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Papst Licensing GmbH & Co., KG v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Tyler Division

August 30, 2019

PAPST LICENSING GMBH & CO., KG, Plaintiff,
v.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD AND SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC. Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          ROBERT W. SCHROEDER III, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Before the Court are Plaintiff Papst Licensing GmbH & Co., KG (“Papst”) and Defendants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd and Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s (collectively, “Samsung”) motions for post-trial relief. Having considered the parties' written submissions and the arguments at the July 11, 2019 hearing, the Court rules as follows:

• Samsung's Motion to Contact Jurors (Docket No. 319) is DENIED;
• Samsung's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial on Issues Related to Liability (Docket No. 329) is DENIED;
• Samsung's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial on Issues Related to Damages (Docket No. 330) is DENIED;
• Papst's Motion for Entry of Judgment (Docket No. 333) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

         BACKGROUND

         On November 30, 2015, Papst filed suits against Samsung (No. 6:15-cv-1102) and Lenovo (United States) Inc. and Motorola Mobility LLC (collectively, “Motorola”) (No. 6:15-cv-1111) alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 6, 470, 399 (“the '399 patent”), 8, 504, 746 (“the '746 patent”), 8, 966, 144 (“the '144 patent”), 9, 189, 437 (“the '437 patent”) and. 6, 895, 449 (“the '449 patent”). These suits, along with suits filed against Defendants Huawei, LG and ZTE, were consolidated with the lead action against Apple, Inc. (No. 6:15-cv-1095) for pretrial purposes, except venue. See No. 6:15-cv-1095, Docket No. 47.[1] Papst also asserted the ʼ399 and ʼ449 patents against several digital camera manufacturers in a Multi-District Litigation (MDL) currently pending in the District Court for the District of Columbia. In re Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG Patent Litigation, MDL No. 1880, Case No: 1:07-mc-793-RDM (D.D.C. 2018).

         Between June 14, 2016 and December 29, 2017, a number of Defendants in this action and in the MDL filed a combined 37 petitions for inter partes review (“IPR”), including two IPR petitions against the ʼ449 patent. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) issued Final Written Decisions (“FWD”) cancelling all instituted claims, including all asserted claims of the ʼ399, ʼ746, ʼ144, and ʼ437 patents. Conversely, all IPRs against the '449 patent terminated without any of the claims being cancelled. Two IPRs were denied institution and the petitioners of the instituted IPRs settled the dispute without a FWD. Because none of the IPRs concerning the '449 patent reached a FWD, there were no appeals pending on the asserted claims of the '449 patent. Accordingly, Papst agreed to stay the case pending appeals on the ʼ399, ʼ746, ʼ144 and ʼ437 patents, but disputed a stay as to the ʼ449 patent. See Docket No. 1. Papst then stayed or settled its disputes with all defendants in the lead case, No. 6:15-cv-1095, except Samsung and Motorola related to the '449 patent. See id.

         Samsung argued that the ʼ449 patent substantially overlaps with claims found unpatentable by the PTAB and that many of the terms used in the ʼ449 patent are identical to terms at issue in the pending IPR appeals. See No. 6:15-cv-1095, Docket No. 718 at 4. Samsung also argued that the Federal Circuit's analysis of the scope and content of the identical prior art references would inform these proceedings. Id. The Court rejected Samsung's arguments, finding that the terms Samsung specifically identified, “customary” and “communication, ” were either not addressed in the Markman briefing or not at issue in the IPR appeals. See Docket No. 1 at 8. The Court also noted that the specific prior art combination used by the PTAB, the “Kawaguchi/Schmidt combination” was not elected by Samsung and that a stay would therefore not simplify the issues. Id.

         Accordingly, claims 1 and 17 of the '449 patent were severed into a new cause of action, the present case, with a trial date of October 30, 2018. See Id. On October 19, 2018, Papst and Motorola notified the Court that they had settled their dispute, leaving Samsung as the sole remaining defendant for trial on infringement of the '449 patent. See Docket Nos. 219, 226. The Court held a jury trial in this matter from October 30, 2018 to November 6, 2018. After the six-day trial, the jury reached a verdict, finding that the '449 patent was not invalid, that Samsung infringed claims 1 and 17 of the '449 patent and that Samsung's infringement was not willful. See Docket Nos. 294, 298. The jury awarded Papst $5, 924, 374.00. See Docket No. 294.

