United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division
LENA D. MORRIS, Plaintiff,
TEXAS HEALTH AND HUAN SERVICES COMMISSION, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LAKE SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Lena D. Morris, brings this action against defendant, the
Texas Health and Human Services Commission
("THHSC") for race, sex, and age discrimination and
for retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2, et seq., and for interference and
retaliation in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.
Pending before the court are Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment ("Defendant's MSJ") (Docket
Entry No. 22), and Plaintiff Lena D. Morris' Motion for
Leave to File Sur-Reply to Defendant's Reply to
Plaintiff's Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment
("Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File
Sur-Reply") (Docket Entry No. 2 9) . For the reasons set
forth below, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File
Sur-Reply will be denied as moot, and Defendant's MSJ
will be granted in part and denied in part.
Standard of Review
judgment is authorized if the movant establishes that there
is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the law
entitles it to judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Disputes about
material facts are "genuine" if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). A "party moving for summary
judgment must 'demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact,' but need not negate the
elements of the nonmovant's case." Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)
(en bane) (per curiam) (quoting Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986)). "If the
moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion
must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's
response." Id. If, however, the moving party
meets this burden, Rule 56 requires the nonmovant to go
beyond the pleadings and show by admissible evidence that
specific facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for
trial. Id. "[T]he court must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it
may not make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000). Factual controversies
are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only
when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both
parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts."
Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
December of 2014 Lisa Pietrzyk ("Pietrzyk"),
Director of the Off ice of Inspector General
("OIG") for the THHSC, offered Morris, an
African-American woman, an Investigator VI position at the
Electronic Benefits Transactions ("EBT") Unit in
Houston.Morris accepted the offer and began working
for the THHSC as a probationary employee on January 9,
2015. Morris initially reported to Ronald
Mendoza ("Mendoza"), manager of OIG's Houston
office. Within Morris' first month of
employment, Orlando Mayers ("Mayers") was hired to
manage the EBT Unit, and he became Morris's direct
supervisor even though he was based in Austin.
first day of work Morris provided Mendoza a Certification of
Health Care Provider for Family Member's Serious Health
Condition intended to show that she qualified for
intermittent FMLA leave to care for her daughter. Morris
filled out, signed, and dated the first page on January 8,
My leave will be sporadic and unscheduled at times. I will
have to transport her to various doctor and therapist
appointments. And during the time that she is incapacitated,
I will need to stay with her. I have to tend to her daily
needs during these times.
subsequent pages had been filled out, signed, and dated by
her daughter's health care provider on September 24,
other employees of the EBT Unit in Houston both started their
employment at or near the time that Morris started her
employment there: Rick McDougald ("McDougald")
(Investigator VI) and Steve Lightfoot ("Lightfoot")
(Investigator V) . Although Lightfoot's position as
Investigator V was a lower-ranked position than Morris's
and McDougald's position, Lightfoot earned $63, 139.00
per annum while Morris and McDougald earned $52,
January 14, 2015, Mendoza sent Pietrzyk an email stating:
[Morris] provided FMLA documentation for a family member
(daughter) that she occasionally takes to the doctor. She has
requested the following days off or adjustments of hours
The week of 1/20/15 - FMLA - Would like to work 11 hours on
1/21, 1/22 and 10 hours on 1/23.
The week of 02/20/15 - Would like to work 4-10 hour days to
avoid taking leave.
The week of 02/26/15-02/27/15 Annual Leave - Would like to
work 3-10 hour days for that week.
The week of 03/03/15 - FMLA - Would like to work 4-10 hour
days to avoid taking leave.
The week of 03/13/15 - FMLA - Would like to work 4-10 hour
days to avoid taking leave.
These are appointments that are already scheduled. She stated
if other days come up unexpectedly, she will inform us. She
also indicated the reason she would like to avoid having to
take leave is due to if her daughter is hospitalized, she
will have the leave to cover her being out.
