United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Tyler Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
W. SCHROEDER III, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court are Plaintiff Papst Licensing GmbH & Co., KG
(âPapstâ) and Defendants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd and
Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s (collectively,
âSamsungâ) motions for post-trial relief. Having considered
the parties' written submissions and the arguments at the
July 11, 2019 hearing, the Court rules as follows:
• Samsung's Motion to Contact Jurors (Docket No.
319) is DENIED;
• Samsung's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Law, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial on Issues
Related to Liability (Docket No. 329) is
• Samsung's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Law, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial on Issues
Related to Damages (Docket No. 330) is
• Papst's Motion for Entry of Judgment (Docket No.
333) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
November 30, 2015, Papst filed suits against Samsung (No.
6:15-cv-1102) and Lenovo (United States) Inc. and Motorola
Mobility LLC (collectively, “Motorola”) (No.
6:15-cv-1111) alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,
470, 399 (“the '399 patent”), 8, 504, 746
(“the '746 patent”), 8, 966, 144 (“the
'144 patent”), 9, 189, 437 (“the '437
patent”) and. 6, 895, 449 (“the '449
patent”). These suits, along with suits filed against
Defendants Huawei, LG and ZTE, were consolidated with the
lead action against Apple, Inc. (No. 6:15-cv-1095) for
pretrial purposes, except venue. See No.
6:15-cv-1095, Docket No. 47. Papst also asserted the ʼ399
and ʼ449 patents against several digital camera
manufacturers in a Multi-District Litigation (MDL) currently
pending in the District Court for the District of Columbia.
In re Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG Patent
Litigation, MDL No. 1880, Case No: 1:07-mc-793-RDM
June 14, 2016 and December 29, 2017, a number of Defendants
in this action and in the MDL filed a combined 37 petitions
for inter partes review (“IPR”),
including two IPR petitions against the ʼ449 patent. The
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) issued
Final Written Decisions (“FWD”) cancelling all
instituted claims, including all asserted claims of the
ʼ399, ʼ746, ʼ144, and ʼ437 patents.
Conversely, all IPRs against the '449 patent terminated
without any of the claims being cancelled. Two IPRs were
denied institution and the petitioners of the instituted IPRs
settled the dispute without a FWD. Because none of the IPRs
concerning the '449 patent reached a FWD, there were no
appeals pending on the asserted claims of the '449
patent. Accordingly, Papst agreed to stay the case pending
appeals on the ʼ399, ʼ746, ʼ144 and ʼ437
patents, but disputed a stay as to the ʼ449 patent.
See Docket No. 1. Papst then stayed or settled its
disputes with all defendants in the lead case, No.
6:15-cv-1095, except Samsung and Motorola related to the
'449 patent. See id.
argued that the ʼ449 patent substantially overlaps with
claims found unpatentable by the PTAB and that many of the
terms used in the ʼ449 patent are identical to terms at
issue in the pending IPR appeals. See No.
6:15-cv-1095, Docket No. 718 at 4. Samsung also argued that
the Federal Circuit's analysis of the scope and content
of the identical prior art references would inform these
proceedings. Id. The Court rejected Samsung's
arguments, finding that the terms Samsung specifically
identified, “customary” and “communication,
” were either not addressed in the Markman
briefing or not at issue in the IPR appeals. See
Docket No. 1 at 8. The Court also noted that the specific
prior art combination used by the PTAB, the
“Kawaguchi/Schmidt combination” was not elected
by Samsung and that a stay would therefore not simplify the
claims 1 and 17 of the '449 patent were severed into a
new cause of action, the present case, with a trial date of
October 30, 2018. See Id. On October 19, 2018, Papst
and Motorola notified the Court that they had settled their
dispute, leaving Samsung as the sole remaining defendant for
trial on infringement of the '449 patent. See
Docket Nos. 219, 226. The Court held a jury trial in this
matter from October 30, 2018 to November 6, 2018. After the
six-day trial, the jury reached a verdict, finding that the
'449 patent was not invalid, that Samsung infringed
claims 1 and 17 of the '449 patent and that Samsung's
infringement was not willful. See Docket Nos. 294,
298. The jury awarded Papst $5, 924, 374.00. See
Docket No. 294.
the verdict, Samsung filed a renewed Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial on
Issues Related to Liability (Docket No. 329) and a renewed
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the
Alternative, for a New Trial on Issues Related to Damages
(Docket No. 330). Papst filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment
seeking costs, interest, supplemental damages, and fees
(Docket No. 333). Samsung also filed a Motion to Contact
Jurors (Docket No. 319). The Court heard argument on these
motions on July 11, 2019. See Docket No. 378. The
Court addresses the motions below.
as a matter of law is only appropriate when “a
reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). “The grant or denial of a motion
for judgment as a matter of law is a procedural issue not
unique to patent law, reviewed under the law of the regional
circuit in which the appeal from the district court would
usually lie.” Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group,
Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Fifth Circuit law, a court is to be “especially
deferential” to a jury's verdict and must not
reverse the jury's findings unless they are not supported
by substantial evidence. Baisden v. I'm Ready Prods.,
Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 2012).
“Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of such
quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the
exercise of impartial judgment might reach different
conclusions.” Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum,
Inc., 211 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 2000). The Court will
“uphold a jury verdict unless the facts and inferences
point so strongly and so overwhelmingly in favor of one party
that reasonable men could not arrive at any verdict to the
contrary.” Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246
F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Int'l Ins.
Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281, 296 (5th Cir. 2005).
However, “[t]here must be more than a mere scintilla of
evidence in the record to prevent judgment as a matter of law
in favor of the movant.” Arismendez v. Nightingale
Home Health Care, Inc., 493 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir.
2007) (citing Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 577
(5th Cir. 2003)).
evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court
must “draw all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the verdict and cannot substitute other
inferences that [the court] might regard as more
reasonable.” E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co.,
L.L.C., 731 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2013). Although the
court must review the record as a whole, it must disregard
all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is
not required to believe. Ellis v. Weasler
Eng'g Inc., 258 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2001).
However, a court may not make credibility determinations or
weigh the evidence, as those are solely functions of the
jury. See Id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000)). The
Court gives “credence to evidence supporting the moving
party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached if that evidence
comes from disinterested witnesses.”
Arismendez, 493 F.3d at 606.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), a new trial may be
granted on any or all issues “for any reason for which
a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law
in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P 59(a)(1)(A). The
Federal Circuit reviews the question of a new trial under the
law of the regional circuit. Z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The court
can grant a new trial “based on its appraisal of the
fairness of the trial and the reliability of the jury's
verdict.” Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co.,
773 F.2d 610, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1985). “Courts grant a
new trial when it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error
has crept into the record or that substantial justice has not
been done, and the burden of showing harmful error rests on
the party seeking the new trial.” Sibley v.
Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Del Rio Distributing, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 589
F.2d 176, 179 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979)). “A new trial may be
granted, for example, if the district court finds the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded
are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was
committed in its course.” Smith, 773 F.2d at
612-13. The decision to grant or deny a new trial is
committed to the sound discretion of the district court.
See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S.
33, 36 (1980). “[N]ew trials should not be granted on
evidentiary grounds unless, at a minimum, the verdict is
against the great not merely the greater weight of the
evidence.” Conway v. Chem. Leaman Tank Lines,
Inc., 610 F.2d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 1980).
Samsung's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in
the Alternative, for a New Trial on Issues
Related to Liability (Docket No. 329)
requests judgment as a matter of law of noninfringement and
invalidity, or in the alternative, a new trial. See
Docket No. 329.
Judgment as a Matter of Law on Direct Patent
moves for judgment as a matter of law that the Accused
Products do not directly infringe claims 1 and 17 of the
'449 patent because Papst failed to provide substantial
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Accused
Products infringe. See Docket No. 329 at 2. Samsung
contends that its accused products: (1) do not send a signal
identifying as a customary storage device, (2) do not have
the capability to misidentify to a host, and (3) are not
arranged for simulating a virtual file system to the host.
See Id. at 2-3.
Identifying as a customary storage device
1 and 17 of the '449 patent both require sending a signal
“to the host device which signals to the host device
that it is a storage device customary in a host
device.” Based, at least in part, on the Federal
Circuit's claim construction in the MDL appeal, the Court
construed “customary” to mean “normally
part of commercially available computer systems at the time
of the invention.” See No. 6:15-cv-1095,
Docket No. 275 at 28-29. The parties do not dispute that the
time of invention is March 1997. See Docket No. 302
(“10/31/18 A.M. Tr.”) at 15:13-14, 57:15-17;
asserts that the accused products “identify themselves
to a host device as a USB Mass. Storage Class, ” which
did not exist at the time of the invention. Docket No. 329 at
3. Samsung argues that a USB Mass. Storage device, therefore,
cannot be a storage device normally part of commercially
available computer systems at the time of the invention.