         Following the verdict, Samsung filed a renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial on Issues Related to Liability (Docket No. 329) and a renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial on Issues Related to Damages (Docket No. 330). Papst filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment seeking costs, interest, supplemental damages, and fees (Docket No. 333). Samsung also filed a Motion to Contact Jurors (Docket No. 319). The Court heard argument on these motions on July 11, 2019. See Docket No. 378. The Court addresses the motions below.

         LEGAL STANDARD

         Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate when “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). “The grant or denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law is a procedural issue not unique to patent law, reviewed under the law of the regional circuit in which the appeal from the district court would usually lie.” Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

         Under Fifth Circuit law, a court is to be “especially deferential” to a jury's verdict and must not reverse the jury's findings unless they are not supported by substantial evidence. Baisden v. I'm Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions.” Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 211 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 2000). The Court will “uphold a jury verdict unless the facts and inferences point so strongly and so overwhelmingly in favor of one party that reasonable men could not arrive at any verdict to the contrary.” Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Int'l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281, 296 (5th Cir. 2005). However, “[t]here must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence in the record to prevent judgment as a matter of law in favor of the movant.” Arismendez v. Nightingale Home Health Care, Inc., 493 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir. 2003)).

         In evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court must “draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict and cannot substitute other inferences that [the court] might regard as more reasonable.” E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., L.L.C., 731 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2013). Although the court must review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Ellis v. Weasler Eng'g Inc., 258 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2001). However, a court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, as those are solely functions of the jury. See Id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000)). The Court gives “credence to evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached if that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.” Arismendez, 493 F.3d at 606.

         Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), a new trial may be granted on any or all issues “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P 59(a)(1)(A). The Federal Circuit reviews the question of a new trial under the law of the regional circuit. Z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The court can grant a new trial “based on its appraisal of the fairness of the trial and the reliability of the jury's verdict.” Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1985). “Courts grant a new trial when it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error has crept into the record or that substantial justice has not been done, and the burden of showing harmful error rests on the party seeking the new trial.” Sibley v. Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Del Rio Distributing, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 589 F.2d 176, 179 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979)). “A new trial may be granted, for example, if the district court finds the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course.” Smith, 773 F.2d at 612-13. The decision to grant or deny a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980). “[N]ew trials should not be granted on evidentiary grounds unless, at a minimum, the verdict is against the great not merely the greater weight of the evidence.” Conway v. Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 610 F.2d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 1980).

         ANALYSIS

         I. Samsung's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial on Issues Related to Liability (Docket No. 329)

         Samsung requests judgment as a matter of law of noninfringement and invalidity, or in the alternative, a new trial. See Docket No. 329.

         A. Judgment as a Matter of Law on Direct Patent Infringement

         Samsung moves for judgment as a matter of law that the Accused Products do not directly infringe claims 1 and 17 of the '449 patent because Papst failed to provide substantial evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Accused Products infringe. See Docket No. 329 at 2. Samsung contends that its accused products: (1) do not send a signal identifying as a customary storage device, (2) do not have the capability to misidentify to a host, and (3) are not arranged for simulating a virtual file system to the host. See Id. at 2-3.

         1. Identifying as a customary storage device

         Claims 1 and 17 of the '449 patent both require sending a signal “to the host device which signals to the host device that it is a storage device customary in a host device.” Based, at least in part, on the Federal Circuit's claim construction in the MDL appeal, the Court construed “customary” to mean “normally part of commercially available computer systems at the time of the invention.” See No. 6:15-cv-1095, Docket No. 275 at 28-29. The parties do not dispute that the time of invention is March 1997. See Docket No. 302 (“10/31/18 A.M. Tr.”) at 15:13-14, 57:15-17; 64:20-65:5.

