Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

King v. Pro Repair Texas LLC

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

August 9, 2019

JAYLOND KING, Plaintiff,
v.
PRO REPAIR TEXAS LLC, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          A. JOE FISH SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         Before the court is the defendant Pro Repair Texas, LLC (“Pro Repair”)'s motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Motion to Dismiss (docket entry 9). For the reasons stated below, Pro Repair's motion is granted.

         I. BACKGROUND

         This case concerns Pro Repair's alleged failure to properly pay the plaintiff overtime compensation in line with the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207. See generally Complaint (docket entry 1). The parties in this case consist of the plaintiff Jaylond King (“King”) and the defendant Pro Repair. Id. at 1. King is a resident of Dallas, Texas who works as a repair technician for Pro Repair. Id. Pro Repair is a Texas limited liability company located in Fort Worth, Texas that provides computer, tablet, and smartphone repair services. Id. at 2; Answer (docket entry 10) at 2.

         As stated in King's complaint, King alleges that at all relevant times he was an employee of Pro Repair engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce as described in 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207. Complaint ¶ 4. King also avers that at all relevant times Pro Repair was an enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s). Id. ¶ 6. Further, King contends that at all relevant times Pro Repair achieved annual gross sales made or business done of not less than $500, 000.00 in accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii). Id. ¶ 8. Additionally, King avers that at all relevant times during his employment, Pro Repair issued paychecks to him, directed his work, and benefitted from the work he performed. Id. at 2.

         More importantly, however, King explains that from approximately October 2017 through September 2018 King worked for Pro Repair as a repair technician fixing broken screens on smartphones, tablets, and computers. Id.; Answer at 3. Both King and Pro Repair agree that King was paid on an hourly basis and that his time at work was tracked using a computer time tracking system. Complaint at 3; Answer at 3. Nevertheless, King and Pro Repair disagree as to the total amount of time King worked. Complaint at 3; Answer at 3. Whereas King alleges that he worked more than forty hours a week and thus should have received overtime compensation, Pro Repair denies that King ever worked in excess of 40 hours of week. Complaint at 3; Answer at 3.

         As King believed he was entitled to overtime compensation, since he “typically worked approximately 50 hours a week, ” see Complaint at 3, on December 12, 2018, King filed the instant action against Pro Repair for overtime compensation under the FLSA. See generally Complaint. Shortly thereafter, on January 28, 2019, Pro Repair filed the instant motion to dismiss. See Motion to Dismiss. Also on the same date, Pro Repair filed its answer to King's complaint. See Answer. On February 11, 2019, King filed his response to Pro Repair's motion to dismiss. See Response (docket entry 12). Pro Repair never filed a reply. Pro Repair's motion to dismiss is thus now ripe for decision.

         II. ANALYSIS

         A. Legal Standard

         1. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

         “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1182 (2008). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations, quotations marks, and brackets omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” In re Katrina Canal, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Martin K. Eby Construction Company, Inc. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

         The Supreme Court has prescribed a “two-pronged approach” to determine whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). The court must “begin by identifying the pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. The court should then assume the veracity of any well-pleaded allegations and “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. The plausibility principle does not convert the Rule 8(a)(2) notice pleading to a “probability requirement, ” but “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” will not defeat a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678. The plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (quoting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)). The court, drawing on its judicial experience and common sense, must undertake the “context-specific task” of determining whether the plaintiff's allegations “nudge” his claims against the defendant “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” See id. at 679, 683.

         2. FLSA Coverage

         “In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege facts that show coverage under the FLSA.” Andrews v. Faith Ministries of Texas, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-1407-BF, 2015 WL 4257555, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 13, 2015) (Stickney, Magistrate J.) (citing Lindgren v. Spears, No. H-10-1929, 2010 WL 5437270, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2010)). “The FLSA guarantees overtime pay to employees engaged in the production of goods for commerce (“individual coverage”) or employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce (“enterprise coverage”).” Martin v. Bedell, 955 F.2d 1029, 1032 (5th Cir.) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied,506 U.S. 915 (1992). “Either individual or enterprise coverage is enough to invoke FLSA protection.” Id. (emphasis in original). “Commerce” under the FLSA “means trade, commerce, ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.