See Id. Samsung contends this issue is
“undisputed” based on the testimony of
Papst's infringement expert, Mr. Zeidman. See
Id. at 3-4. Samsung asserts Mr. Zeidman testified that
the accused products comply with USB specification, act as a
USB Mass. Storage device and connect to host devices in USB
Mass. Storage mode. See Id. (citing 10/31/18 A.M.
Tr. at 40:3-4, 41:18-21, 42:3-8, 42:14-17, 44:5-6, 44:25,
45:9, 45:23-25, 53:11-13, 64:20-22; Docket No. 303
(“10/31/18 P.M. Tr.”) at 6:8- 12). Samsung also
asserts that Mr. Zeidman explained that USB Mass. Storage
devices send an identifier, “bInterfaceClass 08h,
” to indicate to the host computer that the device is a
USB Mass. Storage device that uses the USB Mass. Storage
protocol. See Id. at 4 (citing 10/31/18 P.M. Tr.
6:8-12). Samsung also points to evidence in the record that
the identifier, “08h” did not correspond to disk
drives in protocols that did exist at the time of invention,
such as the SCSI protocol. See id. (citing
DTX36 at 133 (Schmidt reference)). Samsung also argues that
the “Windows operating system did not have a USB
driver, so it did not support any USB devices.”
10/31/18 P.M. Tr. at 9:22-10:4. Accordingly, Samsung argues
that no reasonable jury could find that the accused products,
identifying as USB Mass. Storage Class devices, satisfy the
limitation of signaling “to the host device that it is
a storage device customary in a host device.” See
responds that Samsung's argument has already been
rejected, both in the MDL and in this case. See
Docket No. 339 at 3. Specifically, Papst contends that
Samsung raised, and lost, its argument during summary
judgment motions. Id. Papst points to the
Court's Order, which states:
To the extent Defendants contend that the Accused Products do
not meet the “customary” limitations present in
claims 1 and 17 of the ʼ449 patent because USB Mass.
Storage Devices or Mass. Storage Class devices did not exist
at the time of the invention, this argument turns on an
underlying factual inquiry of whether these devices fall
within the broad category of mass storage devices, or whether
these devices are, in themselves, a new class of devices that
did not exist at the time of the invention.
Id. (quoting Docket No. 201 at 5-6). Papst argues
that there is substantial evidence in the record to support
the jury's underlying factual finding that the accused
devices fall within the claimed category of devices. See
Id. at 3-4. Papst points to testimony by Samsung's
infringement expert, Dr. Wolfe, where he stated that a
“[m]ass storage device is a category of things, and a
hard drive is one thing that could be in that
category.” Id. (quoting Docket No. 305
(“11/1/18 P.M. Tr.”) at 56:23-24; 125:18-126:3);
Docket No. 346 at 1.
also argues that it proved the accused products satisfy the
“customary” limitation. See Docket No.
339 at 4. Papst does not dispute the evidence relied upon by
Samsung regarding the accused products and USB protocols.
See Id. Instead, Papst argues that the USB
identifier, bInterfaceClass 08h, is the claimed signal that
“tells the computer that the newly-connected device is
a mass storage device.” Id. Papst points to
Mr. Zeidman's testimony:
So, it's the signal that's critical here because the
signal indicates it's a mass storage device. 08h is a
mass storage device defined by the USB specification. And the
customary talks about what was available at the time of the
invention in 1997. So if you say a mass storage device that
was available in 1997 and the signal indicates a mass storage
device available in 1997, it indicates it was a hard disk. So
it's a signal that's defining, you know, what the
computer sees. From the point of view of the computer, it
sees a hard disk, whether one is there or not.
10/31/18 A.M. Tr. at 64:20-65:5.24. Papst argues that the
jury considered substantial evidence supporting its finding
that the accused products identify as a customary storage
Papst notes, Samsung previously raised similar arguments
regarding the issue of “customary” as applied to
USB devices. See Docket No. 201 at 5. The Court
rejected Samsung's argument at the summary judgment stage
because it turned on an underlying factual inquiry. See
Id. Further, Samsung's argument presented the Court
with good cause to clarify its claim construction that the
term “customary” only limits the storage device,
not the driver. See Id. at 7. The jury has now
considered Samsung's argument and rejected it.
Substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that USB
Mass. Storage devices fall within the broad category of mass
storage devices, as opposed to a new class of devices that
were not customary at the time of invention. For example, Dr.