January 15, 2015, Pietrzyk and Mayers engaged in an exchange
of emails about Morris's requests for leave that began
when Pietrzyk responded to Mayers' email from the day
before by asking, "Have all required documents been
received and who reviewed them? Is Lena Morris EBT or
FI?" Mendoza replied by attaching
Morris's FMLA documents to an email that he sent to
Pietrzyk stating, "She is with EBT." Pietrzyk
responded by asking, "Does this new employee meet the
FMLA Ch 5 eligibility?" Mendoza replied:
"[Morris] has been employed with the State 17 years. She
is a transfer from TWC. She stated the FMLA was approved by
the other agency she was employed with. If more information
is needed, please let me know."
the same day, i.e., January 15, 2015, Pietrzyk
forwarded the email chain about Morris's FMLA requests to
James Williams, Human Relations Manager, in the THHSC s Human
Resources Section along with the following message:
"Does this FMLA flex schedule seem consistent with our
agency? My understanding is that she's to take leave and
it codes as FMLA. OIG doesn't allow probationary
employees to participate in flex schedule[s] like 10 hour
days unless they pass probation." Williams
I believe we are dealing with two separate policies.
Supervisory approval to work or change a flexible schedule is
required according to the HR Policy referenced below.
A flex schedule is a work schedule that allows flexibility in
the employee's arrival and departure times. An employee
must receive supervisory approval to work or change a
flexible schedule. Office coverage must be maintained under
the flex schedules. State offices must be open between 8 am
and 5 pm, Monday through Friday, and remain open during the
noon hour of each workday with at least one person on duty to
accept calls, receive visitors, and transact business.
The FMLA should be invoked for the employee's leave
related to the WH-380-F for her daughter's medical
condition. We can discuss further if needed.
forwarded Williams' response to Mayers.
March 17, 2015, Morris and Mayers exchanged text messages
regarding Morris's intent to be out of the office on
Wednesday, March 18th; Mayers told Morris that he thought she
intended to be out of the office on March 17th and that she
needed to work eight hours on March 18th.
March 23, 2015, Mayers sent an email to Cleve Tolver, Human
Resources Specialist IV, in THHSC's Employee Relations
Unit, asking Tolver to call him to discuss documents
regarding Morris's request for time off. Later that
day Tolver sent Mayers an email stating:
FMLA can be granted for the employee to care for the eligible
I did notice that the doctor completed the form back in
September of 2014. I would like to suggest that you obtain
new information and start the FMLA based on what the new
1st, check to see if the employee has 12 months of state
service and has worked 1250 hours within the last year. If
the employee meets these requirements, provide the employee
with form WH381 to inform them they meet the requirements.
Then, provide them with WH380E to return to you in 15 days.
When you receive the new WH380E, scan it to me and we can
March 24, 2015, Morris sent an email to Mayers titled
"Harassment over FMLA and Time," which Mayers
forwarded to Pietrzyk the same day. In pertinent part the
March 24, 2015, email states:
. . . You indicated on Friday that you had already fired
Gina, the only other woman in your three units for missing
too much work. It is distressing when a supervisor threatens
one's job. I believe this because you clearly stated that
you are out to fire me for not having, as you put it, ".
. . worked a full week since you have been here." This
was said by you despite my having used Flex Time to make up
my hours and work a 40 hour week, all previously approved by
you. I was told when I first came on board that my permanent
manager would work with me on my leave situation. I requested
to work 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. since that was my schedule at
the agency that I transferred from. I was told that once
Steve started I would be able to work the "Flex
Time" hours where I was working 7:00 a.m. - 3:30 p.m.,
the same as Rick has been allowed to work all along. You
claim that Lisa Pietryzk [sic], the Director of the division,
is the one telling you that I cannot do this now because I am
on probation; yet she is the one who approved Rick's Flex
Time. Why the double standard? Why do women not get the same
flexibility as the men? Is the real reason you want to fire
me is to be rid of all of the women, or is it that you just
don't like the idea of my being able to take off to take
my "special needs daughter" to her appointments?
