United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
FISH SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the court is the defendant Pro Repair Texas, LLC (“Pro
Repair”)'s motion to dismiss the plaintiff's
complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Motion to Dismiss
(docket entry 9). For the reasons stated below, Pro
Repair's motion is granted.
case concerns Pro Repair's alleged failure to properly
pay the plaintiff overtime compensation in line with the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §
207. See generally Complaint (docket entry 1). The
parties in this case consist of the plaintiff Jaylond King
(“King”) and the defendant Pro Repair.
Id. at 1. King is a resident of Dallas, Texas who
works as a repair technician for Pro Repair. Id. Pro
Repair is a Texas limited liability company located in Fort
Worth, Texas that provides computer, tablet, and smartphone
repair services. Id. at 2; Answer (docket entry 10)
stated in King's complaint, King alleges that at all
relevant times he was an employee of Pro Repair engaged in
commerce or the production of goods for commerce as described
in 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207. Complaint ¶ 4.
King also avers that at all relevant times Pro Repair was an
enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of goods for
commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s).
Id. ¶ 6. Further, King contends that at all
relevant times Pro Repair achieved annual gross sales made or
business done of not less than $500, 000.00 in accordance
with 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii). Id. ¶
8. Additionally, King avers that at all relevant times during
his employment, Pro Repair issued paychecks to him, directed
his work, and benefitted from the work he performed.
Id. at 2.
importantly, however, King explains that from approximately
October 2017 through September 2018 King worked for Pro
Repair as a repair technician fixing broken screens on
smartphones, tablets, and computers. Id.; Answer at
3. Both King and Pro Repair agree that King was paid on an
hourly basis and that his time at work was tracked using a
computer time tracking system. Complaint at 3; Answer at 3.
Nevertheless, King and Pro Repair disagree as to the total
amount of time King worked. Complaint at 3; Answer at 3.
Whereas King alleges that he worked more than forty hours a
week and thus should have received overtime compensation, Pro
Repair denies that King ever worked in excess of 40 hours of
week. Complaint at 3; Answer at 3.
believed he was entitled to overtime compensation, since he
“typically worked approximately 50 hours a week,
” see Complaint at 3, on December 12, 2018,
King filed the instant action against Pro Repair for overtime
compensation under the FLSA. See generally
Complaint. Shortly thereafter, on January 28, 2019, Pro
Repair filed the instant motion to dismiss. See
Motion to Dismiss. Also on the same date, Pro Repair filed
its answer to King's complaint. See Answer. On
February 11, 2019, King filed his response to Pro
Repair's motion to dismiss. See Response (docket
entry 12). Pro Repair never filed a reply. Pro Repair's
motion to dismiss is thus now ripe for decision.
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must
plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” In re Katrina Canal
Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)), cert. denied, 552
U.S. 1182 (2008). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the
grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations, quotations
marks, and brackets omitted). “Factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” In
re Katrina Canal, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as
true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Martin K. Eby
Construction Company, Inc. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit,
369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks
Supreme Court has prescribed a “two-pronged
approach” to determine whether a complaint fails to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). The court must
“begin by identifying the pleadings that, because they
are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. The court
should then assume the veracity of any well-pleaded
allegations and “determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. The
plausibility principle does not convert the Rule 8(a)(2)
notice pleading to a “probability requirement, ”
but “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully” will not defeat a motion to dismiss.
Id. at 678. The plaintiff must “plead[ ]
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it
has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is
entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679
(alteration in original) (quoting Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2)). The court, drawing on its judicial
experience and common sense, must undertake the
“context-specific task” of determining whether
the plaintiff's allegations “nudge” his
claims against the defendant “across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” See id. at 679,
order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
plaintiff must allege facts that show coverage under the
FLSA.” Andrews v. Faith Ministries of Texas,
Inc., No. 3:13-CV-1407-BF, 2015 WL 4257555, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Jul. 13, 2015) (Stickney, Magistrate J.) (citing
Lindgren v. Spears, No. H-10-1929, 2010 WL 5437270,
at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2010)). “The FLSA guarantees
overtime pay to employees engaged in the production of goods
for commerce (“individual coverage”) or employed
in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce (“enterprise
coverage”).” Martin v. Bedell, 955 F.2d
1029, 1032 (5th Cir.) (internal quotations omitted),
cert. denied,506 U.S. 915 (1992).
“Either individual or enterprise coverage is
enough to invoke FLSA protection.” Id.
(emphasis in original). “Commerce” under the FLSA
“means trade, commerce, ...