         Samsung asserts that the accused products “identify themselves to a host device as a USB Mass. Storage Class, ” which did not exist at the time of the invention. Docket No. 329 at 3. Samsung argues that a USB Mass. Storage device, therefore, cannot be a storage device normally part of commercially available computer systems at the time of the invention. See Id. Samsung contends this issue is “undisputed” based on the testimony of Papst's infringement expert, Mr. Zeidman. See Id. at 3-4. Samsung asserts Mr. Zeidman testified that the accused products comply with USB specification, act as a USB Mass. Storage device and connect to host devices in USB Mass. Storage mode. See Id. (citing 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. at 40:3-4, 41:18-21, 42:3-8, 42:14-17, 44:5-6, 44:25, 45:9, 45:23-25, 53:11-13, 64:20-22; Docket No. 303 (“10/31/18 P.M. Tr.”) at 6:8- 12). Samsung also asserts that Mr. Zeidman explained that USB Mass. Storage devices send an identifier, “bInterfaceClass 08h, ” to indicate to the host computer that the device is a USB Mass. Storage device that uses the USB Mass. Storage protocol. See Id. at 4 (citing 10/31/18 P.M. Tr. 6:8-12). Samsung also points to evidence in the record that the identifier, “08h” did not correspond to disk drives in protocols that did exist at the time of invention, such as the SCSI protocol. See id. (citing DTX36 at 133 (Schmidt reference)). Samsung also argues that the “Windows operating system did not have a USB driver, so it did not support any USB devices.” 10/31/18 P.M. Tr. at 9:22-10:4. Accordingly, Samsung argues that no reasonable jury could find that the accused products, identifying as USB Mass. Storage Class devices, satisfy the limitation of signaling “to the host device that it is a storage device customary in a host device.” See id.

         Papst responds that Samsung's argument has already been rejected, both in the MDL and in this case. See Docket No. 339 at 3. Specifically, Papst contends that Samsung raised, and lost, its argument during summary judgment motions. Id. Papst points to the Court's Order, which states:

To the extent Defendants contend that the Accused Products do not meet the “customary” limitations present in claims 1 and 17 of the ʼ449 patent because USB Mass. Storage Devices or Mass. Storage Class devices did not exist at the time of the invention, this argument turns on an underlying factual inquiry of whether these devices fall within the broad category of mass storage devices, or whether these devices are, in themselves, a new class of devices that did not exist at the time of the invention.

Id. (quoting Docket No. 201 at 5-6). Papst argues that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the jury's underlying factual finding that the accused devices fall within the claimed category of devices. See Id. at 3-4. Papst points to testimony by Samsung's infringement expert, Dr. Wolfe, where he stated that a “[m]ass storage device is a category of things, and a hard drive is one thing that could be in that category.” Id. (quoting Docket No. 305 (“11/1/18 P.M. Tr.”) at 56:23-24; 125:18-126:3); Docket No. 346 at 1.

         Papst also argues that it proved the accused products satisfy the “customary” limitation. See Docket No. 339 at 4. Papst does not dispute the evidence relied upon by Samsung regarding the accused products and USB protocols. See Id. Instead, Papst argues that the USB identifier, bInterfaceClass 08h, is the claimed signal that “tells the computer that the newly-connected device is a mass storage device.” Id. Papst points to Mr. Zeidman's testimony:

So, it's the signal that's critical here because the signal indicates it's a mass storage device. 08h is a mass storage device defined by the USB specification. And the customary talks about what was available at the time of the invention in 1997. So if you say a mass storage device that was available in 1997 and the signal indicates a mass storage device available in 1997, it indicates it was a hard disk. So it's a signal that's defining, you know, what the computer sees. From the point of view of the computer, it sees a hard disk, whether one is there or not.

10/31/18 A.M. Tr. at 64:20-65:5.24. Papst argues that the jury considered substantial evidence supporting its finding that the accused products identify as a customary storage device.

         As Papst notes, Samsung previously raised similar arguments regarding the issue of “customary” as applied to USB devices. See Docket No. 201 at 5. The Court rejected Samsung's argument at the summary judgment stage because it turned on an underlying factual inquiry. See Id. Further, Samsung's argument presented the Court with good cause to clarify its claim construction that the term “customary” only limits the storage device, not the driver. See Id. at 7. The jury has now considered Samsung's argument and rejected it. Substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that USB Mass. Storage devices fall within the broad category of mass storage devices, as opposed to a new class of devices that were not customary at the time of invention. For example, Dr. Wolfe stated that “[m]ass storage device is a category of things, and a hard drive is one thing that could be in that category.” 11/1/18 P.M. Tr. at 56:23-24; 125:18-126:3. Mr. Zeidman stated that “USB is not a type of mass storage. Mass. storage devices, hard disks were, available and they had different interfaces. USB was one of the interfaces.” 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. at 8:25-9:3.