This morning you called to inform me that you received an
email that states that even though I turned in my FMLA
paperwork when I began working here that I am not on FMLA.
You then gave the reason why I am not on FMLA as being that
the paperwork that I turned in was done in September. Lisa
has had the paperwork since I began and now management waits
until almost three months later to tell me that it needs to
be up-to-date. This is unacceptable. And you are saying that
only you can designate my Sick leave as FMLA in CAPPS. This
is a blatantly transparent attempt to circumvent the FMLA
protections that are afforded me. . .
The Agency knew prior to my hire that I was a single mom of a
special needs child. I left two voice mail messages for Lisa
before showing up to report to work, that were never answered
by her so that I could discuss this with her before coming on
board. I have kept you informed of when my daughter's
doctor's appointments have been, as well as having filed
all of the appropriate FMLA paperwork with the agency for her
condition. As a matter of fact, I have forwarded to you
several times the FMLA paperwork that I have filed with the
agency because you said that Lisa did not have it and wanted
you to get it from me. . .
You keep referring to Texas being an "At Will"
state which allows you to fire me for any, or even no reason
at all. As I told you, if you are firing me for time missed
while taking my child to the doctor, or anything else covered
by FMLA, you will be in violation of Federal Law, which
supersedes state law and agency policy /memorandums. We have
discussed these FMLA issues several times, and most of the
time that I was off for my daughter; I made up the time by
fulfilling my 40 hours per week with your full knowledge and
As I stated to you on Friday, I am feeling harassed at this
point with the repeated requests for the same FMLA paperwork,
and your threats to fire me because of my taking off to care
for my daughter and take her to her doctor's
appointments. At this point, I am afraid that you will say
that you are firing me for a made up reason in an attempt to
circumvent the rationale behind the FMLA protections. . .
I did not choose for my daughter to have the problems that
she does. I have had to work and care for her virtually on my
own. If every agency or business behaved in the way that you
are acting then there would be no work available for parents
of special needs children. . . .
Per our conversation, when you informed me that I will not be
able to use "Flex Time," you also said that I will
just have to use my personal leave time, leaving me with no
cushion the next time my daughter is hospitalized. That is
your right to do so, but you cannot deny my right to take my
child to the doctor or hospital as long as I have filed the
proper FMLA paperwork, as I have. You also stated that you
may send me to El Paso, and if I declined then that would be
another reason that I can be fired. I know that traveling is
a job requirement, and would be happy to travel anywhere. I
would just make arrangements for my daughter. . .
March 27, 2015, Morris filed an internal complaint with the
THHSC's Office of Civil Rights, alleging that she was
being discriminated against because of her sex, female,
and that she was being subjected to "a campaign of
harassment due to the dislike of my bringing in FMLA
paperwork on my first day of employment. I was asked to
provide the paperwork on no less than three
April 6, 2015, Tolver and Mayers engaged in an exchange of
emails about Morris's FMLA eligibility in which Tolver
informed Mayers that he had heard back from all the agencies,
that Morris had previously been certified for FMLA with the
Office of Injured Employee Counsel, and that Mayers should
provide Morris with form WH380E/F and give her the form WH381
once she was determined to meet requirements.
April 6, 2015, Mayers and Pietrzyk responded to the email
that Morris sent to Mayers on March 24, 2015, and Mayers
forwarded to Pietrzyk. In pertinent part, Mayers denied
making many if not most of the statements that Morris
attributed to him, denied having approved Morris's use of
flex time to make up time off, i.e., flexing within
the week, and asserted that he had not denied Morris sick
leave. Pietrzyk reminded Morris that they had previously
discussed that OIG work hours are eight hours between 7:00
a.m. and 6:00 p.m. and could not end earlier than 4:00 p.m,
flex time within a day must be preapproved, and probationary
staff are not eligible to work a compressed work week.
