United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division
C. GUADERRAMA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is United States Magistrate Judge Robert F.
Castaneda's "Report and Recommendation" (ECF
No. 8) ("R&R"). Therein, the magistrate judge
recommends that the instant case should be dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Also, before the Court is
Plaintiff Hadi Abdul Haqq's "Opposition to U.S.
Magistrate Judge['s] Report and Recommendation" (ECF
No. 11) ("Objections to the R&R"). Mr. Haqq is
proceeding pro se and in forma pauper is
("IFP") in this action.
22, 2019, Mr. Haqq tendered a complaint to the district clerk
and filed an application to proceed IFP along with his
financial affidavit. On July 29, this Court, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b), referred this case to Judge Castaneda.
Because the information provided in the affidavit indicated
that Mr. Haqq lacked the funds necessary to prosecute this
action, the magistrate judge granted the application, and his
Complaint (ECF No. 5) was docketed on July 30. See
Order Granting IFP, ECF No. 4. Moreover, the magistrate judge
ordered the Clerk of the Court not to issue service of
process until he conducts juridical screening of the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Id. at
1. On August 9, 2019, the magistrate judge issued the R&R
recommending dismissal of this action. The judge allowed Mr.
Haqq fourteen days to file written objections to his proposed
findings, conclusions, and recommendations. R&R at 6.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P.
72(b)(2). On August 19, 2019, Mr. Haqq filed his Objections
to the R&R.
Standard for Review of the R&R
party files timely written objections to a magistrate
judge's report and recommendation, the district judge
must "make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
"[I]n providing for a 'de novo
determination,' rather than de novo hearing,
Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district
judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to
place on a magistrate's proposed findings and
recommendations." United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667, 676 (1980). After completing its review of the
report, the district judge "may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
other portions-that is, the unobjected-to portions-of the
magistrate judge's report or when a party does not file
written objections, the district judge applies a
"clearly erroneous, abuse of discretion and contrary to
law" standard of review. United States v.
Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989). A finding
"is clearly erroneous if the court 'is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.'" Alphonse v. Arch Bay Holdings,
Z.Z.C, 618 Fed.Appx. 765, 768 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573
Standard for Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
federal IFP statute instructs the district court to dismiss
"at any time" an IFP complaint, if it determines
that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In
making that determination, courts apply the same standard
that it applies on a motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674,
678 (5th Cir. 2009).
12(b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint for "failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Bell Atl Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To meet the
"facial plausibility" standard, the plaintiff must
"plead factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court's task, then, is "to
determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally
cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the
plaintiffs likelihood of success." Doe ex rel. Magee
v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th
Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Standard for Pro Se Complaints and Briefs
are to liberally construe the pleadings and briefs of pro
se litigants, like Mr. Haqq here, and apply less
stringent standards to pro se litigants than to
parties represented by counsel. Andrade v. Gonzales,
459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006); Grant v. Cuellar,
59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, like any
other parties, pro se litigants must properly plead
sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a
plausible claim to relief, and clearly address and brief the
issues. See KRO.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475,
484 (5th Cir. 2014); Grant, 59 F.3d at 524;
Nunez v. US. Postal Serv., 298 Fed.Appx. 316, 319
(5th Cir. 2008).
"the 'special judicial solicitude' with which a
district court should view such pro se complaints
does not transform the court into an advocate" for the
pro se party. Welter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.
for City of Baltimore,901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir.
1990); see also Barker v. Norman,651 F.2d 1107,
1129 n.26 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) ("[A] district
judge ... is neither required nor ...