         Accordingly, Samsung's motion is DENIED on this basis.

         2. Capability to misidentify to a host

         Claims 1 and 17 of the '449 patent both require that the interface device send a signal, “regardless of the type of the data transmit/receive device attached to . . . the interface device, to the host device which signals to the host device that it is a storage device customary in a host device.” The parties agree that this claim language requires that an interface device has the capability to send a signal to a connected host computer identifying the interface device as a customary device, regardless of the type of data transmit/receive device (“DTRD”) attached to the interface device. See Docket No. 329 at 5-6; Docket No. 339 at 5. The parties refer to this limitation as “misidentification” or “misrepresentation.” See id.

         Samsung asserts that there is no dispute that its “devices truthfully comply with the relevant standards and cannot do otherwise.” Docket No. 329 at 5-6. Samsung points to evidence and Dr. Wolfe's opinion for support that the accused devices follow USB protocols, which require the accused devices to identify themselves as phones with “the capabilities of the USB mass storage device with a memory card.” See Id. at 6 (quoting Docket No. 304 (“11/1/18 A.M. Tr.”) (Wolfe) 123:11-22). Samsung dismisses Mr. Zeidman's opinion that the devices misidentify themselves as USB Mass. Storage Class devices when they are actually phones, tablets or cameras. Id. at 6. Samsung analogizes the phones to a Swiss army knife, which is a single object that may truthfully be recognized as different and distinct items. Id. Similarly, Samsung contends that the accused devices are phones and tablets that are also cameras and USB Mass. Storage class devices. Id. Samsung argues that the accused devices are, therefore, not capable of misidentifying themselves as mass storage devices because they are truthfully mass storage devices.

         Papst responds that Samsung improperly focuses on compliance with the USB standard rather than the claim language. Docket No. 339 at 5. Papst asserts that the proper analysis is whether the interface device “signals” to the host device that it is a storage device regardless of the type of DTRD attached to the interface device. Id. Papst contends that the DTRD is the CMOS array or the microphone. Id. (citing 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at 32:11-34:2, 38:11-14, 59:11- 22; 11/1/18 P.M. Tr. (Wolfe) at 50:15-18). By contrast, Papst asserts that the interface device signals to the computer that it is connected to a hard drive regardless of what is actually attached to the interface device. Id. at 6; see 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at 59:22-60:1 (“T]he interface devices of all of the accused devices signal to the computer that it's a hard drive. It's not a hard drive, but it's signaling to the computer it is a hard drive so the computer will know how to talk to it.”). Papst also points to Dr. Wolfe's testimony that the Accused Products use the 08h identifier to identify themselves as mass storage devices. Id.

         In its Reply, Samsung asserts that Papst “incorrectly argues that the claims require an interface device that is capable of misidentifying what the DTRD is, rather than what the interface device is.” Docket No. 343 at 2 (emphasis in original). Samsung argues that Papst's position on infringement is inconsistent with its invalidity position, where Papst argues that the interface device must be misidentified. Papst replies that Samsung misrepresents Papst's position and that it agrees with Samsung's construction, both for infringement and invalidity. Docket No. 346 at 2. Papst contends that the interface device must signal to the host computer that the host computer is communicating with a hard drive, even though a CMOS array/microphone is attached to the interface device. Id.

         Samsung's argument is unpersuasive, largely because it relies on the parties' shorthand description of this limitation as “misidentification” rather than on the claim language itself. The claim limitation recites:

the interface device, when receiving an inquiry from the host device as to the type of a device attached to the multi-purpose interface of the host device, sends a signal, regardless of the type of the data transmit/receive device attached to the second connecting device of the interface device, to the host device which signals to the host device that it is a storage device customary in a host device,

'449 patent at claim 1 (emphasis added). Samsung focuses on “misidentification” and whether the DTRD or interface device must be misidentified; however, the claim language does not explicitly require misidentification. Instead, the limitation recites that the signal to the host device identifies a particular device type without regard to the type of DRTD attached to the interface device. As Mr. Zeidman explained, “what that means is it doesn't matter . . . what's connected to the interface device. In our case it's a CMOS array, which is part of a camera, and a microphone. That regardless of that, it's telling the computer that it's a hard disk, which was available in 1997.” 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at 59:4-8; 59:22-60:1; 60:13-61:7; see also 11/1/18 P.M. Tr. (Wolfe) at 51:8-11.