Pietrzyk referred Morris to Tolver for FMLA questions, and
advised Morris to make arrangements for childcare ahead of
time because her position required up to 60% travel that
could be required on a daily, weekly, monthly, or annual
basis based on business need.
April 8, 2015, Tolver sent Mayers an email confirming that
Morris "meets the requirements for FMLA.
April 29, 2015, Morris raised her voice to Mayers during a
meeting when Mayers informed her that she would have to work
late.On April 30, 2015, Mayers sent Morris an
email "to recap my discussion concerning the outburst to
instructions regarding working late, " in which
Mayers wrote: "[P]lease refrain from any open opposition
to instructions given by management. Please discuss in
private any concerns/issues you may have with the di rec ti
ves. " On May 7, 2015, Morris replied with an
email to Mayers copied to Pietrzyk in which Morris agreed
that "we should keep our disagreements private,
" but complained, "I find it very
disturbing that you want me to talk to you in private so
there will be no witnesses, yet you hold your confrontational
meetings with me in the presence of multiple male
8, 2015, Mayers called Morris to a meeting at which he gave
her a termination letter,  stating in pertinent part:
After much deliberation, it has been determined that you are
not suited for the assigned Investigator VI position. I
regret to inform you that your last day of employment with
[THHSC-OIG] will be May 08, 2015.
The Department's policy regarding probationary employees
is contained in Health & Human Services Human Resources
Manual, Chapter 11, which states in part:
"Probationary employees may be dismissed for any
nondiscriminatory reason at any time during the
employees' probationary period (first six months of
employment) . . . if it is determined the employee was not
suited for the assigned position. In these cases:
• The employee will receive written notice of discharge,
which states that employment is terminated because the hiring
authority determined the employee was not suited for the
• No. cause will be cited . . .
November 23, 2015, the THHSC's Office of Civil Rights
sent Morris a letter stating that its investigation of her
March 27, 2015, internal complaint did not substantiate her
Plaintiff's Motion to File Sur-Reply
that "Defendant has attempted to raise in its Reply
Brief  arguments that Defendant did not raise in its
Dispositive Motion filing, including, but not limited to, a
different legal argument for seeking to have Plaintiff's
FMLA Retaliation Claim dismissed as a matter of law,
" Morris seeks leave to file a sur-reply.
Asserting that its reply did not raise new legal theories or
present new evidence, the THHSC opposes Morris's motion
for leave to file sur-reply. After carefully reviewing the
THHSC's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
the court concludes that it neither raises new legal theories
nor presents new evidence. Moreover, review of Morris's
proposed sur-reply shows that she seeks only to clarify
applicable law as stated in two cases: Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct.
2405 (2006), and Lanier v. University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center, 527 Fed.Appx. 312 (5th Cir.
2013) .Because the THHSC cited both of these
cases in its original summary judgment brief, and because the
court does not find the clarifications offered in
Morris's sur-reply necessary to rule on Defendant's
MSJ, Morris's Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply will be
denied as moot.
Defendant's Motion for Suary Judgment
THHSC argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on
Morris's Title VII and FMLA claims because she is unable
to establish a prima facie case and, alternatively, because
Morris was discharged for the legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason of insubordination. Morris responds that fact issues
preclude granting the THHSC's motion for summary judgment
on either her Title VII or her FMLA claims.
Title VII Claims
asserts Title VII claims for race and sex discrimination and
for retaliation for having engaged in activity protected by
Title VII. Morris alleges that she was paid less and not
provided the same opportunity to use flex time as her
non-African-American male counterparts, and that when she
opposed the THHSC's discriminatory treatment she suffered
a hostile environment and her employment was terminated in
retaliation for having complained of
discrimination. In response to Defendant's MSJ,
Morris argues that "she was discriminated against with
regards to pay because of her race and gender,
" and that her "Title VII retaliation
claim cannot be dismissed as a matter of
VII protects individuals from discrimination by an employer
based on the "individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)
(1). A plaintiff may establish claims for employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII by using direct
evidence or by using the indirect method of proof set forth
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S.Ct. 1817
(1973). See Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 300
(5th Cir. 1999). Direct evidence "is evidence that, if
believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without
inference or presumption." Rachid v. Jack In The
Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 310 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004) .
