Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth
Appeal from the 352nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 352-301866-18
Drue Allen Hollis attempts to appeal from the trial
court's interlocutory order granting summary judgment in
favor of Appellees Probate Court No. 1 of Tarrant County,
Probate Court No. 2 of Tarrant County, Tarrant County Sheriff
Bill E. Waybourn, and Tarrant County Hospital District d/b/a
JPS Health Network (collectively, Tarrant
County). The trial court signed the interlocutory
order on May 31, 2019, making Hollis's notice of appeal
due June 20, 2019. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b)
(stating that a notice of appeal in an accelerated appeal
must be filed within 20 days after the judgment or order
signed), 28.1(a) (stating that appeals from interlocutory
orders are accelerated appeals). Hollis filed his notice of
appeal on June 21, 2019, one day late.
18, 2019, we notified Hollis of our concern that we lacked
jurisdiction over this appeal because his notice of appeal
was untimely. We warned Hollis that we would dismiss the
appeal for want of jurisdiction unless he or any party
desiring to continue the appeal filed a response by July 29,
2019, showing a reasonable explanation for the late filing of
the notice of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 10.5(b),
26.3(b), 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We have received no response.
time for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, and
absent a timely-filed notice of appeal or motion for
extension of time to file the notice of appeal, we must
dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. 2, 25.1(b),
26.1, 26.3, 28.1(b); Jones v. City of Houston, 976
S.W.2d 676, 677 (Tex. 1998); Verburgt v. Dorner, 959
S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). A motion for extension of time
is necessarily implied when an appellant acting in good faith
files a notice of appeal beyond the time allowed by rule
26.1, but within the 15-day period in which the appellant
would be entitled to move to extend the filing deadline under
rule 26.3. See Jones, 976 S.W.2d at 677;
Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 617; see also Tex.
R. App. P. 26.1, 26.3, 28.1(b). But even when an extension
motion is implied, an appellant is still required to provide
a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the notice
of appeal. See Jones, 976 S.W.2d at 677;
Linville v. Leuty Ave. Apartments, No.
02-18-00186-CV, 2018 WL 3763934, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
Aug. 9, 2018, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.); see
also Tex. R. App. P. 10.5(b)(1)(C), (b)(2)(A), 26.3(b).
Hollis's notice of appeal was untimely but was filed
within the 15-day period in which an extension is implied.
Even so, Hollis was still required to provide an explanation
for needing an extension. See Jones, 976 S.W.2d at
677; Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 617; Linville,
2018 WL 3763934, at *1. Because he did not, his notice of
appeal is untimely. See Linville, 2018 WL 3763934,
at *1. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of
jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a),
43.2(f); Jones, 976 S.W.2d at 677;
Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 917; Linville, 2018
WL 3763934, at *1.
The trial-court clerk has informed us
that parties and claims remain pending in the trial court and
that the trial court has not signed a final judgment.
We have jurisdiction to consider
appeals from final judgments or from interlocutory orders
made immediately appealable by statute. See Lehmann v.
Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Here,
Tarrant County's summary-judgment grounds included
governmental, judicial, and official immunity. Thus, had
Hollis's notice of appeal been timely, we would have had
jurisdiction to consider this appeal insofar as the trial
court could have dismissed some of Hollis's claims on
immunity grounds. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (providing for an appeal from
an interlocutory order granting a governmental unit's
plea to the jurisdiction); Tex. Dep't of Criminal
Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 349 (Tex. 2004)
(observing that an interlocutory appeal may be taken under
section 51.014(a)(8) whether a jurisdictional argument is
presented in a plea to the jurisdiction or a summary-judgment
motion because the right of appeal is tied to the substance
of the issue raised and not to any particular procedural
vehicle); Liverman v. Denton Cty., No.
02-17-00240-CV, 2017 WL 6377437, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth Dec. 14, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing portion
of appeal from order granting jurisdictional plea that
complained of trial court's dismissal of claims against
government officials in their individual capacities but
addressing portion of appeal that complained of dismissal of
claims against governmental unit and government officials in
their official capacities).
We dismiss Tarrant County's
"Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction" as