         Both parties' experts explained to the jury that the Accused Products send an identifier, “bInterfaceClass 08h, ” to indicate to the host computer that the connected device is a USB Mass. Storage device. See, e.g., 10/31/18 P.M. Tr. 6:8-12. On cross-examination, Samsung asked Mr. Zeidmam, if an accused device signals that “it's a mass storage device, if the phone does have a mass storage device, it's not miscommunicating, . . . it's telling the truth because it really does have mass storage. Will you agree with that?” Id. at 24:12-19. Mr. Zeidman responded, “No, because I don't see that it's saying, I have mass storage. It says, I am mass storage.” Id. at 24:20- 21 (emphasis added). Dr. Wolfe also explained that an accused product “identifies itself with a USB message where it's saying, I am a USB mass storage class-capable device.” 11/1/18 P.M. Tr. (Wolfe) at 11:1-2.

         Substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that the accused interface device sends a signal, regardless of the type of the DTRD attached to the interface device, to the host device which signals to the host device that it is a storage device customary in a host device. As explained above, Mr. Zeidman testified that “the interface devices of all of the accused devices signal to the computer that it's a hard drive. It's not a hard drive, but it's signaling to the computer it is a hard drive so the computer will know how to talk to it.” 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at 59:22-60:1; see also Id. at 59:4-8; 59:22-60:1; 60:13-61:7; 11/1/18 P.M. Tr. (Wolfe) at 51:8-11. Although Dr. Wolfe disputes Mr. Zeidman's conclusion, he does not appear to dispute the factual bases for Mr. Zeidman's opinion. For example, Dr. Wolfe acknowledged that the accused products signal they are storage devices, that a CMOS array and microphone are attached to the interface device in the product and that the CMOS array and microphone are not storage devices. 11/1/2018 P.M. Tr. (Wolfe) at 50:15-21, 51:8-11, 53:6-10. The assignment of credibility or weight attributed between the experts is squarely within the province of the jury, and Samsung has not sufficiently shown why the jury's decision should be supplanted. See Ellis v. Weasler Eng'g Inc, 258 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2001).

         Accordingly, Samsung's motion is DENIED on this basis.

         3. Simulating a virtual file system to the host

         Claims 1 and 17 of the '449 patent both recite “wherein the interface device is arranged for simulating a virtual file system to the host.” The Court construed “simulating a virtual file system to the host” to mean “presenting to the host device a file system that emulates the file system of the storage device customary in the host device, even though the emulated file system does not actually exist on the interface device.” See No. 6:15-cv-01095-RWS, Docket No. 275 at 38-39.[2]

         Samsung argues that there was no evidence to support a finding that the accused devices can or do emulate any file system that “does not actually exist on the interface device.” Docket No. 329 at 7. Samsung asserts that Papst identified the file system on a removable S.D. card inserted into the Accused Products as the file system that is not on the interface device. See Id. (citing 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. at 74:6-9). Samsung raises two disputes to Papst's theory. Id. First, Samsung argues that the file system on the S.D. card is not an emulated file system. Id. Second, Samsung argues that an installed S.D. card necessarily exists “on” the interface device. Id.

         On the issue of an emulation, Samsung contends that Papst admits the S.D. cards have “real, ” not emulated, file systems. See Id. (citing 10/31/18 P.M. Tr. at 15:21-25, 16:15-17). Samsung points to Dr. Wolfe and Mr. Jung's testimony that the accused devices have memory capable of storing image data captured by the device. See Id. (citing 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Jung) at 8:8-16; 11/1/18 A.M. Tr. (Wolfe) at 127:5-21). Relying on Dr. Wolfe's testimony, Samsung asserts that the file systems of the onboard memory and the removable S.D. card of the Accused Products are presented separately to the PC. See Id. (citing 11/1/18 P.M. Tr. (Wolfe) at 31:16-32:4). According to Samsung, this evidence supports that none of the file systems are emulated, but rather “real” file systems. See id.

