Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth
Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2018-004416-1
Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
Sudderth Chief Justice.
James Reedom appeals from the agreed judgment (Agreed Final
Judgment) rendered by the trial court in the eviction case
brought against him by Appellee 5950 Boca Raton LP d/b/a
Madison Park (Woodstock). We affirm.
2018, Reedom was a tenant at Woodstock. On June 14, 2018,
Woodstock filed an action in the justice court to evict him.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510. Its complaint alleged that
Reedom failed to pay $268.39 of his June 2018 rent. The jury
found in favor of Reedom, and the justice court rendered
appealed to the county court on July 16, 2018. On August 14,
2018, Reedom signed an "Agreed Final Judgment" in
the county court; he signed it as "Agreed to." In
that judgment, the county court stated that the parties had
arrived at an agreement, and, having heard the agreement, the
county court awarded Woodstock (1) possession of the property
on August 25, 2018 (thus giving Woodstock possession but not
immediately); (2) $2, 010; (3) reasonable attorney's fees
of $1, 000; and (4) the cash bond it had deposited with the
then filed this appeal. In his brief, Reedom raises four
issues, none of which challenge the agreed judgment. Instead,
he complains about the dismissal of a federal lawsuit he
filed. He argues that "[t]his case is about an appellant
who was forced to leave the appelle[e']s complex because
he [was a] whistle blower on several federal HUD law
violations and improprieties. This ultimately led to a
retaliation case against him."
A Party's Consent to Judgment Waives
an allegation and proof of fraud, collusion, or
misrepresentation, a party generally cannot appeal from or
attack a judgment to which he has consented or agreed.
Estate of Nielsen, No. 02-17-00251-CV, 2018 WL
4625531, at *3 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth Sept. 27, 2018, pet.
denied) (mem. op.); Pillitteri v. Brown, 165 S.W.3d
715, 718 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). "A
party's consent to a trial court's entry of judgment
waives any error, except for jurisdictional error, contained
in the judgment, and that party has nothing to present for
appellate review." Pillitteri, 165 S.W.3d at
718. However, "for waiver to occur under this theory,
agreement should be explicit and unmistakable."
Estate of Nielsen, 2018 WL 4625531, at *3; see
also Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1997, no writ).
Reedom Waived His Issues on Appeal.
judgment is titled "Agreed Final Judgment," and
Reedom signed the judgment as "Agreed to," not just
"agreed as to form." This language is not
necessarily sufficient to establish that the judgment is
agreed, however, and appellate courts are not unanimous on
the issue of whether a judgment can be challenged on appeal
when it appears to be agreed but, like the Agreed Final
Judgment, "has no recitation of the agreement in the
body of the order itself." Estate of Nielsen,
2018 WL 4625531, at *4. However, here the Agreed Final
Judgment further recited that "[t]he parties announced
an agreement" and that the court was rendering judgment
after hearing that agreement. Thus, the judgment reflects
that an agreement existed and also that the county court had
evidence of both its existence and its substance. Contra
Bexar Cty. Crim. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Mayo,
773 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ)
(stating that the word "Approved," in the judgment
signed by the appellant, with nothing more, did not indicate
a consent judgment when "[n]othing in the body of the
judgment suggests that the case had been settled or that
judgment was rendered by consent" and that "[t]here
are no other indications of agreement in the record").
in the record indicates that Reedom signed the Agreed Final
Judgment under protest or in any way indicated to the county
court that it did not reflect the parties' agreement.
Contra Baw, 949 S.W.2d at 767 (holding that despite
signing the divorce decree as "approved and consented to
as to both form and substance," the appellant, "by
his objections to the trial court's characterization of
the [profit-sharing-retirement-trust] plan, did not
explicitly and unmistakably give his consent to that portion
of the divorce decree and did not waive his right of
appeal"). He does not argue that the judgment
erroneously states the existence of an agreement when none
existed or that he did not agree to the terms of the
judgment. In fact, he makes no argument at all about whether
the Agreed Final Judgment was an agreed judgment. Nor does he
argue that the county court did not have jurisdiction to
render the Agreed Final Judgment. See Pillitteri,
165 S.W.3d at 718. Instead, he appears to complain about the
dismissal of a federal lawsuit he filed against Woodstock and
whether the dismissal was proper under federal rules of civil