United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FRANCES H. STACY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Before
the Court[2] in this social security appeal is
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (DocumentNo. 13)
and Plaintiff s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
(DocumentNo. 17). After considering the cross motions for
summary judgment, Defendant's response to Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 18), the
administrative record, the written decision of the
Administrative Law Judge dated July 13, 2017, and the
applicable law, the Court ORDERS, for the reasons set forth
below, that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED, and this matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for
further proceedings.
I.
Introduction
Plaintiff
Sheron Rena Wade ("Wade") brings this action
pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act
("Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial
review of an adverse final decision of the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner")
denying her claim for disability insurance benefits. Wade
argues in two point in this appeal that: (1) "The ALJ
failed to properly recognize and evaluate the limiting
effects of Plaintiff s anxiety disorder;" and (2)
"The ALJ failed to recognize and analyze the limiting
[e]ffects of Plaintiff s hand impairments." The
Commissioner, in contrast, argues that there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the ALJ's decision,
that the decision comports with applicable law, and that the
decision should be affirmed.
II.
Procedural History
In
November 2014, Wade applied for disability insurance
benefits, claiming that she was unable to work since May 18,
2014, as a result of a meningioma, Type II diabetes, memory
loss, osteoporosis, gastritis, colon polyps, high blood
pressure, degenerative disc disease in her back, anxiety and
depression. The Social Security Administration denied her
application at the initial and reconsideration stages. After
that, Wade requested a hearing before an ALJ. The Social
Security Administration granted her request and an ALJ,
Marjorie Panter, held a hearing on February 22, 2017, at
which Wade's claims were considered de novo.
(Tr. 64-129). On July 13, 2017, the ALJ issued her decision
finding Wade not disabled. (Tr. 16-32).
Wade
sought review of the ALJ's adverse decision with the
Appeals Council. The Appeals Council will grant a request to
review an ALJ's decision if any of the following
circumstances are present: (1) it appears that the ALJ abused
his discretion; (2) the ALJ made an error of law in reaching
his conclusion; (3) substantial evidence does not support the
ALJ's actions, findings or conclusions; or (4) a broad
policy issue may affect the public interest. 20 C.F.R. §
416.1470. On May 10, 2018, the Appeals Council found no basis
for review (Tr. 1-4), and the ALJ's July 13, 2017,
decision thus became final. Wade seeks, with this proceeding
filed pursuant to § 405g, judicial review of that final,
adverse administrative decision.
The
parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment
(Document Nos. 13 & 17), which have been fully briefed
and are ripe for ruling.
III.
Standard for Review of Agency Decision
The
court's review of a denial of disability benefits is
limited "to determining (1) whether substantial evidence
supports the Commissioner's decision, and (2) whether the
Commissioner's decision comports with relevant legal
standards." Jones v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 692, 693
(5th Cir. 1999). Indeed, Title 42, Section 405(g) limits
judicial review of the Commissioner's decision: "The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive." The Act specifically grants the district
court the power to enter judgment, upon the pleadings and
transcript, "affirming, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or
without remanding the cause for a rehearing" when not
supported by substantial evidence. 42U.S.C.§405(g).
While it is incumbent upon the court to examine the record in
its entirety to decide whether the decision is supportable,
Simmons v. Harris, 602F.2d 1233, 1236 (5th Cir.
1979), the court may not "reweigh the evidence in the
record nor try the issues de novo, nor substitute [its]
judgment for that of the [Commissioner] even if the evidence
preponderates against the [Commissioner's]
decision." Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343
(5th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 692, 693
(5th Cir. 1999); Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391 (5th
Cir. 1985). Conflicts in the evidence are for the
Commissioner to resolve. Anthony v. Sullivan, 954
F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992).
The
United States Supreme Court has defined "substantial
evidence," as used in the Act, to be "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." Richardson v. Per ales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co.
v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). Substantial
evidence is "more than a scintilla and less than a
preponderance." Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d
357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993). The evidence must create more than
"a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be
established, but no 'substantial evidence' will be
found only where there is a 'conspicuous absence of
credible choices' or 'no contrary medical
evidence.'" Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162,
164 (5th Cir. 1983).
IV.
Burden of Proof
An
individual claiming entitlement to disability insurance
benefits under the Act has the burden of proving his
disability. Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 344 (5th
Cir. 1988). The Act defines disability as the "inability
to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The
impairment must be proven through medically accepted clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(3). The impairment must be so severe as to limit the
claimant in the following manner:
he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists
in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a
specific job ...