         On the issue of location, Samsung disputes Papst's theory that the removability of the S.D. card from the accused products satisfies the limitation that the emulated file system does not actually exist “on” the device. See Id. Samsung argues that, “[t]he only way that the real file system on the S.D. card can be accessed is when the S.D. card is installed as part of the device.” See id. (citing 10/31/18 P.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at 16:19-23). Samsung maintains that an installed S.D. card in an accused device must necessarily be “on” the interface device according to the claim construction. Id.

         Papst responds that it proved each element in the limitation as construed by the Court. Docket No. 339 at 7. Papst's infringement expert, Mr. Zeidman, split the Court's construction into three sections: (a) presenting to the host device a file system; (b) that emulates the file system of the storage device customary in the host device; and (c) even though the emulated file system does not actually exist on the interface device. See 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at 74-76. Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Zeidman showed the interface device receives the file system of the S.D. card and presents it to the host computer. See Id. at 74:6-9; 96:21-97:15. Plaintiff also asserts that this file system allows the computer to know where the files, directories, file names and which files are in which directories. See Id. at 74:10-13.

         For the second section, “emulation, ” Papst argues it proved that all the Accused Products have removeable S.D. cards and that, when an S.D. card is inserted into the Accused Products, the interface device displays a file system emulating the file system of a hard disk. Docket No. 339 at 7 (citing Id. at 75:11-19). Papst points to Mr. Zeidman's testimony that the file system on the S.D. cards emulates the file system of a hard drive by sending information concerning the physical moving parts of a hard drive despite the S.D. card not using that technology. Id. Mr. Zeidman explained:

A. So, what's happening is that the file system on these cards have information that point to sectors and blocks of data and have information even about how many heads, magnetic read heads.
This has not - this is just electronics. This is solid-state. There's no moving parts. There's no read head. That doesn't exist.
But the file systems that are used are file systems that talk about read heads. This has magnetic read heads. And it also has sectors physically on the disk. Inside it's a spinning magnetic disk. And so even though - so, this gives that information because it was designed to look like one of these hard disks.

10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at 96:22-97:15.

         For the third section, Papst argues that it sufficiently proved to the jury that the interface device does not include a removeable S.D. card. Docket No. 339 at 8. Papst points to numerous statements by Mr. Zeidman asserting that the S.D. card, when installed, is not “on” the interface device. See 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at 74:6-7 (“So, the interface device does not include the S.D. card that you put in, the memory card.”), 74:11-17, 76:1-6 (“the S.D. card is not part of the interface device . . . [the file system] exists on the S.D. card, which is not part of the interface device.”), 76:9-11 (“the interface device of all the accused devices don't include the S.D. card. The user puts in the S.D. card. It's something separate.”). Papst also challenges Dr. Wolfe's analysis, asserting that Dr. Wolfe acknowledged his interpretation was not based on the Court's construction. See Docket No. 339 at 9 (citing 11/1/18 PM (Wolfe) at 55:6-16, 56:1-4).

         Samsung replies that Papst's infringement and invalidity positions for this limitation are inconsistent. Docket No. 343 at 2. Samsung contends that its prior art Coolpix camera identifies as a hard disk drive, despite containing solid-state flash memory, just as Papst alleges the Accused Products do. Id. at 2-3. Papst replies that its positions are consistent because the emulated file system in the Coolpix camera prior art is on the interface device, whereas the emulated file system of a removeable S.D. card is not on the accused interface devices. See Docket No. 346 at 3.

         Substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that the accused interface device presents to the host device a file system that emulates the file system of the storage device customary in the host device, even though the emulated file system does not actually exist on the interface device. Both of Samsung's arguments, that the file system on the S.D. card is not an emulated file system and an installed S.D. card necessarily exists “on” the interface device, are factual questions properly decided by the jury.

         As explained above, Mr. Zeidman testified that the S.D. card file system includes information relevant to hard drives, such as sectors, blocks and magnetic read heads, despite that information not being relevant to a solid-state drive. See 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at 96:21- 97:15. Mr. Zeidman concluded that the presented file system was emulating a hard drive because the presented file system was designed for a hard drive. See Id. Dr. Wolfe described the emulation limitation as “talking about something that - that is pretending to be there but ...


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