldman forbade the plaintiff from bringing the
case, the Fifth Circuit explained: ‘[o]ne hallmark of
the Rooker-Feldman inquiry is what the federal court
is being asked to review and reject. A federal district court
lacks jurisdiction over challenges to state court
decisions in particular cases arising out of
judicial proceedings.'” Stabler,
949 F.Supp.2d at 667 (quoting Truong, 717 F.3d at
382) (emphasis in original). “[T]he second
‘hallmark' is ‘the source of the federal
plaintiff's alleged injury,' and specifically,
whether the plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong ‘an
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