IN THE INTEREST OF K.G. AND A.K., CHILDREN
On
Appeal from the 220th District Court Comanche County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. FM17917
Panel
consists of: Bailey, C.J., Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.
[1]
MEMORANDUM OPINION
KEITH
STRETCHER, JUSTICE
This is
an appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated
the parental rights of the mother and the fathers of K.G. and
A.K. The mother filed this appeal. In her sole issue on
appeal, she contends that the order of termination is void
because the trial court had lost jurisdiction because it did
not timely commence the trial. See Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 263.401(a) (West 2019). We affirm.
Background
Facts
On
February 14, 2019, the trial court commenced the bench trial
and signed the order of termination in this cause. The trial
court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination
of Appellant's parental rights would be in the best
interest of the children and also that Appellant had
committed five of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1) of
the Texas Family Code. See id. § 161.001(b)(1),
(2) (West Supp. 2018). Because Appellant does not challenge
those findings in this appeal, we need not discuss the
evidence in support of those findings.
Instead,
the pertinent facts relate to the date that the trial court
entered an order regarding temporary conservatorship, the
dismissal date as mandated by the Family Code, and the date
that the bench trial commenced. The record reflects that the
Department of Family and Protective Services filed the
original petition in this cause on September 12, 2017, and
that the trial court entered its emergency order appointing
the Department as the temporary sole managing conservator of
the children on September 13, 2017. In an order dated March
1, 2018, the trial court correctly indicated that the
dismissal date was September 17, 2018. However, on July 30,
2018, prior to the original dismissal date, the trial court
determined that extraordinary circumstances necessitated that
the children remain in the temporary managing conservatorship
of the Department and that it would be in the children's
best interest to do so. In its July 30, 2018 order, the trial
court retained the case on the court's docket and set a
new dismissal date of March 16, 2019, which was 180 days
after the original dismissal date. Trial commenced prior to
March 16, 2019.
Analysis
The
section of the Family Code upon which Appellant relies
provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits or
granted an extension under Subsection (b) or (b-1), on the
first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the
court rendered a temporary order appointing the department as
temporary managing conservator, the court's jurisdiction
over the suit affecting the parent-child relationship filed
by the department that requests termination of the
parent-child relationship or requests that the department be
named conservator of the child is terminated and the suit is
automatically dismissed without a court order. Not later than
the 60th day before the day the suit is automatically
dismissed, the court shall notify all parties to the suit of
the automatic dismissal date.
(b) Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits,
the court may not retain the suit on the court's docket
after the time described by Subsection (a) unless the court
finds that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child
remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the
department and that continuing the appointment of the
department as temporary managing conservator is in the best
interest of the child. If the court makes those findings, the
court may retain the suit on the court's docket for a
period not to exceed 180 days after the time described by
Subsection (a). If the court retains the suit on the
court's docket, the court shall render an order in which
the court:
(1)schedules the new date on which the suit will be
automatically dismissed if the trial on the merits has not
commenced, which date must be not later than the 180th day
after the time described by Subsection (a);
(2)makes further temporary orders for the safety and welfare
of the child as necessary to avoid further delay in ...