Wolfe stated that “[m]ass storage device is a category
of things, and a hard drive is one thing that could be in
that category.” 11/1/18 P.M. Tr. at 56:23-24;
125:18-126:3. Mr. Zeidman stated that “USB is not a
type of mass storage. Mass. storage devices, hard disks were,
available and they had different interfaces. USB was one of
the interfaces.” 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. at 8:25-9:3.
Samsung's motion is DENIED on this
Capability to misidentify to a host
1 and 17 of the '449 patent both require that the
interface device send a signal, “regardless of the type
of the data transmit/receive device attached to . . . the
interface device, to the host device which signals to the
host device that it is a storage device customary in a host
device.” The parties agree that this claim language
requires that an interface device has the capability to send
a signal to a connected host computer identifying the
interface device as a customary device, regardless of the
type of data transmit/receive device (“DTRD”)
attached to the interface device. See Docket No. 329
at 5-6; Docket No. 339 at 5. The parties refer to this
limitation as “misidentification” or
“misrepresentation.” See id.
asserts that there is no dispute that its “devices
truthfully comply with the relevant standards and cannot do
otherwise.” Docket No. 329 at 5-6. Samsung points to
evidence and Dr. Wolfe's opinion for support that the
accused devices follow USB protocols, which require the
accused devices to identify themselves as phones with
“the capabilities of the USB mass storage device with a
memory card.” See Id. at 6 (quoting Docket No.
304 (“11/1/18 A.M. Tr.”) (Wolfe) 123:11-22).
Samsung dismisses Mr. Zeidman's opinion that the devices
misidentify themselves as USB Mass. Storage Class devices
when they are actually phones, tablets or cameras.
Id. at 6. Samsung analogizes the phones to a Swiss
army knife, which is a single object that may truthfully be
recognized as different and distinct items. Id.
Similarly, Samsung contends that the accused devices are
phones and tablets that are also cameras and USB Mass.
Storage class devices. Id. Samsung argues that the
accused devices are, therefore, not capable of misidentifying
themselves as mass storage devices because they are
truthfully mass storage devices.
responds that Samsung improperly focuses on compliance with
the USB standard rather than the claim language. Docket No.
339 at 5. Papst asserts that the proper analysis is whether
the interface device “signals” to the host device
that it is a storage device regardless of the type of DTRD
attached to the interface device. Id. Papst contends
that the DTRD is the CMOS array or the microphone.
Id. (citing 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at
32:11-34:2, 38:11-14, 59:11- 22; 11/1/18 P.M. Tr. (Wolfe) at
50:15-18). By contrast, Papst asserts that the interface
device signals to the computer that it is connected to a hard
drive regardless of what is actually attached to the
interface device. Id. at 6; see 10/31/18
A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at 59:22-60:1 (“T]he interface
devices of all of the accused devices signal to the computer
that it's a hard drive. It's not a hard drive, but
it's signaling to the computer it is a hard drive so the
computer will know how to talk to it.”). Papst also
points to Dr. Wolfe's testimony that the Accused Products
use the 08h identifier to identify themselves as mass storage
Reply, Samsung asserts that Papst “incorrectly argues
that the claims require an interface device that is capable
of misidentifying what the DTRD is, rather than what
the interface device is.” Docket No. 343 at 2
(emphasis in original). Samsung argues that Papst's
position on infringement is inconsistent with its invalidity
position, where Papst argues that the interface device must
be misidentified. Papst replies that Samsung misrepresents
Papst's position and that it agrees with Samsung's
construction, both for infringement and invalidity. Docket
No. 346 at 2. Papst contends that the interface device must
signal to the host computer that the host computer is
communicating with a hard drive, even though a CMOS
array/microphone is attached to the interface device.
argument is unpersuasive, largely because it relies on the
parties' shorthand description of this limitation as
“misidentification” rather than on the claim
language itself. The claim limitation recites:
the interface device, when receiving an inquiry from the host
device as to the type of a device attached to the
multi-purpose interface of the host device,
sends a signal, regardless of the type of the data
transmit/receive device attached to the second connecting
device of the interface device, to the host device which
signals to the host device that it is a storage device
customary in a host device,
'449 patent at claim 1 (emphasis added). Samsung focuses
on “misidentification” and whether the DTRD or
interface device must be misidentified; however, the claim
language does not explicitly require misidentification.
Instead, the limitation recites that the signal to the host
device identifies a particular device type without regard to
the type of DRTD attached to the interface device. As Mr.