Morris relies on the McDonnell Douglas framework to
establish her Title VII claims. Morris's initial
burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework is to
establish a prima facie case. 93 S.Ct. at 1824. If she
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
THHSC to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions. Id. If the THHSC meets this burden,
Morris must adduce evidence capable of establishing that the
THHSCs stated reasons are false and are, instead, pretexts
for discrimination. Id. at 1825.
Application of the Law to the Undisputed Facts
THHSC is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Morris's Claims
of Race and Gender Discrimination.
THHSC argues that Morris cannot prove that it discriminated
against her on the basis of race and/or gender by paying her
less than male employees who were not
African-American.Morris argues that she has adduced
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact
establish a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination
based on pay discrimination Morris must show "(1)
'that [she] was a member of a protected class'; (2)
'that [she] was paid less than a non-member'; and (3)
'that [her] circumstances are '"nearly
identical" to those of the better-paid non-member."
Mengistu v. Mississippi Valley State
University, 716 Fed.Appx. 331, 334 (5th Cir. 2018) (per
curiam) (quoting Taylor v. United Parcel Service,
Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 522-23 (5th Cir. 2008)).
THHSC does not dispute that Morris has satisfied two of the
three elements required to establish a prima facie case of
pay discrimination based on sex and/or race, i.e.,
Morris belongs to two protected classes (African-American and
female), and Morris was paid less than a non-member of her
protected classes, i.e., Steven Lightfoot. The THHSC
argues that Morris is unable to satisfy the third element of
a prima facie case because
Director Pietrzyk hired two men during the same timeframe as
Morris to work in the same newly-created Electronic Benefits
Transfer ("EBT") unit: Rick McDougald and Steven
Lightfoot . . . At the time of hire, Morris and McDougald had
no previous work experience with HHSC agencies and their
starting salaries were therefore established at $52, 800.00 .
. . Lightfoot transferred into the EBT Unit from another HHSC
agency and possessed approximately 16 years of experience
with HHSC agencies. . . Lightfoot earned a salary of $63,
183.84 not because of his gender but based wholly on
cumulative pay increases gained over the course of his
lengthy career with HHSC . . . Morris's claim fails
because she received the same starting salary as her
similarly-situated male counterpart and she cannot show that
any other alleged pay disparity is the result of
support of its argument the THHSC cites the Declaration of
Lisa Campos Garza, formerly known as Lisa Pietrzyk, and the
deposition testimony of Ronald Mendoza. Campos Garza
[i] n addition to Lena Morris, I also hired two male
employees into the EBT Unit during the same timeframe, Rick
McDougald and Steven Lightfoot. Rick McDougald and Lena
Morris were hired at the same starting salary of $52, 800.00.
Unlike Ms. Morris and Mr. McDougald, Steven Lightfoot
transferred from another HHSC agency, had years of experience
within HHSC agencies, and was already earning more than $52,
800.00. As a result, Steven Lightfoot was hired at an annual
starting salary of $63, 138.84.
testified that Lightfoot had prior experience as an
investigator and came from the Fatality Unit at Child
Protective Services, which is an HHSC agency.
does not dispute that her circumstances were not nearly
identical to Lightfoot's circumstances. Instead Morris
argues that THHSC's stated reasons for paying Lightfoot a
higher salary are pretextual because she had 17 years'
experience as a state employee and had worked for the
THHSC's predecessor agency, but was nevertheless paid
less than Lightfoot who had a lower-ranking position. Morris
also argues that the THHSC's stated reasons for the pay
disparity between her and Lightfoot are pretextual because
she was paid the same as McDougald who had no prior state
experience, and she was paid less than the amount budgeted
for her position.  In support of her argument, Morris cites
her own declaration stating that she "was first employed
by the State of Texas in 1991 with the Department of Health
Services ('DHS'), which was the predecessor agency to
Defendant [THHSC], " and a document that the THHSC
provided during discovery showing that the salary budgeted
for her position was more than the salary that she was
offered and paid.
