United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division
OPINION AND ORDER
T. PITTMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is a consolidated action for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Petitioner,
Kevin Jerome Jones, a state prisoner confined in the
Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice (TDCJ), against Lorie Davis, director of
that division, Respondent. After considering the pleadings
and relief sought by Petitioner, the Court has concluded that
the petition should be denied.
is confined in TDCJ pursuant to his 2003 conviction in
McLennan County, Texas, No. 2002-573-C, for burglary of a
habitation and 20-year sentence and his 2017 conviction in
Tarrant County, Texas, No. 1469217D, for robbery causing
bodily injury and 5-year sentence. Clerk's R. 171, ECF
No. 13-12. Respondent has provided the affidavit of Charley
Valdez, a Program Supervisor III for the Classification and
Records Department of TDCJ, reflecting that Petitioner was
released on parole from his 20-year McClennan County sentence
on August 11, 2014. Resp't's Answer, Ex. B, 3-5, ECF
No. 53-2 (citations omitted). While on parole, Petitioner was
charged with new offenses in Tarrant County, Texas, No.
1469217D. Id. On September 8, 2017, Petitioner
pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of
robbery causing bodily injury in the Tarrant County case and
was sentenced to 5 years' confinement. Id.
Subsequently, on December 6, 2017, Petitioner's parole
was revoked. Id. As a result of the parole
revocation, Petitioner forfeited 1 year, 11 months, and 9
days of street time. Id.
indicates that, by way of these petitions, he challenges a
judgment of conviction or sentence, a parole revocation
proceeding, and a disciplinary proceeding. Pet. #1,
2-3, ECF No. 1; Pet. #2, 2, ECF No. 1. Although vague and
largely indecipherable, Petitioner's specific claims
appear to involve (1) his 2017 Tarrant County conviction and
5-year sentence; (2) the December 2017 revocation of parole
and resultant forfeiture of his street-time credits; and (3)
a disciplinary proceeding conducted at the Eastham unit and
resultant reduction in his line-class status and confinement
in “medium custody.” Pet. #1, 6-7, ECF No. 1;
Pet. #2, 6-7, ECF No. 3. He seeks restoration of his
line-class status, transfer from “medium custody,
” credit for his forfeited street time, and monetary
damages. Pet. #1, 7, ECF No. 1; Pet. #2, 7, ECF No. 3.
Respondent asserts that the action should be dismissed
because Petitioner's claims are unexhausted and
procedurally barred, waived, or without merit.
Resp't's Answer 1-2, ECF No. 53. Notwithstanding the
failure of a petitioner to exhaust administrative or
state-court remedies, a court may deny a habeas petition on
the merits, and the Court does so here. 28 U.S.C. §
The 2017 Tarrant County Conviction and 5-Year
prevalent theme throughout Petitioner's pleadings is that
his 5-year sentence for the 2017 Tarrant County conviction
for robbery should have been or was somehow dismissed. The
record reflects that in the Tarrant County case, Petitioner
was indicted on one count of robbery causing bodily injury
(count one) and one count of credit card abuse (count two).
4-5, ECF No. 55-4. The indictment also contained
sentence-enhancement allegations as to each count.
Id. Importantly, count one contained a
habitual-offender notice, increasing the punishment range for
the second-degree felony from two to 20 years' to 25 to
99 years' or life confinement. SHR 66, ECF No. 55-4. On
September 8, 2017, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner
pleaded guilty to count one and the state waived count two
and the sentence-enhancement allegations and recommended a
5-year sentence, which was assessed by the trial court.
Id. at 11. The state courts found that Petitioner
was fully admonished regarding the waiver of his rights and
the consequences of his guilty plea; that he signed the
written plea admonishments acknowledging that he had read and
understood those admonishments and was aware of the
consequences of his plea; and that his plea was freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily entered. Id. at 68-69.
Petitioner received the full benefit of his bargain, and
there is no factual basis in the record for his assertion
that his conviction or 5-year sentence have been dismissed.
record indicates that during the pendency of his Tarrant
County case, the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles initiated
parole revocation proceedings against Petitioner based on the
new charges and other alleged violations of his conditions of
parole. Resp't's Answer, Ex. A, 9-11, ECF No. 53-1.
Constitutional due process requires certain minimal
safeguards to protect the limited liberty interest at stake
in the parole-revocation context. These safeguards include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b)
disclosure to the parolee of the evidence against him; (c)
opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached'
hearing body such as a parole board . . .; and (f) a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for revoking parole.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972).
does not contend that one or more of these requirements were
violated. Instead, he appears to complain only of the
forfeiture of his street time following his parole
revocation. Under Texas law, eligibility for street time
served on parole is determined by the statute in effect upon
the revocation of parole. Ex parte Hernandez, 275
S.W.3d 895, 897 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). At the time of
Petitioner's parole revocation, he was not eligible to
receive credit for his street time as a matter of state law
under Texas Government Code § 508.283(b) because of his
2017 second-degree robbery conviction.See Tex.
Gov't Code Ann. §§ 508.149(a)(11), 508.283(b)
(West Supp. 2014 & 2012); Ex parte Hernandez,