Zeidman explained, “what that means is it doesn't
matter . . . what's connected to the interface device. In
our case it's a CMOS array, which is part of a camera,
and a microphone. That regardless of that, it's telling
the computer that it's a hard disk, which was available
in 1997.” 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at 59:4-8;
59:22-60:1; 60:13-61:7; see also 11/1/18 P.M. Tr.
(Wolfe) at 51:8-11.
parties' experts explained to the jury that the Accused
Products send an identifier, “bInterfaceClass 08h,
” to indicate to the host computer that the connected
device is a USB Mass. Storage device. See, e.g.,
10/31/18 P.M. Tr. 6:8-12. On cross-examination, Samsung asked
Mr. Zeidmam, if an accused device signals that
“it's a mass storage device, if the phone does have
a mass storage device, it's not miscommunicating, . . .
it's telling the truth because it really does have mass
storage. Will you agree with that?” Id. at
24:12-19. Mr. Zeidman responded, “No, because I
don't see that it's saying, I have mass
storage. It says, I am mass storage.”
Id. at 24:20- 21 (emphasis added). Dr. Wolfe also
explained that an accused product “identifies itself
with a USB message where it's saying, I am a USB mass
storage class-capable device.” 11/1/18 P.M. Tr. (Wolfe)
evidence supports the jury's finding that the accused
interface device sends a signal, regardless of the type of
the DTRD attached to the interface device, to the host device
which signals to the host device that it is a storage device
customary in a host device. As explained above, Mr. Zeidman
testified that “the interface devices of all of the
accused devices signal to the computer that it's a hard
drive. It's not a hard drive, but it's signaling to
the computer it is a hard drive so the computer will know how
to talk to it.” 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at
59:22-60:1; see also Id. at 59:4-8; 59:22-60:1;
60:13-61:7; 11/1/18 P.M. Tr. (Wolfe) at 51:8-11. Although Dr.
Wolfe disputes Mr. Zeidman's conclusion, he does not
appear to dispute the factual bases for Mr. Zeidman's
opinion. For example, Dr. Wolfe acknowledged that the accused
products signal they are storage devices, that a CMOS array
and microphone are attached to the interface device in the
product and that the CMOS array and microphone are not
storage devices. 11/1/2018 P.M. Tr. (Wolfe) at 50:15-21,
51:8-11, 53:6-10. The assignment of credibility or weight
attributed between the experts is squarely within the
province of the jury, and Samsung has not sufficiently shown
why the jury's decision should be supplanted. See
Ellis v. Weasler Eng'g Inc, 258 F.3d 326, 337 (5th
Samsung's motion is DENIED on this
Simulating a virtual file system to the host
1 and 17 of the '449 patent both recite “wherein
the interface device is arranged for simulating a virtual
file system to the host.” The Court construed
“simulating a virtual file system to the host” to
mean “presenting to the host device a file system that
emulates the file system of the storage device customary in
the host device, even though the emulated file system does
not actually exist on the interface device.”
See No. 6:15-cv-01095-RWS, Docket No. 275 at
argues that there was no evidence to support a finding that
the accused devices can or do emulate any file system that
“does not actually exist on the interface
device.” Docket No. 329 at 7. Samsung asserts that
Papst identified the file system on a removable S.D. card
inserted into the Accused Products as the file system that is
not on the interface device. See Id. (citing
10/31/18 A.M. Tr. at 74:6-9). Samsung raises two disputes to
Papst's theory. Id. First, Samsung argues that
the file system on the S.D. card is not an emulated file
system. Id. Second, Samsung argues that an installed
S.D. card necessarily exists “on” the interface
issue of an emulation, Samsung contends that Papst admits the
S.D. cards have “real, ” not emulated, file
systems. See Id. (citing 10/31/18 P.M. Tr. at
15:21-25, 16:15-17). Samsung points to Dr. Wolfe and Mr.
Jung's testimony that the accused devices have memory
capable of storing image data captured by the device. See
Id. (citing 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Jung) at 8:8-16; 11/1/18
A.M. Tr. (Wolfe) at 127:5-21). Relying on Dr. Wolfe's
testimony, Samsung asserts that the file systems of the
onboard memory and the removable S.D. card of the Accused
Products are presented separately to the PC. See Id.