THHSC replies that Morris has acknowledged Lightfoot's
investigative experience and transfer from within the THHSC,
and that Morris does not dispute that Lightfoot earned more
in his prior position than the THHSC paid her or
McDougald. The THHSC also cites Campos Garza's
deposition testimony that her decision regarding Morris's
pay was not based solely on budgeted salary, but on
Morris's skill set.
has not established her prima facie case because she has
failed either to argue or to show "that [her]
circumstances are 'nearly identical to those of"
Lightfoot, i.e., the comparator that she identifies
as a better-paid non-member of her protected classes.
Mengistu, 716 Fed.Appx. at 334. There are key
differences between Lightfoot and Morris that render
Lightfoot an inappropriate comparison. Although Lightfoot
started to work at the EBT Unit about the same time as
Morris, Lightfoot was hired into a different position,
i.e., the Investigator V position as opposed to the
Investigator VI position that Morris held. Unlike Morris who
had only worked for a predecessor of the THHSC for two brief
periods of time in the 1990s,  Lightfoot transferred to the
EBT Unit from another THHSC agency, i.e., the
Fatality Unit at Child Protective Services, where he not only
performed investigative work but also earned more than Morris
was offered and paid by the THHSC. Moreover, the THHSC has
provided evidence showing that Morris earned the same salary
as McDougald, a person who like Lightfoot was outside of her
two protected classes, but who unlike Lightfoot was hired
into the same position at approximately the same time, and
like Morris had no prior experience with the THHSC. The court
concludes that Morris has failed to carry her burden of
establishing a prima facie case because she has failed to
present evidence capable of establishing that her
circumstances are nearly identical to those of Lightfoot.
See Mengistu, 716 Fed.Appx. at 334 (citing
Taylor, 554 F.3d at 523). See also Herster v.
Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 887
F.3d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 2018). See also Ryburn v.
Potter, 155 Fed.Appx. 102, 109 (5th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (recognizing that relevant differences in mail
processing experience demonstrated that the plaintiff was not
similarly situated to employees who had more experience).
assuming that Lightfoot is an appropriate comparator, Morris
has failed to rebut the THHSC s nondiscriminatory
explanations for their disparity in pay, i.e.,
Lightfoot's prior investigative experience working for
the Fatality Unit at Child Protective Services, another THHSC
agency, where he earned more than the amount that Morris was
offered and paid. Because these are legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for the pay disparity about which
Morris complains, Morris bears the burden of showing that the
THHSC s reasons for paying Lightfoot more than her were
merely pretexts for race and/or gender discrimination. Morris
has failed to carry her burden because she does not dispute
that Lightfoot had prior investigative experience with a
THHSC agency which she did not have, or that Lightfoot was
paid more at his prior position than she was paid by the
THHSC. Morris's evidence that she had more state
experience than McDougald and that she was not paid the full
amount budgeted for her position is not evidence from which a
reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the THHSC's
stated reasons for paying Lightfoot more than her were false,
unworthy of credence, or motivated by animus for her race
and/or her gender.
THHSC is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Morris's Title
VII Retaliation Claim.
THHSC argues that Morris cannot prove that it retaliated
against her for complaining about discrimination by
terminating her employment because Morris cannot establish a
prima facie case and cannot cite facts capable of
establishing that its legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
for terminating her employment were pretexts for
retaliation. Morris ...