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Wingfield v. Davis

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Wichita Falls Division

September 12, 2019

ANTHONY B. WINGFIELD, TDCJ No. 01896078, Petitioner,
v.
LORIE DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.

          FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

          HAL R. RAY, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         Before the Court are the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") (ECF No. 1), filed September 12, 2018 by Petitioner Anthony B. Wingfield pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Petitioner's Response to the Court Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 19), filed January 15, 2019; Respondent's Preliminary Answer with Brief in Support (ECF No. 25), filed April 5, 2019; and Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Preliminary Response (ECF No. 28), filed April 23, 2019. After considering the pleadings and the applicable legal authorities, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that United States District Judge Reed O'Connor DISMISS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with prejudice as time-barred.

         I. BACKGROUND

         Petitioner Anthony B. Wingfield ("Petitioner") is a prisoner confined in the Polunsky Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") in Livingston, Texas. (ECF No. 1). He challenges the validity of his Wilbarger County conviction for assault against a household member, with a prior conviction. Id. On November 13, 2013, he was convicted of that offense and sentenced to forty-five years in prison. (ECF No. 24-24 at 24, 36). He filed a direct appeal on November 20, 2013, and the Seventh Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed his conviction on November 24, 2015. (ECF Nos. 24-2 at 2; 24-15). He filed a Petition for Discretionary Review ("PDR") with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("TCCA") on December 15, 2015, which was denied on February 10, 2016. (ECF Nos. 24-2 at 2; 24-18; 25 at 2). His conviction became final ninety days later, on May 10, 2016. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2019); see also U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1).

         On August 3, 2017, Petitioner filed an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the TCCA, which was dismissed as noncompliant on September 20, 2017. (ECF Nos. 24-22; 24-24 at 4). On October 18, 2017, he filed another Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the TCCA, which was denied on January 10, 2018. (ECF Nos. 24-24; 24-27 at 3, 12-13). Petitioner filed the instant Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus on September 12, 2018. (ECF No. 1).

         II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

         District courts are permitted to consider, sua sponte, the timeliness of a motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006); Riser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 329(5thCir. 1999).

         A. Petitioner is Time-Barred by the AEDPA Limitation Period

         The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") imposes a one-year statute of limitations for an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97 (2011). AEDPA provides in pertinent part:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward ...

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