(citing 11/1/18 P.M. Tr. (Wolfe) at 31:16-32:4). According to
Samsung, this evidence supports that none of the file systems
are emulated, but rather “real” file systems.
issue of location, Samsung disputes Papst's theory that
the removability of the S.D. card from the accused products
satisfies the limitation that the emulated file system does
not actually exist “on” the device. See
Id. Samsung argues that, “[t]he only way that the
real file system on the S.D. card can be accessed is when the
S.D. card is installed as part of the device.”
See id. (citing 10/31/18 P.M. Tr. (Zeidman)
at 16:19-23). Samsung maintains that an installed S.D. card
in an accused device must necessarily be “on” the
interface device according to the claim construction.
responds that it proved each element in the limitation as
construed by the Court. Docket No. 339 at 7. Papst's
infringement expert, Mr. Zeidman, split the Court's
construction into three sections: (a) presenting to the host
device a file system; (b) that emulates the file system of
the storage device customary in the host device; and (c) even
though the emulated file system does not actually exist on
the interface device. See 10/31/18 A.M. Tr.
(Zeidman) at 74-76. Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Zeidman showed
the interface device receives the file system of the S.D.
card and presents it to the host computer. See Id.
at 74:6-9; 96:21-97:15. Plaintiff also asserts that this file
system allows the computer to know where the files,
directories, file names and which files are in which
directories. See Id. at 74:10-13.
second section, “emulation, ” Papst argues it
proved that all the Accused Products have removeable S.D.
cards and that, when an S.D. card is inserted into the
Accused Products, the interface device displays a file system
emulating the file system of a hard disk. Docket No. 339 at 7
(citing Id. at 75:11-19). Papst points to Mr.
Zeidman's testimony that the file system on the S.D.
cards emulates the file system of a hard drive by sending
information concerning the physical moving parts of a hard
drive despite the S.D. card not using that technology.
Id. Mr. Zeidman explained:
A. So, what's happening is that the file system on these
cards have information that point to sectors and blocks of
data and have information even about how many heads, magnetic
This has not - this is just electronics. This is solid-state.
There's no moving parts. There's no read head. That
But the file systems that are used are file systems that talk
about read heads. This has magnetic read heads. And it also
has sectors physically on the disk. Inside it's a
spinning magnetic disk. And so even though - so, this gives
that information because it was designed to look like one of
these hard disks.
10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at 96:22-97:15.
third section, Papst argues that it sufficiently proved to
the jury that the interface device does not include a
removeable S.D. card. Docket No. 339 at 8. Papst points to
numerous statements by Mr. Zeidman asserting that the S.D.
card, when installed, is not “on” the interface
device. See 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at 74:6-7
(“So, the interface device does not include the S.D.
card that you put in, the memory card.”), 74:11-17,
76:1-6 (“the S.D. card is not part of the interface
device . . . [the file system] exists on the S.D. card, which
is not part of the interface device.”), 76:9-11
(“the interface device of all the accused devices
don't include the S.D. card. The user puts in the S.D.
card. It's something separate.”). Papst also
challenges Dr. Wolfe's analysis, asserting that Dr. Wolfe
acknowledged his interpretation was not based on the
Court's construction. See Docket No. 339 at 9
(citing 11/1/18 PM (Wolfe) at 55:6-16, 56:1-4).
replies that Papst's infringement and invalidity
positions for this limitation are inconsistent. Docket No.
343 at 2. Samsung contends that its prior art Coolpix camera
identifies as a hard disk drive, despite containing
solid-state flash memory, just as Papst alleges the Accused
Products do. Id. at 2-3. Papst replies that its
positions are consistent because the emulated file system in
the Coolpix camera prior art is on the interface device,
whereas the emulated file system of a removeable S.D. card is
not on the accused interface devices. See Docket No.
346 at 3.
evidence supports the jury's finding that the accused
interface device presents to the host device a file system
that emulates the file system of the storage device customary
in the host device, even though the emulated file system does
not actually exist on the interface device. Both of
Samsung's arguments, that the file system on the S.D.
card is not an emulated file system and an installed S.D.
card necessarily exists “on” the interface
device, are factual questions properly decided by the jury.
explained above, Mr. Zeidman testified that the S.D. card
file system includes information relevant to hard drives,
such as sectors, blocks and magnetic read heads, despite that
information not being relevant to a solid-state drive.
See 10/31/18 A.M. Tr. (Zeidman) at 96:21- 97:15. Mr.
Zeidman concluded that the presented file system was
emulating a hard drive because the presented file system was
designed for a hard drive. See Id. Dr. Wolfe
described the emulation limitation as “talking about
something that - that is pretending to be there but