United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
DANIEL JAMES PATTERSON, TDCJ No. 877576, Petitioner,
LORIE DAVIS, Director Texas Department of Criminal Justice Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
L. HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Daniel James Patterson, a Texas inmate, filed a pro
se application for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. See Dkt. Nos. 2, 3, & 4. This
resulting action has been referred to the undersigned United
States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from
United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay. The undersigned
enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendation that the Court should dismiss the habeas
application with prejudice as time-barred under Rule 4 of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
the applicable habeas petition, Patterson challenges his 1999
Dallas County conviction for capital murder, for which he
received a sentence of life imprisonment. See State v.
Patterson, No. F98-49486-H (291st Dist. Ct., Dallas
Cnty., Tex.); Dkt. No. 2 at 3. This criminal judgment was
affirmed on direct appeal in 2000. See Patterson v.
State, No. 08-99-00238-CR, 2000 WL 1681070 (Tex. App. -
El Paso Nov. 9, 2000, pet. ref'd); Dkt. No. 2 at 4. And
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (the “CCA”)
refused Patterson's petition for discretionary review (or
“PDR”) on April 26, 2001. See Patterson v.
State, No. PD-0354-01 (Tex. Crim. App.).
initial review of the federal habeas application, the Court
recognized that the petition is likely time-barred and issued
a questionnaire [Dkt. No. 6] to provide Patterson fair notice
of the limitations issues and to allow him to present his
positions as to those issues through a verified response to
the questionnaire. The Court docketed his timely response on
September 12, 2019. See Dkt. No. 7.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) establishes a one-year statute of
limitations for federal habeas proceedings brought under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. See Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996). The limitations period runs from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The time during which a properly
filed application for state post-conviction or other
collateral review is pending is excluded from the limitations
period. See Id. § 2244(d)(2).
one-year limitations period is also subject to equitable
tolling - “a discretionary doctrine that turns on the
facts and circumstances of a particular case, ”
Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir.
1999), and only applies in “rare and exceptional
circumstances, ” United States v. Riggs, 314
F.3d 796, 800 n.9 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Davis v.
Johnson,158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998)). “[A]
litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of
limitations only if the litigant establishes two elements:
‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,
and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way